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Summary 
Since the early 1980s, Western Europe has witnessed the rising success of niche parties and a 
simultaneous decline in the vote share of mainstream parties. While for one group of these 
niche parties, namely the left-libertarian and green parties, this success is commonly 
explained by the rise of a ‘new politics’ or ‘post-materialist’ dimension, the causes for the 
emergence of Extreme Right Parties (ERPs) are still disputed. The continuous electoral 
support for ERPs at the national, regional and local level was unexpected and has induced a 
great deal of scientific attention and effort to explain the different fortunes of these parties at 
the polls. 
Previous research on the factors influencing the electoral success of ERPs has 
emphasized the importance of voter characteristics and party competition for the electoral 
fortunes of ERPs. With regard to the first, ERP voters have been found to share common 
policy preferences and are related to distinct socio-economic groups. With regard to party 
competition, scholars have pointed to the role of the electoral programmatic of ERPs as well 
as their mainstream competitors for the electoral support of ERPs. While existing studies 
come to the overall conclusion that both voter preferences and patterns of party competition 
do influence the electoral fortunes of ERPs, the question of how party competition influences 
the vote decision for an ERP is still a matter of academic dispute.  
The single contributions of this dissertation contribute to the existing literature on the 
impact of party competition on the vote decision for an ERP by (1) focusing on the interplay 
between the political preferences of ERP voters and party competition, (2) applying a two-
dimensional approach to the political opportunity structure of ERPs, and (3) incorporating the 
findings into a formal theory on how party competition influences the decision of individual 
voters, be they ERP voters or supporters of any other party in Western Europe. 
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During the last three decades, Western Europe has witnessed the evolution and rise of a new 
party family: the Extreme Right. Given the overall stability and continuity of Western 
European party systems (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Volkens and Klingemann 2005), this 
would be a noteworthy phenomenon for itself. However, the emergence of Extreme Right 
Parties (ERPs) has raised an exceptional degree of attention among political scientists, the 
media and the established political parties, caused by the distinct ideology, political rhetoric 
and self-perception of these new actors in the electoral arena.  
As the emergence of Green parties in the late 1970s and 1980s has been accompanied 
by an agenda of ecology-related issues (Dolezal 2010; Müller-Rommel 1998), the rise of the 
Extreme Right has gone hand in hand with the rise of authoritative, cultural-related issues. 
Members of the Extreme Right party family call for restrictive anti-immigration policies, are 
hostile towards cultural and religious diversity, demand harder sanctions for criminals and 
generally propagate a pronounced authoritative idea of man and society (Betz and Johnson 
2004; Swyngedouw and Ivaldi 2001; Zaslove 2004). Since the late 1990s, this political 
agenda is accompanied by a distinct anti-Islamic rhetoric, which has become one of the core 
issues of many ERPs in Western Europe. 
The example of the Austrian Freedom Party — maybe the ideal-type of an ERP —
illustrates how the ideology of ERPs causes severe friction between these parties and their 
established political rivals. When Jörg Haider, the Freedom Party’s prominent leader, 
established the formation of a government coalition together with the Austrian Peoples Party 
under Wolfgang Schüssel in 2000 — the first national government participation of an ERP in 
Western Europe — this resulted in harsh protests among Austrian political elites as well as 
among the European community of states. For several months, other national leaders shunned 
diplomatic contact with members of the new Austrian government. Beyond that, the 
remaining fourteen EU member-states openly questioned the democratic character of the 
Schüssel government and called the European Court of Human Rights to monitor whether or 
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not the legal rights of immigrants in Austria are compatible with EU legislation: an 
unparalleled action within the ‘European community of values.’ While the court´s report 
raised doubts about the democratic orientation of some of the Freedom Party’s government 
members, but also declared the general compatibility of Austrian immigrant legislation with 
European law and values, the outrage of the EU and its members shows a deep mistrust and 
disaffirmation of the ERP’s ideology and its political leaders among the established political 
elites.  
This treatment of ERPs as unacceptable political ‘pariahs’ (Downs 2001; Van Spanje 
and Van der Brug 2007), however, is in line with the self-perception of the Extreme Right. 
Members of the ERP party family see themselves as the only available political alternative to 
the established parties, which they defame as corrupt, undemocratic and unresponsive to the 
political demands of their voters (Betz and Johnson 2004). In the eyes of this accentuated 
populist and anti-establishment rhetoric, ERPs understand themselves as ‘the only real 
democrats’, who take care of the political demands of ‘the common man on the streets.’ 
Thus, ERPs do not only differ from the established parties in their political programs; 
their very existence is perceived as a threat to democracy and liberal society (Hossay and 
Zolberg 2002). If these fears about the political impact of ERPs are not exaggerated — a 
question which has received only limited interest in the literature (but see Zaslove 2004) — 
the ‘shadows over Europe’(Schainet al. 2002) are indeed rising, as the electoral success of the 
Extreme Right in many countries of Western and Eastern Europe is undeniable. 
While early members of the ERP family, like the French National Front and the 
Danish Progress Party, have been represented in their respective national parliaments since 
the 1980s, the electoral break-through of most Western European ERPs took place in the 
second half of the 1990s. Often, this break-through came as abrupt as unexpected. This over-
night success is the more noteworthy, as many ERPs were newly-founded parties with only a 
very short electoral history (e.g. the Dutch List Pim Fortuyn) or were established but only 
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limitedly successful liberal or conservative parties, which transformed into very successful 
ERPs. One example for such a transformation is the already-mentioned Austrian Freedom 
Party, which steadily increased its vote share during the 1990s until it became the second 
largest party in the National Chamber in 1999, reaching 26.9 percent of all votes, as many as 
the rivaling mainstream-right Peoples Party. In the Dutch national election of 2002, the List 
Pim Fortuyn could gain 26 of 150 seats in the Dutch national parliament, thereby reaching the 
best result of a newly founded party in Dutch history. These successes are only dwarfed by 
the Swiss Peoples Party, a former conservative party that today many authors also classify as 
an ERP (Kitschelt and McGann 2005). Following this classification — and the actual 
referenda initiated by this party give support for this interpretation — in 2003, an ERP had 
indeed become the strongest party in a Western European parliament. Since 2007, the SVP 
holds 58 seats in the Federal Assembly and its vote share of 29 percent is the highest vote 
ever recorded for a single party in Switzerland. 
However, these examples of very successful electoral ERPs do not stand for a 
European-wide development. Compared with the prominent ERPs discussed so far, many 
members of this party family are far less successful in electoral terms. While the political 
program of the Walloon National Front is very similar to its well-known French sister party, 
the Belgian ERP never exceeds a vote share of about one percent in national elections. The 
United Kingdom Independence Party and the British National Party are, besides the rather 
good results in the elections to the European Parliament, still without any seats in the House 
of Commons. ERPs in Spain, Portugal and Greece can be characterized as splinter parties, 
never gaining more than one or two percent of all votes. In Ireland (O´Malley 2008) and 
Iceland, there is no party that can be regarded as extreme right at all. A closer look at the 
electoral fortunes of ERPs across Western Europe therefore reveals a large amount of 
variation.  
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Table 1: Electoral support for ERPs across Western Europe  
Country ERPs Vote share in 
1980* 
Vote share in 
1990* 
Vote share in 
2000* 
Vote share in 
2010* 
Austria Freedom Party 
(since 1986 classified as ERP) 
Alliance for the Future of 
Austria 
- 16.6% 26.9% 28.2% 
Belgium 
(Flanders) 
Flemish Block 
1.1% 6.6% 10.1% 10.2% 
Belgium 
(Wallonia) 
National Front  
- 1.0% 1.5% 1.3% 
Denmark Progress Party  
Danish People’s Party 
8.9% 6.4% 12.6% 13.9% 
Finland True Finns (former Finnish 
Rural Party) 
9.7% 4.8% 1.0% 19.1% 
France National Front 
Movement for France 
0.2% 9.6% 15.3% 5.5% 
Germany Republicans  
National Democratic Party  
Union of German People 
0.2% 4.0% 3.3% 2.1% 
Greece National Political Union 
National Democratic Union 
National Alignment 
National Party 
Party of the Progressives 
1.7% 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 
Iceland None - - - - 
Ireland None - - - - 
Italy Northern League 
Italian Social Movement (until 
1995) 
National Alliance (until 2009) 
6.8% 14.1% 16.3% 8.3% 
Luxembourg National Movement - 2.3% - - 
Netherlands List Pim Fortuyn (until 2008) 
Freedom Party 
Centre Party 
Centre Democrats 
0.1% 0.9% 17.0% 15.5% 
Norway 
 
Progress Party 
4.5% 13.0% 14.6% 22.9% 
Portugal National Renewal Party 
Christian Democratic Party 
0.6% 0.6% 0.1% 0.1% 
Spain National Alliance 
National Union 
0.7% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
Sweden 
 
New Democracy 
- 6.1% 0.2% 5.7% 
United Kingdom National Front  
British National Party 
UnitedKingdom Independence  
Party 
0.1% 0.03% 1.5% 5.0% 
*If more than one ERP has contested for votes, the column reports the sum of vote shares for all parties regarded 
as ERPs. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the electoral support for ERPs across 17 countries, indicating that the 
variation in ERP support is mainly country-specific. Investigating the single countries, a time-
trend is far less obvious. While some ERPs have been able to enhance their vote share during 
the 1990s, others have disappeared from the political arena as soon as they entered. Again 
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others have experienced decreasing levels of electoral support over the last three decades but 
then have been able to celebrate remarkable comebacks in the most current elections (Sweden 
Democrats and True Finns). 
Variation in ERPs’ electoral support across Western Europe therefore reveals country- 
as well as time-specific variation. From a comparative point of view, this raises the following 
questions: What has caused the rise of ERPs in Western Europe in the last three decades? 
Why are ERPs so successful in some countries of Western Europe, while playing no or only a 
very limited role for electoral competition in others? How can we explain variations in ERPs 
support over time? What country- and time-specific factors do influence the electoral fortunes 
of ERPs?  
From an analytical point of view, the causal explanation(s) for these questions should 
include variables that differ among countries and time-points as well. Because of the relative 
socio-economic and political homogeneity among Western European countries, such variables 
are by no means obvious. All countries analyzed are stable and established democracies with 
comparable degrees of economic wealth. Most countries are also members of the European 
Union, facing comparable political and economic problems. In addition, the sought-after 
explanans should have appeared not earlier than the 1980s, the time when the first ERPs 
started to establish themselves as relevant political actors.  
After introducing recent efforts to define the ERP party family (section 1), different 
explanations for the variation in ERP support among Western European countries are 
discussed. For analytical reasons, these explanations have been divided into two main groups. 
First, and because ERPs are first of all political parties that contest for votes, the variation in 
the political attitudes of voters across Western Europe might explain their different electoral 
success. These arguments are mainly interested in the political demands of ERP voters and 
will therefore be referred to as ‘demand-side’ arguments (section 2). Second, scholars have 
pointed to the importance of the political offers made by parties to voters (Arzheimer and 
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Carter 2006; Van der Brug et al. 2005; Kitschelt 1995) for the electoral fortunes of ERPs. 
These studies focus on the ‘supply-side’ of electoral competition and are discussed in section 
3. The literature review ends with a critical evaluation of recent demand- and supply-side 
oriented approaches to explain the vote decision for ERPs and identifies the most important 
research gaps (section 4). Section 5 gives an overview on the four single papers and relates 
them to the identified research gaps. Finally, the theoretical arguments and findings of the 
single contributions are incorporated into a theory on the impact of party competition on the 
individual vote decision.   
 
1. Defining the Extreme Right 
An analysis of the varying levels of electoral support for ERPs demands a definition of the 
term ‘Extreme Right Party.’ Which parties should we regard as ERPs, and which not? What 
are the common characteristics of ERPs that let us speak of a distinct party family? While 
these questions have been discussed since the first comparative studies on ERPs in the early 
1990s and many definitions on ERPs exist, a definitive answer is hard to find. This is because 
the different definitions provided in the literature do not only rest on different theoretical 
concepts but also refer to different labels of the object of analysis.  
Beside the term ‘Extreme Right’(Arzheimer 2008a; Ignazi 2003a), which is also used 
in this dissertation, other scholars refer to the ‘Radical Right’(Kitschelt 1995; Norris 2005), 
the ‘Populist Radical Right’(Betz 1994; Mudde 2007) or ‘Anti-Immigrant Parties’ (Van der 
Brug et al. 2005). Given the diversity of labels for the same party family, it should be noted 
that the discussion about the adequate term is indeed often ‘a question of labels not of 
substance’ (Giugni and Koopmans 2007: 489). This statement could insofar be agreed upon, 
as the use of different labels does not result in a disagreement over the parties that should be 
regarded as ERPs. Prominent borderline cases, like the Italian Northern League or the Finnish 
True Finns, do not differ from the preferred label.  However, this does not mean that there are 
 
 
8 
 
no differences among the theoretical concepts behind the different labels. In order to give an 
overview of these concepts, I will restrict myself to those that are interested in the ideology of 
ERPs and are concerned with the question of how ERPs are related to other parties and the 
organization of the political system.  
In one of the first comparative studies on the Extreme Right in Western Europe, Ignazi 
(1992, 2003a) set up three criteria in order to identify these parties. A party is considered an 
ERP if: (1) it is located at the very right end of the political spectrum, (2) it has an ideal and 
symbolic legacy with fascism, and (3) it tries to undermine the legitimacy of democracy. Betz 
(1994) pointed out that the political ideology of ‘Radical Right-wing Populist Parties’ 
involves (1) a radical rejection of the established socio-cultural and socio-political system, (2) 
a strong support for individual achievement and drastic restrictions of the role of the state, and 
(3) a resolute refusal of individual and social equality. This ideology comes along with an (4) 
instrumental and populist use of public sentiments of envy, anxiety and resentment with 
regard to minorities and especially immigrants from non-European countries. In his seminal 
study on the Extreme Right in Western Europe, Kitschelt (1995) saw the growing success of 
ERPs as being caused by the end of industrial society. He claims that the transition to a post-
industrial society has created a demand for both market-liberal issues and authoritative values 
from segments of the electorate in all Western European societies. ERPs have reacted to this 
new demand by combining economic-related market-liberal with cultural-related authoritative 
issues, a combination that Kitschelt describes as the ‘winning formula’ of ERPs. Carter (2005) 
set apart ERPs by three criteria. The Extreme Right (1) holds a combination of nationalist-
xenophobic attitudes, (2) represents a conformist-racist cultural profile, and (3) demands a 
rejection of democracy or a reform of existing democratic institutions. Furthermore, and with 
regard to their political rhetoric, ERPs see politics as constituted by a boundary line dividing 
friends and foes — e.g. natives and immigrants — stressing the primacy of cultural 
homogeneity within national boundaries. In order to give a minimum definition of the 
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‘Populist Radical Right’, Mudde (2007) identifies nationalism as the core ideological feature 
of this party family, understood as a political doctrine that ‘strives for the congruence of 
thecultural and political unit, i.e., the nation and the state’ (ebd.: 16). Mudde argues that other 
political concerns of the Radical Right, e.g. xenophobia, welfare chauvinism and law and 
order, are subordinated to the concept of nationalism and questions the anti-system character 
of most ERPs.  
Each of the definitions presented so far comes with its own problems and has been 
criticized for at least one of its criteria (Fennema 1997; Mudde 1996). Given the overall 
agreement among the different definitions when it comes to the question of which parties 
should be regarded as ERPs, this introduction does not want to contribute to this discussion. 
Instead, let us have a closer look at the very meaning of the terms ‘Extreme’ and ‘Right’ as 
they are understood by different authors. To start with, both terms are related to the ERPs’ 
ideology and both are relative terms. That is, a party is extreme right because it is (1) located 
at the ‘right’ end of the political spectrum (relative to parties to the ‘left’ of this spectrum) and 
(2) located ‘extreme’ to the right end of this spectrum (relative to more ‘moderate’ right 
parties). These considerations confront us with the question about the meanings of the term 
‘right’, resp. ‘left’.  
As is widely accepted in the Western European context, the left-right dichotomy 
describes the ideological space in which parties and voters are acting. Left-right can be 
interpreted as a ‘super-issue’ that absorbs all the different meanings of other issues (Flanagan 
and Lee 2003; Inglehart 1984; Knutsen 1998). Acting as an information shortcut, the left-right 
dichotomy allows voters, parties, and political scientists to reduce the theoretically unlimited 
number of possible issues into only one dimension of political conflict (Jessee 2010). 
Reviewing the definitions presented, what about the ERPs’ political program allows us 
to classify these parties as ‘right’? First of all, ERPs are interested in distinct political issues, 
namely: immigration, law and order, traditional values and morality. These issues have in 
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common that they are all related to cultural, value-oriented questions. With regard to these 
issues, ERPs take up positions that are more extreme than the positions of other political 
parties, including moderate right parties: they are strictly against immigration, call for a much 
harsher punishment of criminals and favor very traditional value-orientations. As we have 
seen for the Austrian case, this extremeness of ERPs towards cultural issues might go so far 
that other political actors question the democratic orientation of these parties.   
Since the first comparative studies in the field, some scholars have pointed out that the 
Extreme Right is not only interested in cultural-related issues but also in questions of the 
economy. The most prominent advocate of this view is Kitschelt (1995), who argues that the 
electoral success of ERPs does depend on the combination of cultural- and economic-related 
issues (Betz 1994; Kitschelt 2007; Kitschelt and McGann 2005; de Lange 2007). According 
to Kitschelt, ERPs are indeed extreme with regard to cultural issues, but they are also extreme 
in their demand for market-oriented economic policies, including less state intervention, less 
taxation and reduced welfare expenditures. According to this view, the cultural and economic 
appeal of ERPs allows us to classify these parties as ‘right-wing’.  
Indeed, the market-liberal appeal of some ERPs is beyond question. This is not 
surprising, given that some of the most popular ERPs in Western Europe originated from 
former liberal parties (e.g., the Austrian Freedom Party and the Danish Progress Party). 
However, it has long been discussed whether market-liberal demands are also important for 
the voters of ERPs or if these are solely motivated by the authoritarian, cultural appeal of the 
Extreme Right; this is a question we will turn to in the next section.  
 
2. The voters of ERPs 
The question of which voter characteristics are related to the vote choice for an ERP has 
raised considerable scientific interest since the first comparative studies in the field 
(Arzheimer 2008a, 2008b, 2009; Arzheimer and Carter 2006, 2009; Van der Brug and 
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Fennema 2003, 2007; Van der Brug and Mughan 2007; Van der Brug et al. 2005; Carter 
2005; Kitschelt 1995; Kitschelt and McGann 2005; Lubbers et al. 2002; Norris 2005). In 
order to summarize the most important findings, it is useful to separate these into two groups, 
depending on the main explanatory variables used. These are either the socio-economic status 
or the issue-preferences of ERP voters. While the findings with regard to the former are more 
or less non-ambiguous, the political preferences of ERP voters have been the object of 
scientific controversy.   
To begin with the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of ERP voters, 
these are either rather young or rather old, middle-agers being underrepresented. Furthermore, 
the voters of the Extreme Right are predominately male and less educated. Concerning class 
and occupation status, ERPs are mainly supported by members of the working-class, the 
unemployed and, to a lesser extent, by members of the petty bourgeoisie (artisans, small shop-
owners and independents).  
With regard to their overall low socio-economic status, Betz (1994) speaks of a 
process of proletarization of many ERP electorates during the early 1990s, mainly driven by 
sentiments of political disenchantment and resentmentof these ‘losers of modernization’ (ebd.: 
25). According to this popular, while somehow outdated (see Eatwell 2003), view on the 
motives of ERP supporters, these are often seen as being rather protest-driven, united only in 
their disaffirmation of economic and cultural globalization and the politicians who are made 
responsible for these developments.  
In contrast to earlier studies emphasizing protest motives, most recent studies come to 
the conclusion that ERP voters share some common policy preferences, and vote for ERPs 
because of these parties’ political programs. According to this view, the vote decision for the 
Extreme Right is therefore mainly policy-driven and not, or to a lesser extent, protest-
motivated (Arzheimer 2008b; Van der Brug and Fennema 2003). However, the question of 
 
 
12 
 
which issue preferences are important for the vote decision of ERP voters has raised a great 
deal of academic dispute. Two positions stand out in this debate.  
First, most authors argue that ERP voters are mainly motivated by issues like 
xenophobia, anti-immigrant sentiments, demand for tough law-and-order policies and 
traditional value orientations regarding morality, sexuality or emancipation of women 
(Arzheimer 2008a, 2008b; Arzheimer and Carter 2009; Arzheimer and Falter 2002; Van der 
Brug and Fennema 2003, 2007; Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009; Giugni and Koopmans 
2007). These value orientations are predominately culturally-oriented and can be seen as the 
counter-issues of liberal ‘post-materialist’ issues (Flanagan and Lee 2003; Ignazi 1992; 
Inglehart 1990, 1997; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987). Second, some authors have argued that 
ERP voters are not only driven by their authoritarian cultural values but are also motivated by 
the market-liberal economic platforms of many ERPs (Kitschelt 1995, 2007; Kitschelt and 
McGann 2005;de Lange 2007). Kitschelt sees the growing success of ERPs as being caused 
by the end of industrial society. He claims that the transition to a post-industrial society has 
created a demand for both market-liberal issues and authoritative values from segments of the 
electorate in all Western European societies. ERPs have reacted to this new demand by 
combining market-liberal economic policies with authoritative cultural issues and their 
electoral success depends therefore on both issue domains.  
Recently, the controversy seems to have been decided in favour of a view focussing 
solely on the cultural policy demands of ERP voters.  Using data from the European Social 
Survey, Arzheimer (2008b) investigates the impact of cultural and economic preferences as 
well as protest motives on the vote decision for an ERP. He finds that authoritative cultural 
attitudes — and most prominently an anti-immigrant sentiment — have the greatest impact on 
the vote intention for the Extreme Right. Moreover, once these cultural preferences are 
controlled for, neither economic preferences nor the socio-economic status of ERP voters 
seems to have a significant impact on their vote decision. While these findings contradict the 
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theoretical assumption of Kitschelt`s ‘winning formula’ of ERPs, other scholars (Ivarsflaten 
2005; Mudde 2007) come to a similar conclusion: Voters of ERPs are mainly motivated by 
their authoritarian cultural preferences and not by their economic preferences, which vary 
between economic left and right.  
With regard to the initial question of the different electoral fortunes of ERPs among 
Western European countries, these findings point to a presumptuous interpretation: The 
variation in ERP support might be due to variation in the cultural preferences of voters across 
countries. If this is indeed the case, we should find voters in countries with strong ERPs being 
significantly more authoritarian and significantly more hostile towards immigrants than voters 
in countries with limited or no ERP support. However, we observe the very opposite.  
In their report on majority attitudes towards minorities for the European Monitoring 
Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Coenders et al. (2005) point out that there are indeed 
large differences between the 18 European countries analysed. While not less than 50 percent 
of the general public shows resentment against immigrants and cultural diversity ‘many of 
these exclusionist stances turn to be widely supported by people living in the Mediterranean 
countries among which Greece often comes out on top, while ‘people in Nordic countries 
appear to disassociate themselves from these exclusionist stances more often’ (ebd., summary 
V). These findings are also supported by a recent survey of the German Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung (Zick et al. 2011). The authors show that prejudices towards immigrants, anti-
Semitism, racism, anti-Muslim attitudes, sexism and homophobia are closely correlated with 
each other and can therefore be summarized into one index of group-focused enmity. Among 
the six surveyed Western European countries the extent of group-focused enmity is smallest 
in the Netherlands (15 percent of all respondents) and highest in Portugal (41 percent of all 
respondents).  
These two studies contradict a simple conclusion for the relationship between public 
attitudes and ERPs’ electoral success (Van der Brug and Fennema 2003). While voters in 
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Southern Europe are the much more culturally authoritarian than their Nordic EU neighbours, 
ERP support in these countries is very limited. In contrast, some of the most culturally liberal 
countries of Western Europe – namely the Netherlands and Denmark – are at the same time 
home of some of the most successful ERPs.  
Let us sum up the main findings of this chapter. First, ERP voters share some common 
political preferences that let them vote for these parties. Second, these preferences are 
authoritarian and cultural-related, while ERP voters are divided among their preferences with 
regard to economic issues. Third, the variation in ERP support among Western European 
countries cannot be explained by the variation of the political preferences of voters alone. 
Because of this, the literature has focused on possible context factors that might influence the 
vote decision for an ERP, thereby providing a favorable opportunity structure for these 
parties.  
 
3. The political opportunity structure of ERPs 
The basic idea of all studies that refer to the ‘political opportunity structure’ of ERPs is rather 
simple: Extreme Right Parties, like all other parties, have to compete with other parties for 
votes. This competition takes place in a specific context, varying across countries and over 
time, which is defined by (1) the electoral strategies adopted by parties,(2) the institutional 
setting, and (3) the socio-economic environment. 
Among these groups of explanatory variables, party competition, i.e. the political 
offers made by ERPs as well as by other parties to voters, are the most promising when it 
comes to explaining the different electoral fortunes of ERPs across Western Europe. This is 
because institutional structures are very stable, and can therefore not explain variation over 
time, while the socio-economic environment among Western European nations is rather 
comparable, and can therefore not explain cross-country variation in ERP support. This 
introduction, as well as the single papers of this dissertation, focus on the role of party 
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strategies in the electoral fortunes of ERPs and treat the institutional setting and socio-
economic environment as control variables, thereby applying a narrow definition of the 
political opportunity structure of ERPs. 
Before proceeding with an overview on the theoretical arguments and empirical 
findings on the impact of party competition on the electoral fortunes of ERPs, it is useful to 
begin with a short description of the political space in Western Europe, in which parties 
compete for votes. According to the dominant view in the literature on party competition, this 
space can be described by two separate dimensions — or axes — each consisting of a set of 
related political issues (Enyedi and Deegan-Krause 2010). On the one hand, political 
competition is formed through economic-related conflicts over the distribution of material 
resources, resulting in a distinct economic dimension of political competition with the two 
extremes ‘state-interventionism’ for traditional left-wing policies and ‘free-market solutions’ 
for traditional right-wing policies. On the other hand, since the 1970s, scholars have identified 
a second dimension that consists of cultural or non-economic related issues. Its new left-wing 
extreme may be labeled ‘liberalism’ and its new right-wing extreme ‘authoritarianism’. We 
have already mentioned that many ERPs combine a market-liberal with a pronounced 
authoritarian policy appeal.  
Three questions on how this political space is related to the electoral fortunes of ERPs 
are discussed in the literature: (1) which of the two dimensions is important for the electoral 
fortunes of ERPs? (2) how is party competition on the dimensions influencing the vote 
decision for an ERP? and (3) how should we measure this?  
With regard to the first question, there are two opposing views. On the one hand, most 
scholars (Akkerman 2005; Arzheimer 2008b; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Van der Brug, 
Fennema, and Tillie 2005; Ignazi 2003b; Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002; Norris 
2005) argue that ERPs mainly contest for votes on the cultural dimension, as it is primarily 
along this dimension that they compete with their mainstream rivals (Arzheimer and Carter 
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2003). This judgment is often based on the analysis of the political preferences of ERP voters, 
who are mainly interested in and motivated by cultural issues (see previous section). On the 
other hand, some scholars have pointed to the importance of the economic dimension for 
ERPs electoral success (Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1995, 2007; de Lange 2007). Recently, most of 
the literature seems to agree on the view stressing the importance of the cultural-related 
dimension alone.   
The second question ‘How does party competition influence the electoral fortunes of 
ERPs?’ is still a matter of academic dispute. Potential explanations might be divided into two 
groups, each relying on different theories of party competition. First, and mainly motivated by 
the issue-ownership theory of voting behaviour (Petrocik 1996; Petrocik et al. 2003), it is 
argued that parties ‘own’ distinct political issues, i.e., voters see these parties as the most 
competent to solve problems related to these issues. In the case of ERPs, immigration is often 
named as an issue that is owned by these parties. Voters concerned about problems occurring 
from immigration are therefore likely to vote for an ERP (Arzheimer and Carter 2006; 
Meguid 2005). While this is a pure demand-side argument, and therefore related to the 
motivations of voters only, it is often implicitly linked to a supply-side argument, stemming 
from salience theory of party competition (Budge 2001). Salience theory states that parties do 
not compete with each other on all possible issues but put greater emphasis on issues they 
‘own,’ i.e., issues on which they are adjudged to have the greatest problem-solving 
competence. At the same time, they ignore issues occupied by rival parties. Parties’ positions 
thus consist of contrasting emphases placed on different policy areas. The theoretical link 
between this supply-side theory and the arguments made by issue-ownership theory is that 
parties may be forced to put emphasis on issues they do not own, thereby favoring their rivals. 
The reasons for that may lie in external events or in the successful electoral strategies of the 
issue-owners themselves. In case of ERPs, these parties would benefit in electoral terms if 
other parties did also pay attention to, for example, the immigration-issue. Secondly, 
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confrontational theory (Downs 1957) of party competition and electoral behavior sees parties 
taking up a range of explicit positions on each issue, ranging from fully pro to fully con. In 
this spatial view on the political space, voters will cast their vote for the party that is closest to 
their own position; while parties take up the most promising position in terms of electoral 
support. However, other parties will try to follow the same vote-maximizing strategy and 
locate themselves close to their competitors. With regard to ERPs, authors motivated by 
confrontational theory often put a special emphasis on the positions taken up by mainstream 
right parties, because these parties are the direct ‘neighbours’ of ERPs in the political space. 
The distinct hypotheses stemming from confrontational theory are numerous and will not be 
summarized here (see paper 1 for a detailed summary).  
The third question concerns the data and methods used to determine parties’ positions 
(confrontational theory) or issue-salience (salience theory) Several methods exist for 
determining these, the most common being mass survey data, expert data and manifesto data. 
While each data source reveals its own advantages and disadvantages, in this dissertation 
manifesto-based data offered by the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001; 
Klingemann et al. 2006) is used to identify party policy positions as well as issue salience. 
The main theoretical advantage of this approach is that it allows us to easily separate different 
dimensions of party competition, in our case an economic, a cultural and an overall left-right 
dimension. 
Table 2 gives an overview on previous studies on the political opportunity structure of 
ERPs dealing with the impact of party competition on the electoral fortunes of the Extreme 
Right. Please note that none of these studies tests for the impact of the economic dimension of 
party competition. This is either due to theoretical considerations (see above) or simply due to 
a lack of data, as most mass and expert surveys do not allow for the estimate of party 
positions on an economic dimension over a longer period of time. 
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Table 2: Overview of previous studies on the political opportunity structure of ERPs 
Author (Year) Countries Time-
period 
covered  
Parties analysed 
(dependent 
variable) 
Assumed dimension of 
party competition (theory 
of party competition) 
Data source for 
party 
positions/issue 
salience 
Abedi (2002) 16 1982 and 
1993 
Anti-political-
establishment 
parties  
Left-right (confrontational) Expert surveys 
Arzheimer (2009) 18 1980-2002 ERPs Non-economic (salience) CMP 
Arzheimer/Carter 
(2003, 2006) 
7 1984-2001 ERPs Non-economic 
(confrontational) 
CMP 
Carter (2005) 15 1980-2002 ERPs Left-right (confrontational) Expert surveys 
Kitschelt (1995) 15 1990 ERPs Left-right (confrontational) Expert surveys 
Lubbers et al. (2002) 16 1994-1997 ERPs Non-economic 
(confrontational) 
Expert surveys 
Meguid (2005) 17 1970-2000 ERPs  Non-economic 
(salience) 
CMP 
Norris (2005) 14 2000-2004 ERPs Left-right (confrontational) Expert surveys 
Van der Brug et al. 
(2005) 
10 1989, 
1994, 
1999 
ERPs Left-right (confrontational) 
Non-economic (salience) 
Mass survey  
CMP 
Veugelers/Magnan 
(2005) 
10 1982-1995 ERPs Left-right (confrontational) Expert surveys 
 
 
4. Identifying research gaps 
Previous research has emphasized the importance of demand- and supply-side factors for the 
electoral fortunes of ERPs. While these studies differ greatly in terms of applied theories of 
electoral behavior and party competition as well as in their conceptualization of the political 
space in Western Europe, they come to the overall conclusion that both voter preferences and 
patterns of party competition influence the electoral success of ERPs. A closer look at the 
previous efforts on the political opportunity structure of ERPs reveals three main research 
gaps. 
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First, while there are a couple of studies interested in demand-side or supply-side arguments, 
there are only a few studies theoretically addressing the interplay between the two (but see 
Kitschelt 1995), and even fewer that empirically analyze their simultaneous impact on the 
vote decision for an ERP (Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Van der Brug et al. 2005; Lubbers et 
al. 2002). Even these latter studies do not address the interplay — or, technically speaking, 
possible interaction effects — between the political preferences of ERP voters and the 
political offers made by parties.  
Second, while the current literature on party competition implies a two-dimensional 
view on the political space in Western Europe, there is not one study on ERP support 
incorporating measures of party policy positions on more than one dimension. In particular, 
the economic dimension of party competition is not considered — and the theoretical 
arguments for this non-inclusion are rather weak as they stem from demand-side findings 
only.  
Third, research on ERPs and their voters is often not related to dominant theories of 
electoral behavior and therefore risks being isolated from the wider literature of electoral 
studies. This is because existing studies on ERPs often mix distinct, and sometimes 
contradicting, theoretical schools of party competition and electoral behavior. While this 
approach might be adequate to explore a new research object, after more than a decade of 
efforts to explain the vote decision for an ERP, these findings should now be theoretically 
linked to existing theories of electoral behavior.  
This dissertation addresses these research gaps (1) by focusing on the interplay 
between the political preferences of ERP voters and party competition, (2) by applying a two-
dimensional approach to the political opportunity structure of ERPs, and (3) by incorporating 
the findings into a formal theory on how party competition influences the decision of 
individual voters, whether they are ERP voters or supporters of any other party in Western 
Europe.  
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5. Summary of papers 
Paper 1 ‘A Two-Dimensional Approach on the Political Opportunity Structure of Extreme 
Right Parties in Western Europe’(with Simon Franzmann) points to the importance of the 
strategies of established parties for the success — or failure — of ERPs, standing in the 
tradition of studies that focus on the political opportunity structure of the Extreme Right. The 
basic idea of these studies is that Extreme Right parties – like all other parties – have to 
compete with other parties for votes and their success in doing so depends greatly on the 
strategies of their mainstream party competitors.  
While there are some frequently discussed variables of this opportunity structure of 
ERPs (mainstream party convergence, the position of the established right, and party system 
polarization), scholars disagree on the underlying dimension on which these variables should 
be measured. A literature review shows that three different answers to this question have been 
given. Some studies assume an overall left-right dimension on which party competition takes 
place, including all possible political issues. Others argue that ERPs only compete with their 
mainstream competitors on their own core themes, namely: immigration, authoritarian values 
and anti-multiculturalism. Therefore, they consider the position of parties on a non-economic 
dimension to be the most important. The third possible answer is that the economic dimension 
of party competition is crucial for the political opportunity structure of ERPs. As some 
authors argue, it is the market-liberal programmatic position of ERPs which is relevant for 
their voters, at least when considered alongside other, non-economic issues.  
Paper 1 applies a two-dimensional view on the political opportunity structure of ERPs, 
and is thereby the first study simultaneously accounting for the impact of an economic and a 
non-economic dimension of party competition. It inspects the interplay of both dimensions 
and analyses their impact on ERPs’ vote share.  
The empirical analysis focuses on Western Europe and on the time period from 1980 
to 2003. This leads us to a dataset, which includes 116 elections in 18 party systems. The 
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dependent variable is the vote share of all parties considered as being members of the Extreme 
Right; the authors are therefore conducting a macro-analysis. While Table 1 (introduction) 
already indicates that not all of the included 18 party systems host an ERP, the analysis does 
also include those elections in which no ERP had contested (n=23) for methodological 
reasons, as their non-inclusion would cause a serious selection bias. The authors have 
therefore decided to run a Tobit instead of an OLS model.  
With regard to our main independent variables on party competition, data offered by 
the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) has been used to identify party policy positions on 
each of the dimensions. The approach in calculating these on the basis of the salience-based 
CMP data allows to account for time- and country-specific meanings of the terms ‘left’ and 
‘right’, an important theoretical advantage compared to other approaches. Each of the three 
independent variables (mainstream party convergence, position of the established right and 
party system polarization) is then measured on a left-right reference model, an economic and 
a non-economic dimension.  
The results of the empirical analysis indicate that both dimensions of party 
competition are important for the political opportunity structure of ERPs. On the non-
economic dimension, the convergence of the mainstream parties and a high level of party 
system polarization are found to increase ERPs’ vote share. Furthermore, the results signify 
that economic-related variables moderate the effects of the non-economic-related variables 
and are therefore relevant for the political opportunity structure of ERPs, a result that 
contradicts recent findings in the field. 
 
Paper 2 ‘Explaining Working-Class Support for Extreme Right Parties: A Party Competition 
Approach’ incorporates the macro-findings on the political opportunity structure of ERPs —
developed in paper 1 — into a multi-level model also including individual-level variables. 
The paper offers theoretical arguments on how party competition influences the individual 
 
 
22 
 
vote decision for an ERP. As in paper 1, party competition is measured on an economic and a 
non-economic (cultural) dimension. The main theoretical argument developed in paper 2 is 
that voters are able to differentiate between the offers made to them by parties on each of the 
two dimensions and base their vote decision on the dimension which offers the greatest 
possible impact in terms of expected policy outcome. 
The theoretical arguments are tested by focusing on a group of ERP supporters that 
has received considerable scientific interest in the literature: the working-class. These voters, 
who have always been associated with left-wing political parties, today, show — at least in 
some countries — a disproportionally high support for Extreme Right parties, a development 
that previous studies have explained with changing political preferences of this voter group. 
 In contrast to this widespread view, paper 2 argues that it is not the changing political 
preferences of the working-class that lead them to vote for ERPs, but changes in the supply 
side of party competition that have caused the re-orientation of these voters towards the 
Extreme Right. These changes have caused working-class voters to base their vote decisions 
solely on their authoritarian, non-economic preferences and not — as in the past — on their 
still left-wing economic demands.  
The theoretical assumptions on the impact of party competition are tested empirically 
with data from the Eurobarometer Trend File for the period from 1980 to 2002 for thirteen 
Western European countries. The binary dependent variable is the vote decision for an ERP 
(=1) or any other party (=0). As each of the 217.508 voters included is nested in one of 164 
election contexts, a multi-level model has been applied to account for context-related 
influences and variance, i.e., varying patterns of party competition. On the individual level, 
the model accounts for well-established socio-economic characteristics and political attitudes 
of ERP voters, one of these being social class. Compared to other social strata, working-class 
members show a significantly higher support for ERPs. On the macro (party system level), the 
model includes measures of party system polarization and issue-salience, each measured on 
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an economic and a non-economic dimension. In addition, the unemployment rate and the 
number of asylum seekers have been included as control variables. 
The empirical analysis reveals that party system polarization moderates the effect of 
the working-class dummy on the probability to vote for an ERP. In elections in which parties 
are more polarized among economic, rather than among non-economic issues, the positive 
impact of being member of the working-class on the voting decision in favor of an ERP is 
strongly reduced, a finding that supports the macro-findings of paper 1. If a party system is 
more divided on economic issues, working-class voters tend to vote on the basis of their 
economic preferences because, on this dimension of party competition, their votes can be 
expected to make the greatest difference in policy outcome. Under these considerations, 
working-class voters will support a party of the economic left and not an ERP. However, if 
parties are more divided on non-economic issues (including the Extreme Right’s core issues), 
working-class voters will make voting decisions on the basis of their authoritarian non-
material preferences, which increases the probability that they will cast their votes for an 
ERP.  
While there is strong evidence that ERP voters do not support these parties because of 
their economic appeal and that economic issues are of only minor importance for the ideology 
of ERPs, the decline in polarization of the economic dimension of party competition 
nonetheless has influenced the electoral fortunes of ERPs by providing these parties with a 
favorable political opportunity structure to mobilize voters on their non-material core issues. 
 
Paper 3 ‘When Voters Have to Decide: Explaining Vote Choices in a Two-dimensional 
Political Space’ incorporates the findings of papers 1 and 2 into a formal theory on how party 
competition influences the individual vote decision. It is therefore not restricted to the 
analysis of ERP voters but could be used to analyse the vote decision for any party in Western 
Europe. The paper takes on a recent finding with regard to the representation of voters by 
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parties: citizens with a distinct combination of economic and cultural political preferences 
will be unable to find a party that fits both their demands at the same time, a situation that 
perfectly describes the case of working-class members analysed in paper 2. Confronted with 
this situation, these voters will therefore have to decide between a party matching their 
economic preferences or a party closest to them in cultural terms. Paper 3 analyses this vote 
decision and accounts for the impact of party competition on it. It is thereby the first study 
addressing this question empirically, applying formal theories of voting behaviour.   
Four hypotheses are developed. Two of them—the ranking of political issues and the 
intensity of issue preferences—are derived from formal theories of voting behaviour and are 
related to the individual preferences of voters. The remaining two — the salience of and the 
party system polarization between the two issue-domains — account for a possible impact of 
the political offers made by parties.  
Again, data on the positions of parties are estimated by a transformation of the CMP 
data. The measurement of voters` positions on the two dimensions relies on a battery of 
survey items offered by the World Value Study. Altogether, 28.041 voters in 16 countries 
could be analysed. While the focus of the paper is solely on the binary vote decision between 
the economic- and cultural-closest party, a multinomial logistic model is run to include all 
theoretical possible vote choices.   
The findings point to the importance of individual preferences as well as patterns of 
party competition for the individual vote decision. On the individual level, the intensity of 
preferences towards economic and cultural issues does have an impact on the decision 
between the economic and cultural-closest party. Voters located close to the state-
interventionist or market-liberal ends of the economic scale demonstrate a higher probability 
of voting for the economic-closest party, while authoritarian voters tend to favour the party 
closest to them in cultural terms instead. Regarding the electoral context, both the salience of 
issues and the party system polarization are relevant predictors of voting behaviour. If cultural 
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issues are of high salience, voters show a higher probability of voting for the cultural-closest 
party. If party competition is more polarized with regard to economic than cultural issues, 
voters will vote for the economic-closest party. 
The results of this extended analysis, therefore, support the findings made with regard 
to the political opportunity structure of the Extreme Right: Party competition is crucial for the 
voting behaviour of individuals and thereby also for the electoral fortunes of parties. 
Depending on the more salient or more polarized dimension of party competition, the very 
same voter with constant political preferences might vote for very different parties. The 
relevance of these findings becomes clear if we recognize that the positions of parties in 
Western Europe tend to converge with regard to economic issues, but tend to diverge on the 
cultural dimension. At the same time, the salience of cultural issues has increased steadily 
during the last decades, while economic issues are less frequently addressed by political 
parties. In light of the theoretical arguments developed in paper 3, this means that more voters 
will allow their voting decision to be guided exclusively by their cultural preferences, whether 
they are liberal or authoritarian.  
 
Paper 4 ‘Does the Mode of Candidate Selection Affect the Representativeness of Parties?’ 
(with André Kaiser) investigates the relationship between the ideology of parties and their 
voters. The authors argue that intra-party procedures of candidate selection for national 
elections influence the degree of ideological congruence between parties and their respective 
mean-voters. In this way, paper 4 contributes to the ongoing discussion on the impact of 
different institutional settings on party representativeness. Furthermore, the authors 
differentiate between two frequently used but theoretically different concepts of 
representation: cross-sectional representation (at one point in time) and dynamic 
representation (over time).  
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With regard to candidate selection we distinguish between two dimensions: inclusion and 
centralization. While the first identifies the type of selectorate for candidate nominations 
(members, delegates or committees), the second captures the territorial unit in which the 
nomination is decided (local, regional or national). In line with the arguments made by 
previous studies, we hypothesize that hierarchically-centralized party structures allow national 
party leaders to impose their political strategies on subordinated party levels and in this way 
let the party offer clear policy positions to potential supporters, thereby increasing party 
representativeness. However, we also argue that centralization alone is theoretically 
insufficient to explain party representativeness and develop arguments for the role of the 
intra-party candidate selectorate. We hypothesize that parties with candidates nominated by 
delegates are the least representative in terms of voter representation, while both candidates 
nominated by members or party elites should increase party-voter congruence.  
In order to analyze the representation of voters by parties, we have measured each 
group’s policy stances on a left-right dimension of political preferences.  We have gathered 
data for the policy statements of parties from the Comparative Manifesto Project; data on the 
preferences of voters come from several international surveys. Values for the centralization 
and inclusion of selection procedures have been assigned independently by three coders. 
Altogether, we have been able to collect data for 53 parties in nine countries for the period 
from 1970 to 1990.    
The results point to the relevance of the inclusion dimension: Parties in which party 
elites decide over the nomination of candidates show slightly higher degrees of representation 
than parties with more inclusive selectorates. While this effect is rather limited, we theorize 
that an increased office-motivation of party elites compared to lower party strata in the end 
leads to better representation.  
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5. Conclusion 
Each of the four single contributions to this dissertation project addresses a specific research 
question, relies on different data and comes to particular, while overall consistent, 
conclusions. This section provides a broad picture of the theoretical argumentation of the 
overall dissertation project. Each of the single papers contributes to this broader theory, and is 
referred to whenever appropriate. 
Based on previous studies on the political opportunity structure of ERPs, it is argued 
that the political offers made by parties to voters are responsible for the vote decision for an 
ERP (as for any other party). These offers vary across countries and time and can therefore 
explain the different electoral fortunes of ERPs. This theoretical core might be split up into 14 
single arguments: 
(1)  Parties are not simple agents of their voters but can choose their political program 
rather independently of the political demands of their supporters (paper 4). 
(2)  For this, they have mainly two options: They can take up positions ranging from fully 
pro to fully con on each single issue and they can decide to pronounce or ignore single 
issues (paper 2 and 3).  
(3)  Voters are aware of and have full information on the political offers of parties and are 
able to compare these offers with their own political preferences. 
(4)  Voters will vote for the party that best matches their own preferences (paper 3).  
(5)  While the preferences of voters with regard to political issues are rather stable over 
time, the ranking of these issues is far less stable (paper 2). 
(6)  While the number of political issues is theoretically infinite, both parties’ 
programmatic and voters’ preferences can be reduced to two dimensions of political 
conflict. One of these is related to economic issues, the other consists of cultural-
related issues (paper 1, 2 and 3).  
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(7)  Many voters will be unable to find a party that matches their economic and their 
cultural preferences (paper 3). With regard to ERPs, this means that many voters do 
share their authoritarian cultural appeal, but would be better represented by other 
parties in terms of their economic preferences (paper 2).  
(8)  These voters are confronted with the decision as to whether they should cast their vote 
on the basis of their cultural or economic preferences (paper 3).  
(9)  This decision is influenced by the individual preferences of voters as well as by the 
political offers made by parties (paper 2 and 3).  
(10)  With regard to individual preferences, voters with extreme economic issue preferences 
will vote on the basis of these. In contrast, voters with extreme cultural preferences 
will let their vote decision be guided by these (paper 3). 
(11)  With regard to the political offers made by parties to voters, the salience of and the 
party system polarization among economic and cultural issues influence the vote 
choice. If parties stress the importance of cultural-related (economic-related) issues, 
voters regard these issues as more important and will therefore cast their vote on the 
basis of their cultural (economic) preferences. If party competition is highly polarized 
with regard to cultural (economic) issues, voters will have a strong incentive to vote 
for the party closest to them on the cultural (economic) dimension, as voting based on 
cultural (economic) preferences offers more distinct alternatives in outcome (paper 2 
and 3). 
(12)  The salience of economic issues has steadily decreased while the salience of cultural-
related issues has increased until the 1980s. At the same time, parties’ policy positions 
have converged with regard to economic but diverged with regard to cultural issues 
(paper 2).  
(13)  Because of the changing political offers made by parties, today more voters base their 
vote decision on the basis of their cultural preferences than in the past. In contrast, 
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fewer voters will base their vote decision on the basis of their economic preferences 
(paper 2 and 3).  
(14)  Voters with authoritarian cultural preferences will vote for a party that matches these 
preferences, while ignoring their economic demands. In many cases this will be a 
party of the Extreme Right. 
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Abstract 
Previous studies on the electoral fortunes of Extreme Right Parties (ERPs) have pointed to the 
importance of variables of party competition for the success – or failure – of ERPs. These 
studies vary greatly when it comes to describing the political opportunity structure of the 
Extreme Right. Apart from their methodological differences, existing studies differ especially 
with regard to the assumed underlying dimension of party competition. In this article, we test 
the impact of three frequently discussed variables in the political opportunity structure of 
ERPs (mainstream party convergence, position of the established right and party system 
polarization) on the vote share of ERPs in Western Europe. In addition to examining previous 
studies in this field, we focus on the interplay between the economic and the cultural 
dimensions as part of the political opportunity structure. We show that a decrease in 
polarization with regard to economic questions is accompanied by a growing salience of 
ERPs’ core issues, leading in the end to an increase in ERPs’ vote share. 
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Introduction 
Since the early 1980s, we have witnessed the rising success of niche parties and a decline in 
the vote share of mainstream parties across Europe. While for one group of these niche 
parties, namely the left-libertarian and green parties, this success is commonly explained by 
the rise of a “New Politics” or “post-materialist” dimension, the causes for the emergence of 
Extreme Right Parties (ERPs) are disputed. The continuous electoral support for ERPs at the 
national, regional and local level was unexpected and has induced a great deal of scientific 
attention and efforts to explain the different fortunes of these parties at the polls. In the last 
several years, Ignazi’s (1992) hypothesis of a silent counter-revolution against the post-
materialistic left has become increasingly popular. Accordingly, Bale (2003) emphasizes that 
the ERPs can be seen as the “ugly sisters” of the green parties, basing their success on the rise 
of the New Politics dimension by opposing the new left-libertarian politics. Bornschier (2010) 
recently confirmed this insight by showing that New Left and New Right parties have driven 
the emergence of a new value conflict in Western Europe. Nevertheless, the way in which the 
simultaneous existence of the classical economic policy dimension and the “new” libertarian-
authoritarian dimension affects ERPs’ electoral fate remains unexplored. In this article, we 
will explore the interplay between the economic and the cultural dimensions as part of the 
political opportunity structure. We will show that low polarization on economic questions is 
accompanied by a growing salience of ERPs’ core issues and leads in the end to an increase in 
ERPs’ vote share. 
The literature on ERPs provides two lines of argumentation in order to explain the 
variance in ERPs’ electoral success across Western Europe. These are the individual 
characteristics and attitudes of ERP voters on the one hand and, on the other hand, context 
variables, which account for the special circumstances in which the act of voting takes place. 
As previous studies have shown, the individual characteristics that are correlated with the vote 
for an ERP are rather evenly distributed between Western European countries (Van der Brug 
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et al. 2005). Therefore, most studies find evidence that it is the time- and country-specific 
national context which is responsible for the different levels of ERPs’ electoral support. 
Influenced by Herbert Kitschelt’s seminal study (Kitschelt 1995), the political opportunity 
structure of ERPs is seen by many authors as one of the most important context variables that 
accounts for the varying electoral fortunes of the Extreme Right (Abedi 2002; Arzheimer 
2009; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Carter 2002, 2005; Golder 2003, 2004; Meguid 2005; 
Norris 2005).  
While there has been no consensus up to now on the elements of party competition 
which belong to the political opportunity structure of ERPs (Arzheimer 2009), all studies 
analysing this question claim that the programmatic strategies of the established parties are 
crucial for the electoral success of the Extreme Right. Therefore, similarly to the analysis of 
niche parties undertaken by Meguid (2008), we will concentrate on the programmatic 
strategies of the mainstream parties to explain the electoral results of ERPs.  
In order to analyse the impact of party strategies on ERPs’ vote share, we have 
identified three frequently discussed variables from the literature: the convergence of the two 
mainstream parties, the position of the mainstream right party and the polarization of the party 
system. However, we are now faced with the next question: On which dimension of party 
competition should these variables be measured? Previous studies reveal three different 
answers to this question. Some studies assume an overall left-right dimension on which party 
competition takes place. Others argue that ERPs only compete with their mainstream 
competitors on their own core themes – namely: immigration, authoritarian values and anti-
multiculturalism. Therefore, they consider the position of parties on a non-economic 
dimension to be the most important (Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Ignazi 2003b; Lubbers 
2002; Meguid 2005). The third possible answer is that the economic dimension of party 
competition is crucial for the political opportunity structure of ERPs. As some authors argue 
(de Lange 2007; Kitschelt 1995, 2007; Kitschelt and McGann 2005), it is the market-liberal 
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programmatic position of ERPs which is relevant for their voters, at least when considered 
alongside other, non-economic issues.  
This article contributes to the ongoing debate on the political opportunity structure of 
ERPs in two important ways. Theoretically and empirically, it analyses the simultaneous 
effects of two dimensions of party competition, measured on two policy scales: an economic 
and a non-economic one. The convergence of the two mainstream parties, the position of the 
mainstream right party and the polarization of the party system are measured separately for 
each scale. This allows us to test which dimension of party competition is relevant for the 
political opportunity structure of ERPs. Methodologically, it uses data from all Western 
European countries and elections since 1980 to measure the impact of the three variables of 
party competition on the different dimensions.  
The article is structured as follows: The first section discusses the multi-
dimensionality of the political space in Western Europe and summarizes the main arguments 
concerning the relationship between the political opportunity structure of ERPs and their 
electoral success. These arguments are summarized into three hypotheses about the impact of 
the different variables of party competition on the electoral results of ERPs. In the second 
section, we will operationalize and justify our dependent and independent variables as well as 
our statistical model. In section three, the proposed hypotheses will be tested empirically 
using data for Western Europe during the period from 1980 to 2003. We will discuss the 
implications of our findings in the conclusion.  
 
2. The political opportunity structure of ERPs 
The basic idea of all studies that refer to the political opportunity structure of ERPs is rather 
simple: Extreme Right Parties – like all other parties – have to compete with other parties for 
votes. This competition takes place in a specific national context which is defined by (1) the 
institutional setting, (2) the strategies of the competing mainstream parties, and (3) the socio-
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economic environment.
1
 For our analysis, we will focus on the role of party strategies in the 
electoral fortunes of ERPs, thereby applying a narrow definition of the political opportunity 
structure. 
Applying a practice that is widely accepted in the Western European context, we have 
used the left-right dichotomy in order to analyse the ideological space in which parties are 
acting. Left-right can be interpreted as a “super-issue” that absorbs all the different meanings 
of other issues (Inglehart 1984; Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990; Knutsen 1998; Flanagan and 
Lee 2003). This left-right super-issue is built on issues originating from different spheres. Of 
course, the ideological space can be separated into more than one dimension. Sartori (1976), 
although analysing the mechanics of party competition within a one-dimensional heuristic, 
already identified at least four dimensions. Sartori argues that analysing the most salient 
policy dimension is both sufficient and necessary in order to reduce the complexity of 
identifying the central mechanisms at work in party systems. Nevertheless, it was widely 
uncontested that at least a socio-economic and a socio-cultural dimension define the political 
space, as Lipset and Rokkan (1967) detect the importance not only of the industrial revolution 
but also of the national revolution for structuring West European party systems. But for a long 
time these two different spheres have merged into one single dimension even on the 
individual level regarding political ideologies (cf. Knutsen 1998; Knutsen 2009). 
While in the 1970s, the explanatory power of the one-dimensional left-right space was 
widely undisputed, this view has changed (Flanagan and Lee 2003). Kitschelt (1994) has 
shown in several publications how the change in the European party systems can be fruitfully 
analysed by referring to both an economic left-right and an authoritarian-libertarian 
ideological axis. In a similar manner, Marks et al. (2006) detect different patterns of party 
competition in Western and Eastern Europe, referring to a socio-economic left-right 
dimension and a GAL-TAN dimension. The latter represents non-economic green, alternative 
                                                          
1
 Arzheimer and Carter (2006) refer to these variables as long-term, medium-term and short-term contextual 
factors. 
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and libertarian (GAL) issues at one pole and traditional, authoritarian and nationalistic (TAN) 
issues at the other pole. Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008) also identify a two-dimensional policy space 
with a cultural and an economic dimension. Using media data, they found that the cultural 
dimension has transformed its meaning since the 1970s by integrating the issue of 
immigration (Kriesi et al. 2006: 950). Finally, in a recent special issue on the structure of 
political competition in Western Europe, scholars confirm the finding of a two-dimensional 
space (Enyedi and Deegan-Krause 2010: 417). According to this literature, we can assume 
that it is sufficient to model the ideological space of party competition using two such types of 
spheres, namely a socio-economic and a socio-cultural one. As we discuss in section three, the 
socio-cultural dimension in our analysis is not restricted to authoritarian and libertarian issues, 
but open for all non-economic issues reflecting the ideas of both Lipset and Rokkan (1967) 
and Flanagan and Lee (2003).  
We further assume that parties can position themselves more to the left or to the right 
by emphasizing particular issues belonging to one of these two spheres. Sometimes these 
issues will be formulated confrontationally, since one party claims the opposite of that which 
another party is advocating. Sometimes these issues represent core issues of one party that are 
ignored by the others. In taking this approach, we are combining thoughts of both 
confrontational and salience theory (cf. Budge 2001; Franzmann and Kaiser 2006; Franzmann 
2009).
2
 Our primary aim in this article is to show that analysing party competition in a two-
dimensional way deepens our understanding of party strategies compared to a one-
dimensional analysis. Even though the usefulness of analysing the political space in two 
                                                          
2
 Note that our approach differs in important aspects from Meguid’s (2008), although both approaches see the 
strategic decisions of parties as decisive. While Meguid (2008: 22-40) clearly separates left-right positions, 
issue-ownership and saliences from each other as strategic tools, we claim that emphasizing issues always has an 
effect on the positioning of a party. Hence, we do not separate these two strategic tools. Furthermore, Meguid 
(2008: 12-13 and 23) is sceptical about the explanatory power of sociological approaches and assumes that 
parties create new policy dimensions. Although we share her view of the importance of actors’ behaviour in 
analysing party competition as well as in the activation of cleavages by parties, we do not dismiss sociological 
findings to the extent that she does. We assume that the evolution of “new” policy dimensions can be explained 
by value changes in the society (Inglehart 1984; Flanagan/Lee 2003), but for our analysis, this is an exogenous 
fact which parties can use strategically and is therefore part of the political opportunity structure. 
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dimensions is often discussed theoretically, there is a lack of empirical studies conducted in 
this way. Here we present a contribution intended to fill this gap by analysing the opportunity 
structure of ERPs. 
How does the positioning of the established parties in these two dimensions affect the 
ERPs’ vote share? In his seminal study on the Extreme Right in Western Europe, Herbert 
Kitschelt (1995) saw the growing success of ERPs as being caused by the end of industrial 
society. He claims that the transition to a post-industrial society has created a demand for both 
market-liberal issues and authoritative values from segments of the electorate in all Western 
European societies, therefore changing the demand side of party competition. ERPs have 
reacted to this new demand by combining market-liberal issues with authoritative issues, a 
combination which Kitschelt describes as the winning formula of ERPs. However, the success 
of this winning formula does not depend solely on the programmatic appeals adopted by the 
ERPs themselves, but also on the programmatic appeals adopted by their mainstream 
competitors. Kitschelt argues that the more the mainstream parties converge in their 
programmes, the less ideologically distinct from each other they become, and as a result they 
offer ERPs more political space (Kitschelt 2002). This leads us to our first hypothesis:  
 
H1: The more the two mainstream parties converge, the greater the ERPs’ vote share. 
 
As we have already mentioned, Kitschelt’s theoretical framework distinguishes 
between two dimensions of party competition, so the question emerges as to on which 
dimension of party competition this programmatic convergence should be measured. In a 
subsequent article, Kitschelt (2007: 1186) specifies that, in order to test the convergence thesis 
adequately, one should measure parties’ positions solely on the economic dimension. While 
we share the view that both dimensions of party competition are equally important for 
analysing party competition, it should be noted that the relevance of economic-related issues 
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for the ERPs’ electoral success is contested by most other authors in the field (Mudde 2007; 
Norris 2005), who claim that the non-economic dimension of party competition alone is of 
relevance for these parties. Many authors (Akkerman 2005; Arzheimer 2008; Arzheimer and 
Carter 2006; Lubbers et al. 2002; Van der Brug et al. 2005) even argue that only some distinct 
non-economic core issues of ERPs are important for their electorates and therefore for their 
electoral success “…as it is primarily along this dimension that they compete with their 
mainstream rivals” (Arzheimer and Carter 2003: 9). If this assumption is correct, H1 should 
not be tested by using parties’ policy positions on the economic scale – as claimed by 
Kitschelt – but by analysing parties’ positions on the non-material scale. 
The relevance of non-economic issues alone is also advocated by Piero Ignazi (Ignazi 
1992, 1995, 2003a, 2003b). Since his assumptions about the dimensionality of the political 
opportunity structure of ERPs can also be found in various other studies (Lubbers et al. 2002; 
Van der Brug et al. 2005; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Arzheimer 2008), we will briefly 
summarize his thoughts. Ignazi argues that the change to post-industrial societies leads to the 
development of non-economic values in parts of the electorate. The demand for these new 
right non-material issues – he names immigration, security and national identity – is seen as a 
time-lagged reaction to the appearance of new left non-material issues. According to Ignazi, 
the mainstream right parties had serious problems when they tried to incorporate the new right 
issues into their party platforms in the 1980s. In contrast to their mainstream competitors, 
ERPs were able to take up these new issues in a more pronounced and radical way, which 
turned out to be more successful. However, the ERPs’ radical adoption and representation of 
the new right’s non-material issues was not sufficient for their electoral success. Equally 
important, according to Ignazi, was the previous failed attempt of the mainstream right parties 
to incorporate these new issues into their party platforms. By doing so, the mainstream right 
did succeed in establishing these new issues in the arena of political competition, legitimizing 
them in the eyes of the electorate and preparing the ground for the successful incorporation of 
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these issues by the ERPs. Following Ignazi (2003b), we assume that the mainstream right can 
legitimize the non-material core issues of the ERPs by incorporating these issues into their 
own programmes. This leads us to our second hypothesis: 
 
H2: The more the mainstream right party positions itself on the right, the greater the ERPs’ 
vote share. 
 
It should be noted that H2 theoretically demands that we measure of the position of the 
mainstream right party on a non-economic dimension alone. While this argument is plausible, 
there are equally good reasons to expect the opposite effect (Lubbers et al. 2002). In the 
tradition of Downs (1957), voters will cast their vote for the party which is closest to their 
own position in the political space. If both the mainstream and the Extreme Right Party are 
positioned close to the potential voters of the latter, these voters will have the possibility of 
choosing between them. In other words, the political space available for the ERP shrinks 
when the mainstream right positions itself near to its extreme right competitor.
3
  
One could argue, furthermore, that the radicalization of the mainstream right parties may lead 
to a higher degree of party system polarization. In an early publication, Ignazi (1992) states 
that strongly polarized party systems may be supportive for ERPs, since in these systems 
extreme positions – be they left or right – may also be seen as legitimate in the eyes of the 
electorate. While this argument is close to the argument developed in H2, the position of the 
mainstream right party alone is not sufficient to produce strong party system polarization, as 
the positions of all other parties also influence this variable. Therefore, we will measure the 
                                                          
3
 It should be noted that it might be the case that the ERP is not the most extreme party of the right. In 75 cases 
for which we have data for both the position of the ERP as well as the mainstream right party, this is the case in 
18 (left-right dimension), 17 (economic dimension) and 15 cases (non-economic dimension). Nearly exclusively, 
this scenario is given in Flanders (Vlaams Blok), Italy (Lega Nord) and Finnland (True Finns). Interestingly, 
these ERPs are often perceived as somehow borderline-cases of ERPs. 
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impact of polarization independently of the position of the mainstream right party, which 
leads us to our third hypothesis: 
 
H3: The more polarized a party system is, the greater the ERPs’ vote share. 
 
Finally, while the hypotheses above can be tested independently for the each of the two 
dimensions of party competition, we assume that the simultaneous study of both dimensions 
will be superior to reducing our study to one dimension. We will therefore measure our three 
variables of party competition (convergence of the mainstream parties, position of the 
mainstream right party and party system polarization) on each of the two dimensions and 
assume possible interaction effects between them. 
Let us sum up at this point: Previous studies on the political opportunity structure of 
ERPs agree that the strategies of the established parties are essential for the ERPs’ electoral 
success. However, these studies differ with regard to the assumed dimensions of party 
competition as well as on the question of which variables of party competition should be 
accounted for. While most authors state that only some non-material core issues are important 
for the electoral fortunes of ERPs, others – mainly following Kitschelt – claim that an 
economic dimension of party competition might also be of relevance for the success or failure 
of ERPs. What has not yet been tested is which dimension of party competition is really 
decisive for explaining ERPs’ electoral success. We will turn to this question in the 
subsequent analysis. 
 
3. Model and variable description 
In this section, we will discuss our case selection, our statistical model and the 
operationalizations of our main independent variable as well as of our control variables. We 
will concentrate our analysis on Western Europe and on the time period from 1980 to 2003. 
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Since the rise of ERPs began in the early 1980s, we have chosen 1980 as the starting point of 
our analyses while the end point is defined by data availability. This leads us to a dataset 
which includes 17 countries and 18 party systems, as the Belgian regions of Flanders and 
Wallonia are treated as separate systems.
4
 Altogether, our dataset consists of 116 elections in 
these 18 party systems. Two Western European countries are excluded from our analysis: 
Malta and Switzerland. While the first is excluded for reasons of data availability, we have 
decided to exclude Switzerland for theoretical reasons. The prominence of direct democracy 
and the distinctiveness of government formation in Switzerland
5
 raise theoretical problems 
when this country is compared with others in terms of party competition. More than that, the 
Swiss case is the only party system analyzed where it is difficult to separate the dominant 
mainstream right party from the ERP itself, given the political history and the electoral 
strength of the Swiss People`s Party.  
Because we are not interested in the electoral fate of a single party but in the whole 
vote share of the ERP party family in one country, the dependent variable is the sum of all 
ERPs’ vote shares in a given election. Table 1 shows the parties identified as ERPs in each 
country. Following the definition of Mudde (2007), we see nationalism as the core ideological 
feature of this party family, understood as a political doctrine that “strives for the congruence 
of the cultural and political unit, i.e. the nation and the state, respectively” (Mudde 2007: 16).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 Since 1978, no party has competed for votes in both regions of Belgium in the national elections.   
5
 The special mode of government formation in Switzerland (Zauberformel) ensures that the five largest parties 
become members of the federal government. This makes it problematic to identify two mainstream parties, since 
in the Swiss case, one can plausibly speak of five mainstream parties.  
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Table 1: Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe   
 
Country Extreme right parties Vote Share in 
1980* 
Vote Share in 
1990* 
Vote Share in 
2000* 
Austria Freedom Party 
(since 1986 classified as ERP) 
- 16.6% 26.9% 
Belgium 
(Flanders) 
Flemish Block 1.1% 6.6% 10.1% 
Belgium 
(Wallonia) 
National Front  - 1.0% 1.5% 
Denmark Progress Party  
Danish People’s Party 
8.9% 6.4% 12.6% 
Finland True Finns (former Finnish Rural 
Party) 
9.7% 4.8% 1.0% 
France National Front 
Movement for France 
0.2% 9.6% 15.3% 
Germany Republicans  
National Democratic Party  
Union of German People 
0.2% 4.0% 3.3% 
Greece National Political Union 
National Democratic Union 
National Alignment 
National Party 
Party of the Progressives 
1.7% 0.1% 0.2% 
Iceland None - - - 
Ireland None - - - 
Italy Northern League 
Italian Social Movement (until 
1995) 
National Alliance 
6.8% 14.1% 16.3% 
Luxembourg National Movement - 2.3% - 
Netherlands Centre Party 
Centre Democrats 
List Pim Fortuyn 
0.1% 0.9% 17.0% 
Norway Progress Party 4.5% 13.0% 14.6% 
Portugal National Renewal Party 
Christian Democratic Party 
0.6% 0.6% 0.1% 
Spain National Alliance 
National Union 
0.7% 0.1% 0.1% 
Sweden New Democracy - 6.1% 0.2% 
United Kingdom National Front  
British National Party 
0.1% 0.03% 1.5% 
 
*If more than one ERP has contested for votes, the column reports the sum of vote shares for all parties regarded 
as ERPs. 
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As Table 1 indicates, we have also decided to include those countries where no ERP exists. 
As Golder (2003, 2004) and Jackman and Volpert (1996) have argued, the non-inclusion of 
these countries would cause a serious selection bias. We will therefore run a Tobit instead of 
an OLS model, as proposed by these authors. In our case, a Tobit model assumes that the 
dependent variable is left-censored at the value of zero and therefore also allows for the 
inclusion of elections where no ERP has contested for votes (n=23).
6
 We will perform our 
analysis at the macro-level, since we are interested only in the effect of different context 
variables. For the study of the opportunity structure this is an adequate procedure (Abedi 
2002; Carter 2005; Golder 2003; Meguid 2005).  
According to our hypotheses presented above, we define three independent variables 
as: (1) the convergence of the two mainstream parties, (2) the position of the mainstream right 
party, and (3) the polarization of the party system. Each of these variables is measured 
separately on an economic, a non-economic and a general left-right dimension. As we have 
emphasized, each of the hypotheses developed in the previous section originally assumes 
either the economic (H1) or the non-economic dimension of party competition (H2 and H3) to 
be decisive. We will nonetheless test each hypothesis on each dimension. By doing so, we can 
also test the simultaneous impact of both dimensions. 
In order to operationalize the variables of party competition, the most important data 
are left-right party positions. There are several methods for determining these positions, the 
most common being mass survey data, expert data and manifesto data. While each data source 
reveals its own advantages and disadvantages, expert data is seldom available for longer time 
periods. For the period of interest (1980 to 2003) there are a few expert surveys, but these are 
not comparable with one another (see Carter 2005). Furthermore, we do not know which 
                                                          
6
 Using a Tobit model is theoretically appropriate only when one assumes that the variables that influence ERPs’ 
vote share also influence the existence or non-existence of an extreme right party (Golder 2003). While we know 
of only one study that directly addresses this question (O´Malley 2008), we want to claim that the theoretical 
argumentation for a Tobit model is convincing. Alternatively, we have also estimated an OLS model without 
these 23 elections, as other studies have done (Abedi 2002; Carter 2005; Meguid 2005), and the results are to a 
large extent comparable. 
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issues of party competition the experts have taken into account when locating parties on a left-
right-scale, and often we do not even know whether the experts have judged electoral 
platforms or government behaviour, or both together. In a nutshell: We have no comparable 
dataset for left-right party positions based on expert surveys for the period from 1980 
onwards. We are confronted with similar problems when we use public opinion surveys.   
Therefore, we decided to use CMP data to identify party policy positions. CMP 
provides a transcription of manifestos due to salience theory. Hence there is a debate how to 
generate positional data using the manifesto raw scores (Kim and Fording 1998; Gabel and 
Huber 2000; Pappi and Shikano 2004; Franzmann and Kaiser 2006). For our empirical 
analysis, we make use of the approach developed by Franzmann and Kaiser (2006). The most 
important advantage of this approach is that it allows us to account for time- and country-
specific meanings of the terms “left” and “right” by identifying positional (either left or right) 
and non-confrontational issues of party competition.
7
  
The resulting left-right scale consists of all possible CMP categories. Moreover, with 
this approach, it is also possible to construct our two subordinated dimensions. Party values 
on the economic scale are measured on the basis of all economic-related CMP categories, 
while all other categories have been assigned to the non-economic scale (see Table 5, 
Appendix).  The decision to subsume all non-economic categories into in one dimension is 
made due to both the theoretical approach and the CMP coding procedure. The theoretical 
argument is, following the insight of Inglehart (1984) that left-right is a super-issue absorbing 
all issues and not only economic ones. It might be argued, that the "new" politics dimension is 
                                                          
7
 The idea of this approach is to take all out of the raw data that is not positional. Using this approach, first 
confrontational and non-confrontational issues are identified. In a second step it is determined, whether a 
confrontational issue is left or right. Then the raw CMP scores itself are transformed. A minimal value is 
substracted for each election and party system in order not to overestimate issue stances that each party in a 
particular country and in a particular election does. The scores of these differences will be summed up and 
transformed to an 11-point scale, leading us to determine party positions between 0 (leftmost) and 10 
(rightmost). Using moving averages as smoothing procedure, the raw value of a manifesto before and after the 
particalur election is used for error correction. This approach reveals not only sufficient reliability scores (Dinas 
and Geminins 2010), but also an high construct validity compared to voters’ left-right positions in mass surveys 
(Franzmann and Kaiser 2006; Franzmann 2009). Data are available online: http://www.uni-
potsdam.de/db/ls_regierungssystem_brd/index.php?article_id=498&clang=0. 
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identical with libertarian-authoritarian attitudes. However, according to the insight of political 
sociologists (Huber/Inglehart 1995; Knutsen 1998; Flanagan/lee 2003; Knutsen 2009), we 
think that also issues like environmentalism, peace, administrative efficiency, 
decentralization, and underprivileged demographic groups belong to the "new" politics. 
Hence we found no category that could be cleary excluded for theoretical reasons. This is the 
more true if one regards the data structure and the coding procedure. The manifesto group 
coded each quasi-sentence only once. Therefore the data set reveals a lot of arbitrary 
categories. Excluding one or more categories increases the danger of ignoring relevant issue 
stances. Small policy scales based on the CMP data are very likely to be biased and only the 
measurement of broad dimensions gives the security to generate valid results. In sum, we 
think that generating policy scales using manifesto data should reconsider the data structure, 
and the data structure suggests to include as many categories as possible.  
We then measure the level of mainstream party convergence on a left-right scale from 
0 to 10, which theoretically leads to a range of values from 0 (minimal convergence) to 10 
(perfect convergence). We define as mainstream parties the two parties that have gained the 
largest and second largest vote shares at a given election (1
st
 criterion). In order to test the 
convergence thesis (H1 and H2), we distinguish between a left and a right mainstream party. 
To be regarded as a left/right mainstream party, a party must comply with the 1
st
 criterion and 
must be placed to the left/right of the other mainstream party on our left-right dimension over 
the whole period (2
nd
 criterion). A list of the parties we have identified as being mainstream is 
given in the appendix (Table 3). In line with H1, we expect that higher levels of programmatic 
convergence will lead to higher vote shares for parties of the Extreme Right. In order to test 
H2, it is sufficient to concentrate on the position of the mainstream right party alone. As we 
stated above, this variable might be positively or negatively related to the ERPs’ vote share. 
Finally, H3 assumes a legitimating function caused by high party system polarization. In line 
with this argument, we assume a positive relationship between our polarization variable and 
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the ERPs’ vote share. We measure party system polarization using the formula first proposed 
by Sigelman and Yough (1978).
8
 An analysis of the correlation between the variables 
measuring mainstream party convergence and the ones accounting for party system 
polarization reveals a high empirical relationship (-0.79 for the economic, resp. -0.85 for the 
non-economic dimension). However, there are also cases in which increased polarization over 
time is accompanied by increased convergence of the mainstream parties (see for a similar 
finding Castles and Mair 1997). This high interdependence of two of our independent 
variables could technically cause a severe problem of multicollinearity. We include both 
variables in one model but carefully account for possible multicollinearity by using robust 
standard errors. As the variance inflation factor of our models never exceeds the value of 2.8 - 
and this highest value only when both variables are included for both dimensions 
simultaneously (model 5, Table 2) - the technical side of the model is unproblematic. With 
regards to content, polarization is distinguished from mainstream party convergence by 
considering all relevant parties and not only the two largest. In our multivariate analysis we 
expect both variables to have a positive impact of ERPs success. When the mainstream parties 
converge but polarization is high, this polarization must be necessarily induced by smaller 
parties, for instance left-libertarian ones. Hence simultaneous convergence accompanied by 
increasing polarization indicates a decreasing attractiveness of the mainstream parties, ERPs 
vote share should then increase.  
As we stated initially, our definition of the political opportunity structure is restricted 
to variables of party competition. While we are only interested in the effects of these 
variables, we also have included four additional variables in our model. These are the 
disproportionality of the electoral system, the degree of institutional federalism, the 
                                                          
8
 The formula reads:
n
2
P P (X X)
i i
i 1
 

 where ip  
is a party’s vote share at a given election, 
i
X is 
this party’s position on a given dimension, and X is the weighted mean of the positions of all parties on this 
dimension. X  is calculated by multiplying the vote share by the ideological position of a party. This step is 
repeated for each party in the party system and finally, these values are summed up.  
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unemployment rate and the share of the foreign-born population. These four variables are 
well-established in the research on the political opportunity structure of ERPs and are 
therefore taken as control variables. We have also added country dummies in our model to 
control for unobserved country-specific characteristics. 
The disproportionality of the electoral system is measured using the index developed 
by Gallagher (1991), which assigns higher values to more disproportional systems. Although 
other studies have used more detailed variables to define the electoral system, including 
electoral thresholds, district magnitudes and upper-tier percentages (Carter 2002; Golder 
2003; Norris 2005), we prefer the Gallagher index because it gives an impression of the 
overall level of disproportionality. Since ERPs are rather small parties, we expect that they – 
like all other minor parties – will benefit from a more proportional electoral system. 
The impact of federalism on ERPs’ electoral fortunes was a subject first raised by 
Arzheimer and Carter (2003, 2006). On the one hand, ERPs might benefit from a federal state 
structure, as this may allow them to rely on additional resources when they perform well in 
subnational elections. ERPs might also benefit from the potentially limited accountability of 
political parties in consensual-oriented political systems, which might increase the political 
dissatisfaction of voters with regard to mainstream parties (see for this discussion: Andeweg 
2001; Hakhverdian and Koop 2007; Lijphart 2001).  On the other hand, these subnational 
elections might act as a filter for political protest. Voters may want to show their dislike of the 
mainstream parties’ programmes by voting for an ERP, but will do so only in subnational 
elections, which they perceive as being of minor importance compared to the national 
elections analysed here. Therefore, the degree of federalism as measured by Lijphart (1999) 
might be positively or negatively correlated with ERPs’ vote share.  
In addition to these two institutional variables, we have also included two socio-
economic context factors: the unemployment rate and the share of the foreign-born 
population. Both variables can be expected to have a positive impact on ERPs’ election 
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results. For data on the standardized unemployment rate, we have used the dataset assembled 
by Armingeon et al. (2008) and for the share of the foreign-born population, data offered by 
the OECD.
9
  
  
4. Results 
We will now test the impact of the variables of party competition that we developed above. 
For our analysis, we have used data for all elections to national parliaments in Western 
Europe from 1980 to 2003 (n=116). Our dependent variable is the vote share of parties which 
we consider to belong to the Extreme Right. As we will later control for possible interaction 
effects between our party competition variables, we have centred all independent variables on 
their mean. 
Altogether, we have specified eight different models. Models 1 to 5 report the main 
effects of our independent variables, Models 6 to 8 control for possible interaction effects 
between these variables. All models reported in Table 2 also include country dummies (not 
shown), and therefore only account for intra-country variation of the dependent variable. We 
have also estimated the same models without country dummies, and the main findings are not 
affected (see Table 4, Appendix).  
Model 1 includes only the four control variables for the disproportionality of the 
electoral system, the degree of federalism, the unemployment rate and the rate of foreign-born 
population. Models 2 to 5 include our three party competition variables: the convergence 
between the two mainstream parties, the position of the mainstream right party and the party 
system polarization variable. Each model tests the impact of these variables on a different 
dimension of party competition: Model 2 on a left-right scale, Model 3 on an economic and 
Model 4 on a purely non-economic dimension. Model 5 then includes the three variables of 
party competition measured simultaneously on both the economic and the non-economic 
                                                          
9
 We obtained our data on international migration flows from the OECD Database on International Migration 
[www.oecd.org]. 
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dimension, which leads to six variables in this case. Finally, Models 6 to 8 control for 
possible interaction effects between the variables measured on the two different dimensions. 
With regard to our control variables, only the share of the foreign-born population is 
significantly and positively correlated with the ERPs’ vote share in all models, a result which 
supports the findings of previous studies (Knigge 1998; Lubbers et al. 2002; Golder 2003; 
Kessler and Freeman 2005). Following the recommendation of Golder (2003), we have also 
tested for a possible interaction-effect between the unemployment rate and the percentage of 
the foreign-born population (model 6). Such an effect could indeed be identified but in 
contrast to the one reported by Golder it is negative: With rising levels of unemployment the 
impact of the foreign-born population on the ERP´s vote share decreases (see for a similar 
finding Arzheimer (2009)). The degree of electoral disproportionality, measured by 
Gallagher’s index, turns out to be significant in three of the eight models. As the index uses 
higher values for more disproportional electoral systems, this result was rather surprising. 
Therefore, we have replaced this variable with another one, district magnitude, but the result 
remains the same: ERPs seem to be more successful in disproportional electoral systems.
10
  
Turning to our party competition variables, Model 2 shows the results for an overall 
left-right dimension. Here, all three variables of party competition are significant and 
positively correlated with ERPs’ vote share, giving support to H1, H2 and H3. ERPs are more 
successful if the two mainstream parties show high levels of convergence, if the mainstream 
right party places itself more to the right, and if the party system is highly polarized. These 
findings support previous studies that also used a left-right dimension to measure the variables 
of party competition (Abedi 2002; Carter 2005, Kitschelt 1995). Models 3 to 5 show what 
                                                          
10
 While the impact of the disproportionality of the electoral system has been analysed extensively by different 
authors (Carter 2002; Golder 2003; Norris 2005), only Golder’s study also analyses elections where no ERPs 
were present. While Golder finds evidence that ERPs actually benefit from more proportional electoral systems – 
the opposite of our finding – his period of analysis is from 1970-2002. Reanalysing his data, we found that the 
statistical significance of his (dis)proportionality variables is due to the inclusion of the elections before 1980 
and turns out to be insignificant (but still positively correlated) for the period from 1980-2002.  
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happens if we split the left-right dimension into an economic and a non-economic dimension 
of party competition. Several points are striking and need further attention.  
First, regarding the part-scales separately, we find significant correlations only for the 
non-economic dimension of party competition, while none of the economic-related variables 
reaches common levels of statistical significance. Up to this point, our findings support those 
studies that have only focused on the non-material core issues of ERPs and measured party 
system competition solely on a non-economic dimension (Lubbers et al. 2002; Meguid 2005; 
Van der Brug et al. 2005; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Arzheimer 2009). But, as we will see 
later, the simultaneous analysis of the two part-scales (Model 5) reveals that indicators from 
both dimensions have a statistically significant effect on ERPs’ vote share.  
Second, Kitschelt’s convergence thesis turns out to be significant only for the non-
economic dimension of party competition, supporting H1. The variable which measured the 
convergence on an economic dimension turns out to be insignificant, and this is the case for 
every model where it is included. The significant test for the left-right convergence (Model 2) 
therefore results from the inclusion of the non-economic dimension alone. This contradicts 
Kitschelt’s expectation (2007) that the convergence variable should only be measured, and 
would only have an impact, on the economic dimension.  
Third, the position of the mainstream right party (H2) does not have any significant 
impact on the vote for ERPs, regardless of the assumed dimension of party competition. 
While the impact of this variable on the non-economic dimension is positive and would 
confirm H2, it does not reach common levels of statistical significance. However, when we 
include both dimensions simultaneously (Model 5), the position of the mainstream right party 
on the economic dimension turns out to be positively correlated with our dependent variable. 
This is an interesting result. It supports our approach in analyzing the two dimensions 
separately, because otherwise in the one-dimensional left-right model the effect is 
underestimated. For instance, especially liberal parties, being at the right on the economic  
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Table 2: Estimates of Tobit models (with country dummies) 
Regressor Model 
(1) 
Model  
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Model 
(4) 
Model 
(5) 
Model 
(6) 
Model 
(7) 
Model 
(8) 
Model 
(9) 
Disproportionality .389*   
(.182) 
.311 
(.182) 
.391*   
(.184) 
.260   
(.169) 
.225   
(.168) 
0.219 
(.164) 
.171   
(.164) 
.242   
(.170) 
.102   
(.169) 
Federalism 2.269   
(1.247) 
1.812    
(1.286) 
2.566   
(1.314) 
.645   
(1.180) 
.996  
(1.200) 
1.323 
(1.185) 
1.246    
(1.168) 
1.019   
(1.199) 
1.041   
(1.167) 
Unemployment -.004   
(.174) 
-.071   
(.168) 
-.032   
(.177) 
.0250   
(.158) 
-.017   
(.157) 
-0.182 
(.173) 
-.077   
(.155) 
-.021   
(.157) 
-.088   
(.155) 
Foreign-born population .728**   
(.203) 
.507*    
(.226) 
.685**   
(.208) 
.696**   
(.203) 
.623**    
(.195) 
0.356 
(.232) 
.628**   
(.189) 
.645**   
(.199) 
.644**   
(.189) 
General 
Left-
Right 
Scale 
Con-
vergence 
 3.407*   
(1.367) 
       
Position 
Mainstream 
Right 
 2.693*   
(1.154) 
       
Party 
System 
Polarisation 
 1.463*   
(.728) 
       
Eco-
nomic 
Scale 
Con-
vergence 
  -.014   
(1.064) 
 .395     
(.995) 
0.661 
(.984) 
.935 
(.988) 
.525   
(1.022) 
1.307   
(1.032) 
Position 
Main-
stream 
Right 
  1.191   
(.897) 
 1.817*   
(.830) 
2.12* 
(.828) 
1.754*   
(.807) 
1.918*  
(.850) 
2.243**   
(.824) 
Party 
System 
Polarisation 
  -.529   
(.463) 
 -.755   
(.432) 
-0.683 
(.424) 
-.146   
(.478) 
-.760   
(.432) 
-.200   
(.473) 
Non-
Eco-
nomic 
Scale 
Convergenc
e 
   2.725**    
(.762) 
2.651**    
(.750) 
2.728** 
(.737) 
2.882**   
(.739) 
2.612**   
(.752) 
2.910**   
(.740) 
Position 
Mainstream 
Right 
   .724   
(.665) 
.673   
(.658) 
0.616 
(.644) 
.267   
(.657) 
.717    
(.664) 
.319   
(.654) 
Party 
System 
Polarisation 
   2.544**   
(.590) 
2.766**   
(.571) 
2.851** 
(.560) 
3.453**   
(.614) 
2.744**   
(.571) 
3.527**   
(.632) 
 
Interacti
on 
Effects 
of both 
part 
scales 
Unemploym
ent*foreign-
born pop 
     -.092*   
(.045) 
   
Con-
vergence 
      -.539**   
(.203) 
  
Position 
Mainstream 
Right 
       .151  
(.275) 
 
Party 
System 
Polarisation 
        -.285*   
(.112) 
Country dummies  Not displayed 
Sigma 3.613 
(.264) 
3.445   
(.251) 
3.523   
(.257) 
3.265 
(.237) 
3.099 
(.225) 
3.030   
(.221) 
3.008   
(.218) 
3.096   
(.225) 
3.008   
(.219) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -262.066 -257.041 -260.006 -251.097 -246.517 -244.477 -242.996 -246.367 -243.382 
N 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 
Non-censored  95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 
Left-censored 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
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scale, tend to be rather moderate or even left on the non-economic scale (Smith 1988). Hence 
the onedimensional left-right-position of these parties is moderate, but in fact they tend to be 
more extreme at least on the economic part-scale. Similar, it indicates a legitimizing effect of 
extreme positions by mainstream parties, but not in the way as we have assumed in hypothesis 
2. It is not the policy field itself what is legitimized, but rather a mainstream party holds a 
position away from the ideological centre. Therefore the extreme right parties benefit from an 
electorate used to be confronted with more extreme positions. 
Fourth, party system polarization turns out to be significantly and positively correlated 
with the dependent variable only on the non-economic dimension, thereby confirming H3. 
This effect of non-economic polarization is even stronger than the effect of the general left-
right polarization, and it increases even more in a simultaneous analysis of the economic and 
the non-economic dimensions. Focussing separately on one dimension obviously leads to an 
underestimation of the impact of non-economic polarization. As we discussed above, this 
finding supports Ignazi’s argument: Party systems that are highly polarised on non-economic 
issues seem to legitimize extreme positions. While Ignazi gives no explanation for the 
converse impact of party system polarization on the different sub-dimensions, we propose the 
following explanation: Voters compare the positions of parties on the two dimensions 
independently from each other. If the non-economic dimension is more polarized, the policy 
options that the different parties offer to the electorate are more distinct, and a vote decision 
based on this dimension would guarantee voters the greatest impact in terms of the expected 
policies. By contrast, a party system that is more polarized on economic issues would lead 
voters to make their voting decisions on basis of their economic preferences, which should 
disadvantage the ERPs, who do not “own” economic issues. The negative – though 
insignificant – coefficients of the polarization variable measured on the economic dimension 
are in line with this argumentation. 
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Fifth, although the direct effects of the economic-related variables of party competition are all 
non-significant, it is too early to conclude that the economic dimension of party competition is 
unimportant for the electoral fortunes of ERPs. It may be the case that the economic-related 
variables moderate the effect of the non-economic related variables, an assumption which we 
control for in Models 7 to 9 by adding interaction effects to our model. It turns out that both 
the impact of convergence between the two mainstream parties and party system polarization 
on the non-economic dimension are moderated by the values of the corresponding variables 
on the economic dimension. The coefficients for both product terms are negative: With higher 
values measured for these variables on the economic dimension, the effects of the 
corresponding variables on the non-economic dimension of the dependent variable decrease. 
While the coefficients in Table 2 only show the significance of the product term at one value, 
we have additionally calculated conditional slopes reported in Figures 1 and 2. The decreasing 
interaction effects indicate that in countries and cases, where convergence and polarization on 
economic and non-economic behave asymmetrically, our two-dimensional model works best. 
In cases where convergence and polarization behave symmetrically, a quasi-one dimensional 
structure occurs and hence the interaction effect of both dimensions provides only a low 
additional explanatory power. 
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Figure 1: Effect of the convergence on the non-economic scale for different values of the 
convergence on the economic scale  
 
Figure 2: Effect of the polarization on the non-economic scale for different values of the 
polarization on the economic scale  
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Sixth, in light of our analysis of the two interaction effects, we conclude that the economic 
dimension of party competition is important for the electoral fortunes of ERPs, since it 
moderates the effect of the non-economic dimension. While our research design has focused 
solely on the party system level and therefore does not allow us to draw any conclusions for 
the individual level, one explanation for the identified interaction effects may be that voters 
are able to separate the two dimensions of party competition when they decide which party to 
vote for. In party systems that are highly polarized on economic issues, voters might regard 
these issues as more important than the non-economic core issues of ERPs, because the 
expected differences in outcome are greater when they base their voting decisions on 
economic preferences. In contrast, voters might have a greater incentive to make their voting 
decisions on the basis of their non-material preferences if they do not see great differences 
between the parties on the economic dimension. The accentuation and polarization of 
economic issues may therefore discredit the ERPs’ appeal to non-economic issues. Focussing 
only on the impact of non-economic issues when analysing the political opportunity structure 
of ERPs, as has been done by most previous studies in the field, might therefore be a 
misleading approach. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
Building upon the theoretical considerations of previous studies, this article has developed 
three hypotheses concerning the political opportunity structure of ERPs. In order to test these 
hypotheses, unlike previous studies, we have not only made a distinction between an 
economic and a non-economic dimension of party competition, but have also carefully 
inspected the interplay of both dimensions. Our approach allowed us to include elections in 
which no ERP participated, and the results of our empirical analysis indicate that both 
dimensions of party competition are important for the political opportunity structure of ERPs. 
On the non-economic dimension, the convergence of the mainstream parties and a high level 
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of party system polarization have been found to increase ERPs’ vote share. Because we have 
only found effects of the economic dimension in models which simultaneously analysed 
factors belonging to both dimensions, our results signify that economic-related variables 
moderate the effects of the non-economic-related variables and are therefore important for the 
political opportunity structure of ERPs.  
With regard to these findings, we want to address two questions. The first refers to the 
general analysis of party competition in a multi-dimensional policy space, while the second is 
more specific, referring to the opportunity structure of the ERPs.  
First, our results clearly confirm that analysing only the general left-right dimension is 
not sufficient for understanding what happens in contemporary party systems. Only if we 
distinguish between an economic and a non-economic dimension are we able to determine 
different ways of explaining ERPs’ electoral success. Analysing just one of these dimensions 
is also not sufficient. We clearly show that the interaction of the two dimensions is decisive. 
Focussing only on one dimension leads to an underestimation of their effects. We assume that 
this is generally true for all kinds of analyses of party competition.  
Second, concerning the question of whether the economic or the non-economic 
dimension of party competition is the most important part of the opportunity structure for 
ERPs, our analysis has shown that the interplay of party strategies on the two independent 
policy dimensions has a significant influence on the electoral fortunes of ERPs. Like most 
authors, we think that the core issues of ERPs clearly belong to the non-economic sphere. But 
only when polarization over economic questions is low do ERPs face an opportunity structure 
which allows them to successfully attract voters with their core issues. Conversely, in party 
systems where economic issues are both highly salient and polarized, ERPs are confronted 
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with an unfavourable opportunity structure which impedes them from attracting voters with 
their issues.
11
  
Therefore, future research on ERPs should not restrict itself to the analysis of a set of 
core issues of ERPs, but should consider economic issues of party competition as well. While 
we have focused our interest on the competitors of ERPs, the question of whether and how the 
ERPs make use of their specific political opportunity structure – e.g., by emphasizing only 
issues which are confrontational for the mainstream parties – should attract closer attention.
                                                          
11
 This consideration suggests that in Germany, the rise of the Linkspartei and the dominance of economic issues 
after reunification have prevented the German party system from developing a successful ERP at the national 
level, despite having a considerable share of voters within the electorate who support ERP policy positions –
especially in eastern Germany and in parts of the south. The comparatively high level of post-materialist 
attitudes among the German electorate reveals that there is strong potential for a rise in the importance of non-
economic issues for the policy agenda. Given that the German mainstream parties – Christian Democrats and 
Social Democrats – have narrowed the gap between their policy positions on the non-economic dimension 
(Franzmann 2008), we expect that with a further reduction in polarization on the economic dimension, the 
probability of a successful ERP will rise.   
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Appendix  
Table 3: List of mainstream parties 
 Mainstream left party  Mainstream right party  
Austria   
1983-2002 SPÖ (43320) ÖVP (43520) 
Belgium: Flanders   
1981-1999 SP (21321) CVP (21521) 
2003      SP (21321) PVV/VLD (21421) 
Belgium: Wallonia   
1981-2003      PS  (21322) PRL (21422; 21423; 21425) 
Denmark   
1981-1990 SD  (13320) KF (13620)  
1994-2001 SD  (13320) V (13420) 
Finland   
1983-1987 SSDP (14320) KK (14620) 
1991-2003 SSDP (14320) SK (14820) 
France   
1981-1988 PS (31320) G (31621) 
1993-1997 PS (31320) RPR (31625) 
2002 PS (31320) UMP (31626) 
Germany   
1980-2002  SPD  (41320) CDU (41521) 
Greece   
1981-2000 PASOK (34313) ND (34511) 
Iceland   
1983-1995 F (15810) SSF (15620) 
1999-2003 S (15328) SSF (15620) 
Ireland   
1981-2002 Labour (53320) FF (53620) 
Italy   
1983-1987        PCI, PDS (32220) DC (32520) 
1994-1996 PDS (32220) FI (32610)  
2001         PDS/DS (32220) FI (32610)  
Luxembourg   
1984-1999 LSAP (23320) CSV (23520) 
Netherlands   
1981-1994        PvdA (22320) CDA (22521) 
1998 PvdA  (22320) VVD (22420) 
2002-2003 PvdA (22320) CDA (22521) 
Norway   
1981-2001 DNA (12320) H (12610) 
Portugal   
1980-2002 PSP (35311) PSD (35313) 
Spain   
1982-2000 PSOE (33320) AP/PP (33610) 
Sweden   
1982-2002 SdAP (11320) M (11620) 
United Kingdom   
1983-2005 Labour (51320) Conservatives (51610) 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
Table 4: Estimates of Tobit models (without country dummies) 
Regressor Model 
(1) 
Model  
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Model 
(4) 
Model 
(5) 
Model 
(6) 
Model 
(7) 
Model 
(8) 
Model 
(9) 
Disproportionality .379*   
(.149) 
.355*    
(.156) 
.377* 
(.152) 
.344*  
(.158) 
.351*   
(.161) 
.411*  
(.159) 
.321*   
(.156) 
.318*  
(.159) 
.316   
(.159) 
Federalism 2.253**   
(.556) 
2.265**    
(.565) 
2.332** 
(.564) 
2.153**   
(.548) 
2.192**   
(.559) 
2.988**   
(.646) 
1.708**   
(.563) 
2.050**   
(.553) 
1.908**   
(.573) 
Unemployment -.377*   
(.173) 
-.346   
(.177) 
-.292 
(.189) 
-.312 
(.181) 
-.294   
(.190) 
-.665**   
(.243) 
-.374*  
(.186) 
-.342   
(.189) 
-.272   
(.188) 
Foreign-born population -.150   
(.130) 
-.102   
(.133) 
-.116 
(.133) 
-.125   
(.132) 
-.115   
(.135) 
-.604*   
(.243) 
-.189    
(.136) 
-.131   
(.133) 
-.127   
(.135) 
General 
Left-
Right 
Scale 
Con-
vergence 
 
.981 
(1.042) 
       
Position 
Mainstream 
Right 
 
-.262 
(.992) 
       
Party 
System 
Polarisation 
 
1.389*    
(.686) 
       
Eco-
nomic 
Scale 
Con-
vergence 
  
-.457 
(.803) 
 
-.511   
(.876) 
-.238 
(.866) 
.027   
(.867) 
-.908 
(.885) 
-.516   
(.863) 
Position 
Main-
stream 
Right 
  
-.509 
(.559) 
 
-.164   
(.576) 
-.182   
(.563) 
.255   
(.576) 
-.238    
(.569) 
-.090   
(.569) 
Party 
System 
Polarisation 
  
.127 
(.511) 
 
-.212   
(.527) 
.321 
(.563) 
.239   
(.535) 
-.252   
(.519) 
-.093   
(.524) 
Non-
Eco-
nomic 
Scale 
Con-
vergence 
   
1.311  
(.923) 
1.498 
(1.051) 
2.572*  
(1.122) 
1.347   
(1.015) 
1.571   
(1.032) 
1.393   
(1.038) 
Position 
Mainstream 
Right 
   
.579   
(.817) 
.591   
(.822) 
.930 
(.817) 
.527   
(.795) 
.764  
(.812) 
.498  
(.812) 
Party 
System 
Polarisation 
   
1.445*   
(.739) 
1.497*   
(.796) 
2.118*   
(.820) 
2.058*    
(.794) 
1.411   
(.784) 
1.745*    
(.797) 
 
Interacti
on 
Effects 
of both 
part 
scales 
Unemploym
ent*foreign-
born pop 
     
-.124*     
(.052) 
   
Con-
vergence 
      
-.889**   
(.312) 
  
Position 
Mainstream 
Right 
       
-.672   
(.364) 
 
Party 
System 
Polarisation 
        
-.312*   
(.150) 
   
Sigma 6.742   
(.499) 
6.655   
(.492) 
6.736   
(.499) 
6.605   
(.489) 
6.589   
(.489) 
6.429   
(.476) 
6.363   
(.471) 
6.474   
(.480) 
6.493   
(.482) 
Log pseudo-likelihood 
-331.709 -329.373 -331.008 -329.102 -328.929 -326.121 -324.909 -327.249 -327.443 
N 116 116 116 116 116  116 116 116 
Non-censored  95 95 95 95 95  95 95 95 
Left-censored 21 21 21 21 21  21 21 21 
 
 
 
     
 
Table 5: Categories underlying left-right-scales 
Left-Right „Super-Issue“ absorbing all issues 
Country and time specific meanings of each issue (cf. Franzmann 2009) 
Categories included in 
Non-Economic Left-Right Scale  
 
Categories included in  
Economic Left-Right Scale 
Per101 Foreign Special Relationship: 
positive 
Per303 Governmental and Administrative 
Efficiency: Positive 
Per102 Foreign Special Relationship: 
negative 
Per401 Free Enterprise 
Per103 Anti-Imperialism Per402 Incentives 
Per104 Military: Positive Per403 Market Regulation 
Per105 Military: Negative Per404 Economic Planning 
Per106 Peace Per405 Corporatism 
Per107 Internationalism: Positive Per406 Protectionism: Positive 
Per108 European Community: Positive Per407 Protectionism: Negative 
Per109 Internationalism: Negative Per408 Economic Goals 
Per110 European Community: Negative Per409 Keynesian Demand Management 
Per201 Freedom and Human Rights Per410 Productivity 
Per202 Democracy Per411 Technology and Infrastructure 
Per203 Constitutionalism: Positive Per412 Controlled Economy 
Per204 Constitutionalism: Negative Per413 Nationalization 
Per301 Decentralisation Per414 Economic Orthodoxy 
Per302 Centralisation Per415 Marxist Analysis 
Per304 Political Corruption Per416 Anti-Growth-Economy 
Per305 Political Authority Per503 Social Justice 
Per501 Environmental Protection Per504 Welfare State Expansion 
Per502 Culture Per505 Welfare State Limitation 
Per506 Education Expansion Per701 Labour Groups: Positive 
Per507 Education Limitation Per702 Labour Groups: Negative 
Per601 National Way of Life: Positive Per703 Agriculture and Farmers 
Per602 National Way of Life: Negative Per704 Middle Class and Professional 
Groups 
Per603 Traditional Morality: Positive Note: Category Labels according to Budge et al 
(2001). For each category is it determined for 
each country and election, whether each 
particular category represent a confrontational 
left issue or confrontational right issue or a non-
confrontational issue. An overview about the 
time and country specific classifications is 
provided by Franzmann (2009).  
Per604 Traditional Morality: Negative 
Per605 Law and Order 
Per606 Social Harmony 
Per607 Multiculturalism: Positive 
Per608 Multiculturalism: Negative 
Per705 Underprivileged Minority Groups 
Per706 Non-economic Demographic Groups 
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Explaining Working-Class Support for Extreme Right Parties:  
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Abstract 
While the overrepresentation of working-class members among the electorates of extreme 
right parties (ERPs) in Western Europe is well documented, previous studies have usually 
explained this pattern as a result of this voter group’s changing political preferences. In 
contrast to these studies, this article argues that it is not the changing political preferences of 
the working class that lead them to vote for ERPs, but changes in the supply side of party 
competition that have caused the re-orientation of these voters toward the extreme right.  
Differentiating between an economic and a cultural dimension of party competition, it is 
shown that both the policy options offered by parties to voters as the salience of the two issue-
dimensions have changed dramatically over the last three decades. While the salience of 
economic issues as well as of party system polarization among these issues have declined in 
most Western European countries, the very opposite trend can be identified for non-economic 
issues, including the core issues of ERPs (e.g., immigration and law and order).  
These changes on the supply side of party competition cause working-class voters to base 
their vote decisions solely on their authoritarian, non-economic preferences and not — as in 
the past — on their left-wing economic demands. The theoretical assumptions are tested 
empirically with data from the Eurobarometer Trend File for the period from 1980 to 2002.  
In contexts where the economic dimension is more polarized than the cultural dimension, the 
positive impact of being a member of the working class on the vote decision for an ERP is 
significantly reduced. 
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Introduction 
Two decades of scientific research regarding extreme right parties (ERPs) and their voters 
have identified a set of individual characteristics and attitudes that affect the voting decisions 
in favor of an ERP. While already the first a comparative studies in the field (Betz, 1994; 
Hainsworth, 1992; Kitschelt, 1995) have highlighted the role of a person’s social class status 
for explaining the vote decision for an ERP, the disproportionately high support for ERPs 
among working-class members is as well-documented as its reasons are discussed 
(Arzheimer, 2008; de Lange, 2007; Houtman, 2003; Ivarsflaten, 2005). In short, this support 
raises a paradoxical question. Why do voters who have always been associated with left-wing 
political parties turn to the extreme right?  
Different answers to this question are discussed in the literature. First, some authors 
argue that increasing international competition has led to changing political preferences 
among this voter group, which in turn has resulted in a realignment of social groups formerly 
opposed along economic issues. Following this argument, the high level of support for ERPs 
among the working class is the result of a new demand for more market-liberal policies 
among at least parts of this voter group. Second, some scholars point to the decreasing 
importance of social status for the individual vote decision per se, and they contend that it is 
more appropriate to examine the policy preferences or attitudes of these voters in order to 
explain their vote decisions. According to this perspective, the high levels of support for ERPs 
among the working class can be attributed to the high levels of anti-immigrant sentiment and 
political dissatisfaction among this group. 
This paper examines the variation in working-class support for ERPs in Western 
Europe for the period from 1980 to 2002. In the first section, three theses that address reasons 
for this support are discussed, as they have been identified by Ivarsflaten (2005): the 
realignment-, the policy-, and the economic division theses.  As will be shown, none of these 
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theses fully explain the varying support of working-class voters for ERPs satisfactorily. Either 
the theoretical arguments are not supported by empirical evidence (realignment thesis), or the 
given explanation simply shifts the explanandum (policy and economic division theses). After 
investigating possible changes in the political attitudes of working-class members during the 
last few decades, a party-centered explanation for the varying working-class support of ERPs 
is presented. It is argued that the political offers made to voters by parties have changed 
dramatically during the last thirty years, especially with regard to economic issues. In 
countries where the economic dimension of party competition has decreased in both salience 
and polarization, the support for ERPs among the working class is considerably higher than in 
countries that do not show such a trend. Accordingly, in elections with both a high salience of 
cultural issues and a high polarization of parties along these issues, working-class voters have 
strong incentives to cast their vote decisions on the basis of their authoritarian, non-economic 
preferences, which cause them to vote for parties of the extreme right. These theoretical 
assumptions are tested in the final section using a multi-level model that covers thirteen 
Western European countries. The findings point to a theoretical link between the rising ERP 
support in Western Europe and the decline of class-based voting. It is argued that both 
phenomena can be explained by changing patterns of party competition, thereby supporting 
recent studies in the latter debate.  
 
1. Working-class Support for ERPs 
According to the first comparative studies in the field (Betz, 1994; Hainsworth, 1992; 
Kitschelt, 1995), a person’s social class has been identified as one of the key variables that 
explain the vote decision for an ERP. In particular, two social groups show a 
disproportionately high level of support for these parties: the working class and the petty 
bourgeoisie (artisans, small shop-owners and independents). Empirical evidence for the over-
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representation of these groups among the ERPs’ electorates is offered by a multiplicity of 
studies (Arzheimer, 2008; Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Betz & Johnson, 2004; Ignazi, 2003a; 
Ivarsflaten, 2005; Kitschelt, 1995; Kitschelt & McGann 2005; Lubbers et al., 2002; Rydgren, 
2004). What makes this correlation between class status and support for an ERP most 
interesting is the fact that ERPs receive support from both groups. While the over-
representation of the petty bourgeoisie is unsurprising, as this group has always shown more 
support for right-wing parties, the significant level of working-class support for ERPs is rather 
paradoxical. Why do voters who have an economic interest in left economic policies and have 
thus mainly supported left-wing parties for decades now cast their votes for ERPs? What has 
caused this ‘proletarisation of the Extreme Right’ (Betz & Johnson, 2004) and turned ERPs 
into ‘workers’ parties’ (Ignazi, 2003a)? 
The study by Ivarsflaten (2005) addresses precisely these questions. Reviewing 
previous theoretical arguments and on the basis of her empirical findings, Ivarsflaten 
distinguishes three explanations for the over-representation of working-class and petty 
bourgeoisie voters among the ERP electorates: the realignment thesis, the policy thesis and 
the economic division thesis.  First, some authors identify a realignment of working-class and 
petty bourgeoisie voters along economic issues (Kitschelt, 1995; Kitschelt & McGann, 2005; 
de Lange, 2007). Kitschelt (1994, 1995) argues that increased international competition in 
some economic sectors has led to more market-liberal views among blue-collar employees 
working in these industries. As a result of these changing economic preferences and the 
authoritarian attitudes of the working class, this voter group has shifted its electoral support to 
ERPs. Second, some scholars argue that social class has become increasingly irrelevant to the 
vote decision and that research should instead consider the distinct policy preferences of ERP 
voters (Van der Brug et al., 2005; Van der Brug & Fennema, 2003; Van der Brug & Fennema, 
2007). In this paper, I will refer to this argument as the “policy thesis.” Authors advocating 
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this thesis come to the conclusion that the disproportionately high level support for ERPs 
among the working class, as well as the petty bourgeoisie, is mainly caused by the fact that 
both groups share distinct authoritarian, non-economic policy preferences. Third, Ivarsflaten 
(2005) has offered an explanation that she calls the economic division thesis. Similar to the 
policy thesis, she argues that working-class and petty bourgeoisie ERP voters are still divided 
on economic issues, but share common non-economic preferences that are addressed mainly 
by the extreme right, namely: anti-immigrant sentiment, strong preferences for law and order 
policies, negative attitudes toward the European Union, and political disillusionment. 
Before we discuss the empirical evidence in support of the three theses, it should be 
noted that they are not as different as they may appear, but they share some common 
theoretical premises. First, these theses hold that increasing support for ERPs is caused by 
developments on the side of the voters, or the demand side of the electoral competition. It is 
argued that voters either have become more similar in terms of their economic preferences 
(realignment thesis), now base their vote decisions on policy preferences instead of their 
social class (policy thesis), or base their vote decisions upon non-economic instead of 
economic preferences (policy and economic division thesis). Second, it should be noted that 
all of the three theses assume that the vote decision for an ERP is guided by the voter’s policy 
preferences. While this seems obvious for the policy and economic division theses, this is also 
the case for the realignment thesis offered by Kitschelt (1995). When van der Brug and 
Fennema state that “modern voters do not cast their votes in agreement with which social 
group they belong to, but in agreement with their own ideological and policy preferences” 
(2003: 66) this is exactly in the sense of authors favoring the realignment thesis. Their 
argument is not that working-class voters support a party because they are working-class 
voters, but that being a member of the working class leads to distinct economic policy 
preferences, which again influence the vote decision for a distinct party—in this case, an ERP. 
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What separates the approaches (and also the measurements) of authors advocating the policy 
or economic division theses from those favoring the realignment thesis is the intervening role 
of a person’s social class in the vote decision. While advocates of the policy and economic 
division theses directly measure respondents’ policy preferences, the realignment thesis 
implies that a person’s social class can be seen as a proxy for his policy preferences. 
Coming to the empirical evidence for the three theses and starting with the 
realignment thesis, most studies conclude that a realignment of former opposed social groups 
along economic issues is not supported by the data. Arzheimer (2008) finds no correlation 
between a person’s market-liberal views and support for an ERP; Ivarsflaten (2005) points to 
the continued distinct economic preferences of working-class and petty bourgeoisie ERP 
voters; and Mudde (2007) questions the relevance of economic issues for both ERP voters and 
these parties themselves. While advocates of the realignment thesis have recently argued that 
ERPs have limited their former distinct market-liberal appeal in favor of a more centrist 
economic position (de Lange, 2007), their conclusion that this shift allows these parties to 
attract support from both groups seems unconvincing. Why should economic left- (or right-) 
leaning voters support an economically centrist party instead of a party of the economic left 
(or right)?  In contrast, empirical evidence for the policy and economic division theses can be 
found in nearly all studies that use attitudinal variables to predict the vote decision for an ERP 
(Arzheimer, 2008; Ivarsflaten, 2005; Lubbers et al., 2002; Kessler & Freeman, 2005; 
Rydgren, 2008; van der Brug et al., 2005). ERP voters share distinct authoritarian, non-
economic attitudes, although they are still divided on their economic preferences.  
Therefore, the policy and economic division theses come to a very similar conclusion, 
which is that the paradox of working-class support for the extreme right can be explained by 
the right-wing cultural views of these voters, which they share with members of the petty 
bourgeoisie (Ivarsflaten, 2005). Seemingly, working-class voters no longer cast their votes on 
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the basis of their (left) economic preferences, but on the basis of their (right) non-economic 
preferences. So is the paradox solved, and does this conclusion really give a satisfactory 
answer to the question of why working-class voters support ERPs? I would oppose this view 
and argue that the answer given by advocates of the policy and economic division theses only 
changes the explanandum. The question is no longer why the working class votes for ERPs 
(because they share their non-economic ideology), but now, why do people with economic left 
and non-economic right policy preferences decide to let their vote decisions be guided 
exclusively by the latter? 
With regard to this new question, it should be noted that blue-collar workers have 
always favored both left economic and right non-economic stances.  “The poorer strata 
everywhere are more liberal or leftist on economic issues (…). But when liberalism is defined 
in non-economic terms — as support for civil liberties, internationalism, etc. — the 
correlation is reversed. The more well-to-do are more liberal, the poorer are more intolerant” 
(Lipset, 1981: 92). Reviewing this initial observation, which is also supported by more recent 
articles (Houtman, 2003; Middendorp & Meloen, 1990), the point made by van der Brug and 
van Spanje (2009), that voters who combine economic left and non-economic right attitudes 
are not represented by any political parties in Western Europe, is as correct as it is not new. 
The working class has ever since combined these distinct preferences, but as decades of 
studies on class voting have reported (Clark & Lipset, 2001; Evans, 1999; Evans & Payne, 
1999; Lipset, 1981; Przeworski & Sprague, 1986; Sartori, 1969), they have tended to ignore 
their right non-economic preferences in favor of their left economic demands. However, since 
the rise of ERPs during the 1980s, this pattern appears to have changed, at least in those 
countries with strong working-class support for ERPs. Today, at least parts of the working 
class have decided to cast their votes solely on the basis of their non-economic demands, 
neglecting their left-leaning material preferences.  
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As will be argued in the third section, the explanation for this shift lies in the changing 
patterns of party competition among Western European countries. Before this supply-side 
argument is developed in depth, the discussion first focuses upon possible changes in the 
political preferences of the working class.  
 
2. The Political Preferences of the Working Class 
The three theses regarding working-class support for ERPs, as discussed above, have 
in common the argument that some factor has changed with regard to the political preferences 
of this voter group. It is stated that working-class voters have become more market-liberal 
(realignment thesis), or that they now now guide their votes based on non-economic, rather 
than economic preferences (policy and economic division theses). It might also be argued that 
working-class voters have become more authoritarian over the last decades; therefore, they 
have turned their support to ERPs. The Eurobarometer Trend File (Schmitt et al., 2005) offers 
two well-known variables that might account for the political preferences of working-class 
members: the respondent’s left-right self-placement and the materialist-postmaterialist index 
developed by Ronald Inglehart (1977, 1990). When we asked working-class members to 
locate themselves on a left-right scale from 1 (leftmost) to 10 (rightmost), we obtained the 
following trend (Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
Figure 1: Left-right self-placement of working-class members in Western Europe 
 
 
Two findings should be noted. First, the self-reported position of working-class members has 
remained relatively stable in the seven countries analyzed.
1
 Second, while there are some cross-country differences (not shown), these never exceed 
more than 0.5 points on the ten-point scale over the whole period analyzed.  
One might argue that the left-right placement of voters is far from a perfect indicator 
for this study’s purposes, as it remains unclear what voters have in mind when they refer to 
labels such as “left” and “right.” Some voters might regard the left-right scale as a super 
dimension, integrating all possible political issues, some might understand it as a purely 
economic scale, and yet others might think of it in terms of non-economic issues, e.g., relating 
to environmental protection. There are good reasons to believe that the issue is becoming even 
more complicated, when comparing different countries at different time points; the meanings 
of “left” and “right” may be country and time-specific (Enyedi & Deegan-Krause, 2010; 
                                                          
1
 As not all thirteen countries analysed in the final section have participated in all years since 1980, Figures 1 and 
2 report mean values for only seven countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany (West), Greece, Italy and 
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Franzmann & Kaiser, 2006; Kitschelt, 1994; Kriesi et al., 2006; Marks et al., 2006). 
Regardless, and while the significance of “left” and “right” to different voters remains 
unclear, a rightward trend is expected for this indicator of political preferences, if the 
argument about the working class’s changing political preferences is valid. If left-right is 
understood as an economic scale and working-class members have become more market-
liberal—as the realignment thesis states—a right-leaning trend would be expected. Likewise, 
if left-right is understood as a non-economic scale and working-class members have become 
more authoritarian, the same would be expected as well. This is the same case if left-right is 
understood as a dimension including all political issues, whether they are economic or non-
economic. However, this rightward trend does not occur. 
Another way to examine the political preferences of voters is through the Inglehart 
Index, which asks respondents to name their first and second most important goals out of four 
political issues: (1) maintenance of law and order, (2) giving people more say in government 
decisions, (3) fighting rising prices, and (4) protecting freedom of expression. The answers 
are then combined to construct a materialist-postmaterialist index, where (1) and (3) are seen 
as indicators for a materialist value orientation, and (2) and (4), for a postmaterialist value 
orientation.  
With regard to the Inglehart Index, three things should be noted.  First, the index is 
only weakly correlated with the left-right self-placement (Spearman’s rho: 0.161).  This 
shows that the two indicators measure different underlying concepts. While both concepts are 
related to the political preferences of respondents, the left-right self-placement measures a 
person’s political attitudes, while the Inglehart Index accounts for the ranking of political 
issues. Second, as Flanagan (Inglehart & Flanagan 1987) notes, three of the four Inglehart 
items (1, 2 and 4) are related to non-economic issues, while only one item (3) can be seen as 
an indicator for economic issues. This results in an overrepresentation of non-economic 
 
 
 
82 
 
answers. Third, the index does not include an item that respondents with a strong interest in 
left-wing economic policies can be expected to choose, as “fighting rising prices” is usually 
regarded as an answer that accounts for right-wing economic preferences. This last point is 
especially problematic for working-class members, as these individuals can be expected to 
have a strong interest in left-wing economic policies, for which the index does not account.  
To compensate for these shortcomings, Figure 2 presents the trend for the most 
important issues reported among working-class members in Western Europe. For this trend, 
items 1, 2 and 4 were summarized to measure non-economic value priorities (whether left or 
right), while item 3 accounts for (right) economic preferences. In contrast to the left-right self-
placement, a common trend is obvious: the percentage of working-class members who rank 
economic issues as being most important has decreased significantly over the period analyzed. 
While about 35 percent of these voter groups assigned these issues the highest priority in 
1980, only 17 percent did so at the end of the century.  
 
Figure 2: Most important issues to working-class members in Western Europe 
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In conclusion, the political preferences of working-class members have remained relatively 
stable in terms of left and right. Given the potential problems of this scale, it can be concluded 
that the working-class is as liberal/authoritarian and as economic left/right as it has ever been 
since 1980. However, the ranking of political issues has changed significantly over the period 
analyzed. Many working-class members do not rank economic issues as highly as they have 
in the past, and today they tend to give cultural issues the highest priority.  
What do these findings mean for the question regarding working-class support for 
ERPs? If we agree that the working class in Western Europe has remained consistently 
authoritarian and does still harbor a strong interest in left-oriented economic policies, but that 
the priorities of this voter group have changed from economic to non-economic issues, this 
change in priorities might have influenced the voting behavior of working-class members. If 
these voters still rank economic issues as being the most important, they should still have a 
strong incentive to vote for parties of the economic left, and not for ERPs, given their more 
market-liberal appeal. In contrast, if working-class members give non-economic issues the 
highest priority, they should support a party that matches their authoritarian preferences, 
which could be an extreme right party, and not a more liberal party of the economic left.  
However, why have the political priorities of working-class members changed during 
the last couple of decades? As will be argued in the next section, the explanation for this shift 
toward cultural issues lies in the changing patterns of party competition among Western 
European party systems, or the supply side of the electoral competition. 
 
3. Working-class Support for ERPs: A Party Competition Approach 
The idea that patterns of party competition influence the voting decision for an extreme right 
party and can thus explain parts of the variation in support for these parties among Western 
European countries has already been discussed by a number of previous studies. While most 
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of these studies model party competition as one-dimensional, there is no consensus about the 
issue content of this single dimension. Some authors claim that only a set of non-economic 
ERP core issues are relevant because ERPs only compete among these issues with other 
parties (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Ignazi, 2003b; Lubbers et al., 2002; Meguid, 2005). Other 
scholars argue that party competition in Western Europe can still be described in terms of 
“left” and “right,” as this super dimension has mainly absorbed the relatively new issues 
raised by the extreme right (Abedi, 2002; Carter ,2005; Van der Brug & van Spanje, 2009). 
Only a few studies addressing the way party competition affects the electoral fortunes of the 
extreme right distinguish between the economic and cultural dimensions of party competition. 
Interestingly, many of these authors are also advocates of the realignment thesis discussed 
above (Kitschelt, 1995; Kitschelt, 2007; de Lange, 2007; Kitschelt & McGann, 2005). While 
these scholars state that ERPs directly compete with other parties among economic issues—an 
assumption that is highly questionable, as indicated in the first section—the belief that an 
economic dimension of party competition may nonetheless be of importance for the electoral 
fortunes of ERPs has recently been put forward again by more recent studies (Bornschier, 
2008; Kriesi et al., 2006; Rydgren, 2004, 2005). 
This paper’s argument adheres to these latter studies and claims that it is necessary to 
distinguish between two dimensions of party competition in order to understand which 
changes have taken place in Western European party systems since the 1980s, and how these 
changes have contributed to the prominence of working-class voters among the ERPs’ 
electorates. More specifically, it is argued that the salience of the economic, class-based 
dimension of party competition is in decline in some Western European countries, but not —
or to a lesser extent — in others. At the same time, parties’ policy positions on the economic 
dimension converge, which means that voters do not see great differences between the parties 
anymore. Parallel to the decline of the economy-related dimension of party competition, the 
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salience of the cultural dimension of party competition, consisting mainly of the ERPs’ core 
issues and their liberal counter-issues, has increased. Parties’ policy positions on this new 
dimension have simultaneously diverged as well, offering voters more distinct policy options 
than before. These developments on the supply side of party competition impact the 
considerations under which working-class members decide for which party to vote.  
The idea that the high salience of non-material issues favors ERPs has already been 
put forth (Ignazi, 2003b) and empirically tested in previous studies (Arzheimer & Carter, 
2006; Meguid, 2005). The positive correlation between the salience of these issues 
(immigration, law and order, and anti-multiculturalism) and the electoral success of ERPs is 
explained by the fact that ERPs ‘own’ these issues and thus benefit if other parties also pay 
attention to them (Ignazi, 2003b). In line with this argument, it can also be assumed that the 
high salience of economic issues has a negative impact on the electoral results of ERPs. This 
negative relationship is based on the findings of previous studies that economic issues are of 
no or only of minor importance for voters in favor of the extreme right (Arzheimer, 2008; 
Ivarsflaten, 2005), as well as for those parties themselves (Mudde, 2007). The high salience of 
economic issues therefore encourages working-class voters to vote on the basis of their 
economic preferences, which are not in line with the economic appeal of ERPs.  
In addition to this salience-based argument, I contend that it is also necessary to 
account for the policy alternatives offered to voters, measured by the polarization of the party 
system. To clarify this point further, one might consider the following example. In a two-party 
system, both parties dedicate 80 percent of their appeals to economic issues, while non-
economic themes are seen to be of only little relevance and are given only 20 percent by both 
parties. In this case, working-class voters should have a strong incentive to base their voting 
decisions on their left-wing economic preferences. Let us now assume that both parties offer 
very similar programs with regard to economic issues, which will result in a low degree of 
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polarization on this dimension. Both parties favor a state-interventionist approach, and both 
wish to expand social services and to protect state-owned industry sectors from international 
competition; in short: both parties are economically left-wing. In contrast, the two parties are 
highly polarized on the non-economic dimension: one party favors a restrictive policy toward 
immigrants and advocates a tough law-and-order state, while the other party advocates a 
multi-cultural integration approach and strongly defends citizens’ rights to freedom. In this 
case, rational working-class voters should base their decisions on their non-material interests, 
even if this dimension is less salient. While voting on the basis of economic issues would not 
make a significant difference upon the outcome and could therefore be regarded as ‘wasted’, 
voting on the basis of non-economic preferences offers much more distinct alternatives in 
outcome. The arguments made thus far can be summarized into two hypotheses: 
 
H1:  In countries where economic issues are more salient than non-economic issues, 
working-class voters will make voting decisions based on their left-wing 
economic preferences. This leads them to vote for parties of the economic left 
and not for ERPs (and vice versa). 
 
H2:  In countries where parties are more polarized among economic than among 
non-economic issues, working-class voters will make voting decisions based 
on their left-wing economic preferences. This leads these them to vote for 
parties of the economic left and not for ERPs (and vice versa). 
 
While the incentives given by the salience and the polarization of the two dimensions are 
theoretically the same for all voters, the discussed variables of party competition are 
especially important to voters of the working class. This is because these voters combine the 
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demand for left economic and right non-economic policies (Houtman, 2003; Kriesi, 1999; 
Lipset, 1981; Middendorp & Meloen, 1990). Contrary to voters with a more centrist position 
on one of the two dimensions, working-class voters must decide between these two opposite 
demands, as there is almost no party in Western Europe that offers a combination of both 
policies (Van der Brug & van Spanje 2009). If working-class voters realize that the economic 
dimension is in decline in terms of salience and do not see any differences between the parties 
on this dimension, they would have the greatest incentives to base their vote decisions on their 
authoritarian non-material preferences, which directly leads them to vote for ERPs.  
Following this argument, the rise of the extreme right in Western Europe was not 
caused by changes on the demand side, but was initiated by the mainstream political parties 
themselves. Parts of the electorate and especially the working class have had authoritarian, 
anti-immigrant and anti-liberal attitudes, but these attitudes had never previously guided their 
vote decision, as this was prevented by the prominence of economic political issues.  
 
4. Changing Patterns of Party Competition in Western Europe 
This section gives an overview of the developments on the supply side of party competition in 
Western Europe during the period between 1980 and 2005.
2
 In order to provide a broad 
descriptive overview of the changing patterns of party competition, time trends for the 
salience of economic and non-economic issues and party system polarization among these 
issues have been estimated for thirteen Western European countries.
3
  
Let us first consider the salience of economic and non-economic issues. For each issue 
dimension, a salience measure based on the CMP dataset (Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et 
                                                          
2
 This period was chosen because most parties regarded as ERPs have emerged—or turned into ERPs—since the 
early 1980s. The year 2005 indicates the last year for which party positions are reported by the CMP, the dataset 
used to calculate the variables of party competition. 
3
 As the Belgium party system is segmented into two independent parts, referring either to the French or Flemish 
community, the two measures of party competition have been calculated separately for each region.  
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al., 2006) has been  constructed. For the economic dimension, all CMP categories that relate 
to economic issues
4
 were taken into account; for the non-economic dimension, only non-
economic categories were used.
5
 The frequencies for both issue sets were taken from the CMP 
dataset and then multiplied for each party with this party’s share of votes. Finally, these 
values were summed up for each single election. This procedure makes the units of the two 
measures of salience difficult to interpret, but they are comparable both over time and 
between countries.  
It should be repeated that the salience of each dimension says nothing about the policy 
options offered to voters on this dimension. In order to account for these options, a 
polarization index has been constructed separately for each of the two dimensions, using the 
formula first proposed by Sigelman and Yough (1978).
6
 Graphs for the party system 
polarization and the salience of both dimensions are given in the appendix (Figures 1 and 2). 
As these graphs illustrate, both the salience as well as the polarization of each dimension of 
party competition vary over time and between countries. In order to provide a more 
straightforward overview for each party system, linear time trends have been calculated (see 
                                                          
4
 For the salience of the economic dimension, all categories of the fourth CMP domain (economy) and categories 
504 (social services expansion), 505 (social services limitation), 701 (labor groups: positive), 702 (labor groups: 
negative), 703 (agriculture) and 704 (middle class and professional groups) were summarized. 
5
 The following CMP categories were used for the non-economic dimension: 107 (internationalism: positive), 
109 (internationalism: negative), 601 (national way of life: positive), 602 (national way of life: negative), 603 
(traditional morality: positive), 604 (traditional morality: negative), 605 (law and order), 607 (multiculturalism: 
positive), 608 (multiculturalism: negative) and 705 (minority groups). 
6
 The polarization (P) is calculated for each dimension using the formula 
n
2
P P (X X)
i i
i 1
 

, where ip is the vote share 
of party at a given election, 
i
X is the position of this party on a dimension of party competition, and X is the 
weighted mean. X is calculated by multiplying the vote share with the ideological position of a party. This step 
is repeated for each party in the party system. Finally, these values are added together. Please note that this 
measurement is independent of the number of parties. For the polarization measure used in this paper, it is 
necessary that party policy positions are measured spatially (on a range from 0 = extreme left to 10 = extreme 
right). While there are different ways of obtaining these values from the salience-based CMP dataset, only the 
approach proposed by Franzmann and Kaiser (2006) accounts for time and country-specific meanings of left and 
right—respectively, of liberal and authoritarian—and was therefore used for this paper. 
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Table 1).  A ‘+’ indicates a positive trend, meaning that the salience or polarization of a 
dimension has increased. In contrast, a ‘-’ indicates a negative trend for the period analyzed. 
Non-significant trends (10% level) are not displayed. 
 
Table 1: Trends in salience and polarization for both dimensions (1980-2005) 
 
 Economic dimension Non-economic dimension Ratio: 
Salience 
Ratio: 
Polarization Country Salience Polarization Salience Polarization 
Austria  - +    
Belgium (Flanders) - - + + - - 
Belgium (Wallonia)  -    - 
Denmark -  + - -  
Finland    -   
France - -   - - 
Germany   + + -  
Greece      + 
Italy  +  +   
Netherlands  - + +  - 
Norway    +  - 
Portugal    -  + 
Spain  +    + 
Sweden  -  -   
 
As the table indicates, the salience of the economic dimension shows a negative trend for 
three countries. In these party systems, the parties pay much less attention to economic issues 
today than they did in the 1980s. In contrast to this development, the salience of non-
economic issues has increased significantly in five of the party systems analyzed. With regard 
to the party system polarization, the findings are more mixed. On the economic dimension, 
there is a decrease in six cases, while two party systems (Italy and Spain) show higher levels 
of party system polarization on this dimension today than in the 1980s. Looking at the party 
system polarization along the non-economic dimension, a negative trend can be identified in 
four cases, while five party systems display increased polarization among non-economic 
issues. 
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The last two columns of the table show the trends for the ratio of the salience of 
economic issues compared to the salience of non-economic issues (ratio: salience), and for 
the ratio of the party system polarization among economic compared to non-economic issues 
(ratio: polarization). For these measures, the salience (polarization) of economic issues has 
been divided by the salience (polarization) of non-economic issues. Ration: salience increases 
when economic issues are more frequently discussed than non-economic issues; ration: 
polarization increases when the party system is more polarized with regard to economic 
issues than to non-economic issues. In addition to the advantage of offering one variable for 
each measure of party competition, this transformation is also necessary for theoretical 
reasons, and therefore only these two measures will be used for the subsequent analysis.
7
 
The reason for this lies in the assumed effect of the variables of party competition on 
voters. It is argued that parties offer their programmatic appeal to voters on both dimensions 
simultaneously. On the basis of these appeals, voters then decide whether their vote decision 
should be based on their economic or their non-economic preferences. Voters therefore 
compare the policy offers made by parties on the two dimensions, which is why an absolute 
measure of salience or polarization for each dimension is inadequate for the subsequent 
analysis. When considering the trends for the two ratio-variables, every country with a 
significant trend for ratio: salience shows a decline of this during the period analyzed. This 
means that voters in these countries should have much less incentive to vote on the basis of 
their economic preferences today than they did during the 1980s. Three of the four party 
systems for which this negative trend is identified are also systems with strong ERPs 
(Denmark, France, and Flanders). With regard to the polarization variable, five countries 
                                                          
7
 An alternative approach for dividing the economic by the non-economic measures would be to subtract them 
from each other. This measure is strongly correlated with the ratio-variables presented here (0.56 and 0.58, 
respectively). While the measures based on subtraction are much harder to interpret because of their units 
(especially for the salience-measure), their use does not change the empirical results presented here and in the 
next sections.     
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show a significant and negative trend. In these countries, voters should have much less 
incentive to base their voting decisions on their economic preferences today than they did in 
the 1980s. In contrast, three countries show a positive trend, which means that voters in these 
countries now have more reason to base their voting decisions on economic preferences than 
they did in the past. These countries are Greece, Portugal, and Spain, all countries with very 
marginal ERPs.    
Although the presentation in this section was limited to a purely descriptive character, 
some results can already be summarized. There are relevant differences in terms of salience 
and of polarization between the two dimensions, and these differences vary both over time 
and between countries. Initially, the identified trends seem to correlate with the electoral 
success of ERPs. However, the aim of this paper is not to provide an explanation for the 
overall electoral success of ERPs, but to give an explanation for working-class support for 
these parties, as well as for variation in this support among different countries. Therefore, the 
variables of party competition must be combined with the individual characteristics of voters, 
including respondents’ class as an independent variable. The resulting multi-level model is 
presented in the next two sections.     
 
5. Data and Operationalizations of Variables 
To test the hypotheses developed in the last sections, a multi-level model of voting behavior 
in Western Europe must be created. The time period covered is 1980 to 2002; the thirteen 
countries included are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden.
8
 This case selection facilitates the 
                                                          
8
 Unfortunately, the Eurobarometer Trend File does not allow for differentiation between the Belgian regions of 
Flanders and Wallonia. As the two regions show quite distinct patterns of party competition (see Section Four 
and the respective graphs in the appendix), I have decided to delete all Belgian voters who report voting 
decisions for a party only contesting in the region of Wallonia. This means that the dataset used for the analysis 
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analysis of countries with very strong ERPs, as well as party systems with only marginal 
ERPs. While the inclusion of the latter comes at the cost of basing the results for these 
contexts on very few ERP voters, this strategy seems adequate, as the non-inclusion of these 
contexts may cause a severe selection bias with regard to the variables of party competition 
(Golder, 2003, 2004). The model features two levels. 
On the first individual level, the model includes a set of individual characteristics and 
attitudes, which are known from previous studies to influence the vote decision for an ERP. 
These variables are the respondent’s sex, age (recoded as four age dummies), education 
(recoded as three education dummies), and dummies for class, respectively, employment 
status (working class, unemployed, petty bourgeoisie, and retired). In addition to these socio-
demographic characteristics, the individual-level model includes two politically-oriented 
variables: the respondent’s left-right self-placement and the reported satisfaction with 
democracy. The dependent variable is the binary recoded vote intention for an ERP.
9
 It is 
coded 1 if the respondent intends to vote for such a party, and 0 if the person would vote for 
any other party or does not intend to vote. All individual variables are taken from the 
Eurobarometer Trend File: 1970-2002 (Schmitt et al., 2005). As the dependent variable is 
dichotomous, a logistic regression (hierarchical generalized linear model) is applied.  
The second level consists of a combination of country and year (e.g., France 1981, 
Germany 1996, etc.) and includes the two variables of party competition developed above, in 
addition to a set of control variables. Altogether, there are 164 of these second-level 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
is limited in the Belgian case to the region of Flanders, which seems appropriate as the Flemish Vlaams Blok is a 
much more prominent example for an ERP than the relatively marginal Front Nationale in Wallonia. 
9
 The following parties were considered to be ERPs: Front National and Allez la France (France); Vlaams Blok, 
Front National and Waardig ouder Worden (Belgium); Centrum Partij and Centrum Democraten (the 
Netherlands); Deutsche Volksunion, Die Republikaner, Nationale Partei Deutschlands, Aktion unabhängiger 
Deutscher, and Freisoziale Union (Germany); Movimento Sociale Italia, Allianza Nazionale, and Lega Nord 
(Italy); Fremskridtspartiet and Dansk Folkeparti (Denmark); Ethniki Politici Enosis and Politici Anixi (Greece); 
Falange Espanola y de la JONS (Spain); Partido da Democracia Crista (Portugal); Fremskrittspartiet (Norway); 
Soumen Masseudun Pouloe und Perussuomalaiset (Finland); Ny Democraty (Sweden); and Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs (Austria). 
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contexts.
10
 In order to test the two hypotheses stated above, the two variables of party 
competition presented in the last section are included on the second level. The first variable 
(salience) measures the ratio of the salience of economic to non-economic issues. Again, 
salience adopts higher values when economic issues are more frequently discussed than non-
economic issues. In line with H1, I therefore expect this variable to be negatively correlated 
with the effect of the working-class dummy on the dependent variable. The second variable 
(polarization) accounts for the policy options available to voters. As stated previously, 
polarization adopts higher values when the party system is more polarized with regard to 
economic rather than non-economic issues. In line with H2, I therefore expect this variable to 
be negatively correlated with the effect of the working-class dummy on the dependent 
variable. 
Additionally, the following variables were included as control variables on the second 
level: the standardized unemployment rate and the change of this rate compared to the 
previous year. Both variables were taken from the Comparative Political Data Set I: 1960-
2006 (Armingeon et al., 2008). To control for the level of immigration, the share of asylum 
seekers and the change in this rate compared to the previous year were included as well. Both 
of these variables were taken from the OECD (1992, 1994, 2005). In line with the arguments 
made by previous studies (Arzheimer, 2009; Golder, 2003, 2004; Knigge, 1998), the 
unemployment and the immigration rates can be assumed to be positively correlated with the 
dependent variable. To control for the possible impact of the electoral system, the 
disproportionality index by Gallagher (1991) has been included.  
 
                                                          
10
 For the analysis, those contexts are included in which no respondent reports a vote intention for an ERP, but 
where he could have voted for such a party. Countries and contexts without an ERP contesting for votes (e.g., 
Ireland, Luxemburg, and the United Kingdom) have been excluded. While the British National Front can clearly 
be regarded as a party of the extreme right, it is not coded in the Eurobarometer Trend File. For this reason, the 
United Kingdom is excluded from the analysis.  
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6. Results 
The estimated effects of the individual and country-level variables are presented in Table 2.  
Due to missing data regarding the individual independent variables in the Eurobarometer 
Trend File, the number of observations at the individual level is reduced to 217.508. At the 
country level, missing data for the number of asylum seekers for Greece and Italy during the 
early 1980s reduce the number of second-level contexts to 164.  
The table reports two models. Model 1 shows the estimated main effects for the 
individual and the second-level variables. With only two exceptions (the retired dummy and 
the dummy for medium education), all b-coefficients of the individual-level variables are in 
line with the findings of previous studies and are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
Even after controlling for other individual variables, being a member of the working class 
strongly increases the probability of voting for an ERP. A test for random slopes for all 
individual level variables shows that the slopes of only four variables (satisfaction with 
democracy, left-right self-placement, sex, and the dummy for higher education) turned out to 
be statistically significant and therefore vary between the contexts. The slopes of these 
variables have thus been set as random. 
Regarding the variables of party competition, Model 1 shows that the salience of 
economic versus non-economic issues has a negative impact on the voting decision for an 
ERP. As this variable adopts higher values when the economic dimension is of greater 
salience than the non-economic dimension, this effect matches the predictions made in 
Section Three. When party competition is primarily based upon economic issues, this is 
unfavorable to a voter’s intention to support an ERP. In contrast, the polarization of the 
economic versus the non-economic dimension does not turn out to be of statistical 
significance, at least not as a main effect for all voters. 
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Table 2: Results of multi-level models 
 
 
Model 2 accounts for possible interaction effects between the working-class dummy and the 
variables of party competition. As the model shows, there is a significant and negative 
interaction effect between the polarization variable and the working-class dummy. This means 
that in contexts in which parties are more polarized among economic rather than among non-
economic issues, the positive impact of being member of the working class on the voting 
decision in favor of an ERP is strongly reduced, a finding that supports H2. Figure 3 shows 
the impact of this cross-level interaction effect.  
 Model (1) Model (2) 
 Coefficient  s. e. Coefficient  s. e. 
 1st level variables     
Working-class 0.424 **   0.040 0.637 **    0.097      
Unemployed 0.518 **   0.056   0.520 **    0.069      
Petty Bourgeoisie 0.105 *    0.055 0.099 *    0.055      
Retired 0.039    0.053 0.038    0.058      
Satisfaction with democracy -0.786 **  0.037 -0.788 **    0.036    
Left-right self placement 0.502 **  0.021 0.502 **    0.021     
Sex (male) 0.557 **   0.043 0.552 **    0.043     
Age (25 to 45 years) -0.272 **    0.043 -0.269 **    0.037     
Age (46 to 64 years) -0.482 **   0.047 -0.481 **    0.048     
Age (older than 65 years) -0.649 **   0.068 -0.648 **    0.069     
Education (medium) 0.005    0.036 0.0007    0.039 
Education (high) -0.458 **    0.054 -0.455 **    0.057     
     
2nd level variables     
Intercept (2nd level) -4.674 **  0.626 -4.727 **   0.681 
Unemployment -0.108 *  0.042 -0.108 *    0.043    
Δ Unemployment 0.084  0.122 0.081    0.117      
Asylum seekers 0.042 *  0.017 0.040 *    0.016      
Δ Asylum seekers -0.012  0.023 -0.011    0.017     
Disprop. of elect. sys. -0.017  0.028 -0.017    0.029    
Salience -0.128 *  0.043 -0.1240 **    0.037     
Polarization 0.001  0.080 0.029    0.084      
     
Interaction effects     
Working-class*salience - - -0.012    0.024     
Working-class*polarization - - -0.093 **    0.023     
     
Variance Components Variance comp. Chi-square Variance comp. Chi-square 
Intercept 2nd level (u0) 3.649 ** 942.179 3.658** 939.306 
SATISDMO slope, 0.105 ** 484.910   0.324 ** 485.776 
LRS slope, 0.046 ** 887.595 0.214 **  880.690 
SEX slope 0.094 ** 227.469 0.304 **   225.978 
EDUC_HIG slope 0.100 ** 208.569   0.297 *  200.434 
     
Number of level 1 units 217.508  217.508  
Number of level 2 units 164  164  
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Figure 3: Cross-level interaction effect between polarization and working-class dummy 
 
 
 
The effect of being a member of the working class on the voting decision in support of an 
ERP is sharply reduced in contexts where parties are more polarized among economic rather 
than among non-economic issues. For every unit that party system polarization increases, the 
effect of being a member of the working class on the voting decision for an ERP is reduced by 
0.093 units. Furthermore, and as Table 3 shows, the identified interaction effect is significant 
for all values of the polarization variable, which provides further support for H2.  
If a party system is more divided on economic issues, working-class voters tend to 
vote on the basis of their economic preferences because, on this dimension of party 
competition, their votes can be expected to make the greatest difference in policy outcome. 
Under these considerations, working-class voters will support a party of the economic left and 
not an ERP. However, if parties are more divided on non-economic issues (including the 
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extreme right’s core issues), working-class voters will making voting decisions on the basis of 
their authoritarian non-material preferences, which increases the probability that they will cast 
their votes for an ERP.  
 
Table 3: Slopes and t-values of working-class dummy for different values of polarization 
 
 Polarization at 
value 
Effect of working-class 
on dependent variable 
t-value 
Polarization (minimum) 0.420 0.343** 7.729 
Polarization (25% 
percentile) 
0.868 0.302** 6.099 
Polarization (mean) 2.280 0.168* 2.344 
Polarization (75% 
percentile) 
2.508 0.146* 1.932 
Polarization (maximum) 7.930 -0.367* -1.974 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The analysis in the previous section has clearly shown that variables of party competition 
explain a large part of the variance in working-class support for ERPs. In contexts where the 
economic dimension is more polarized than the non-economic dimension, the positive impact 
of being member of the working class on the voting decision for an ERP is strongly reduced. 
With regard to this result, Mudde’s conclusion that ‘it’s not the economy, stupid’ (2007: 119) 
should be read more carefully. While there is strong evidence that ERP voters do not support 
these parties because of their economic appeal and that economic issues are of only minor 
importance for the ideology of ERPs, the decline in polarization of the economic dimension of 
party competition nonetheless has influenced the electoral fortunes of ERPs by providing 
these parties with a favorable political opportunity structure to mobilize voters on their non-
material core issues. However, the analysis in this paper also points out that different voter 
groups are affected differently by party competition variables. Future research should 
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therefore focus on interaction effects between party competition and the political preferences 
of voters, an issue that could not be addressed using the Eurobarometer data.  
The results presented in this article also reveal a link between the rise of the extreme 
right and a phenomenon that has also attracted considerable scientific interest during the last 
two decades: the decline of class-based voting (Clark & Lipset, 2001; Evans, 1999). As earlier 
studies in this field (Przeworski & Sprague, 1986; Sartori, 1969) have assumed and more 
recent literature on the conditions of class voting indicates (Achterberg, 2006; Achterberg & 
Houtman, 2006; Elff, 2007, 2009; Evans et al., 1999), working-class voters will only make 
election decisions on the basis of their economic interests, if these interests are politicized by 
political parties. Parties can decide which issues are politicized for electoral competition, and 
these choices directly impact individuals’ voting behaviors (Achterberg & Houtman, 2006; 
Crewe, 1992; Sartori, 1969). It can therefore be concluded that the decline of the economic 
dimension of party competition—or the decline of class-based politics—has certainly 
influenced two distinct phenomena: the rise of the extreme right and the decline in class-based 
voting.  
With regard to democratic representation, two conclusions can be drawn from this 
article. First, voters with both economic left and non-economic right preferences are as well 
represented today as they were decades ago. However, while in the past, left-wing parties 
attracted these voters based on their economic but not on their non-economic preferences, this 
pattern has changed. Today, many of these voters support political parties of the extreme 
right, which offer representation for their authoritarian attitudes without paying attention to 
their economic demands. Working-class voters are therefore as well represented as they have 
been in the past, as there is nearly no party in Western Europe that combines left-wing 
economic principles with right-wing, non-material ideals. Second, this article calls into 
question those studies that have argued that the decline of class-based voting is mainly caused 
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by the fact that class differences among voters have decreased and that have thus praised this 
development as a victory of democratic conflict resolution (Franklin et al., 1992). If working-
class voters have turned away from the political left, only to turn to the extreme right—
because they no longer feel represented in economic terms by the former—this suggests that 
the rise of the extreme right will continue in the future. Changes in the composition of the 
electorate, amplified economic competition and integration in Europe strongly suggest that 
the decline of economic policy options will remain constant, and as this paper has shown, this 
trend is favorable to the electoral success of ERPs. 
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Appendix 
Figure 1: Salience of economic and non-economic issues in Western European party systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
106 
 
Figure 2: Party system polarization among economic and non-economic issues in Western Europe 
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When Voters Have to Decide:  
Explaining Vote Choices in a Two-dimensional Political Space 
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Abstract 
Many voters in Western Europe are confronted with a crucial decision. As there are nearly no 
parties combining an economic left with a cultural right appeal or an economic right with a 
cultural left standing, voters with these combination of preferences have to decide between 
the party that matches their economic needs or the one that meets their cultural demands. This 
paper analyses this vote decision by applying aspects of the proximity theory to voting 
behaviour. The findings for 16 Western European countries suggest that both the individual 
preferences of voters and the overall patterns of party competition do influence this vote 
choice. This means that in two elections, the very same voter with constant political 
preferences might vote for very different political parties. 
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Introduction 
In recent years, it has become more or less common in political science to see the political 
issue-space in Western Europe as being structured by two dimensions (for a recent overview, 
see Enyedi and Deegan-Krause, 2010). On the one hand, political competition is formed 
through economic-related conflicts over the distribution of material resources, resulting in a 
distinct economic dimension of political competition with the two extremes: ‘state-
interventionism’ for the old left-wing policies, and ‘free-market solutions’ for the old right-
wing policies. On the other hand, scholars have identified a second dimension that consists of 
cultural or noneconomic issues. Although the precise content of this second dimension is 
defined rather diverse, its new left-wing extreme may be labelled ‘liberalism’, and its new 
right-wing policies ‘authoritarianism’. Theoretically, therefore, parties and voters in Western 
Europe can position themselves everywhere between these four extremes. 
At the same time, Western European parties seem to be somewhat reserved with 
regard to position themselves in this potential space. Although many parties demonstrate a 
combination of state-interventionism and liberalism or of free-market solutions and 
authoritarianism, Van der Brug and Van Spanje have recently argued  that ‘there are hardly 
any parties that are left-wing on socio-economic issues and right-wing on cultural issues, or 
vice versa’ (2009: 328). Therefore, it is often impossible for voters with these distinct 
combinations of preferences to find a party that simultaneously fits both their economic and 
cultural demands. These voters will have to make an important decision: Should they vote for 
the party that fits their economic preferences, or should they vote for the party that comes 
closest to their cultural perspectives? 
This paper analyses this crucial decision with which many voters in Western Europe 
are faced. It is structured as follows: After summarizing recent findings on the political 
situation in Western Europe, it was discovered that parties and voters are located empirically 
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on an economic and a cultural scale. This mapping supports the assumption that voters with a 
distinct combination of preferences will have difficulty finding a party that matches both their 
economic and cultural demands and will therefore have to decide between economic and 
cultural preferences. After analysing this issue more deeply by applying insights from the 
proximity theory of voting behaviour (Downs, 1957; Enelow and Hinich, 1982, 1984, 1990), 
several hypotheses on the individual and contextual factors that might influence this decision 
were formulated. It is assumed that both the individual characteristics of voters as well as the 
political context in which this decision is made are of importance. The hypotheses were tested 
empirically for 16 Western European countries.  
It was determined that voters with extreme preferences with regard to economic issues 
tend to choose the party that is closest to them in the economic dimension, while voters with 
extreme cultural positions tend to vote for the party closest to them in the cultural dimension. 
However, voters with extreme market-oriented and liberal views show a higher probability to 
cast their vote for the party that fits their economic preferences, while voters with extreme 
state-interventionist and authoritarian preferences tend to vote for party that fits their cultural 
preferences. Furthermore, the political offers made by parties to voters play an important role 
in the decision: If parties focus more on cultural issues, voters tend to vote for the party 
closest to them in cultural preferences. Conversely, if parties focus on economic issues, the 
incentive for voters to vote for the party closest to them in economic preferences increases 
significantly.   
 
1. The Political Space in Western Europe 
Fifty years ago, the well-known ‘frozen-party thesis’ by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) stated that 
the party systems of the 1960s were structured according to the same basic political conflicts 
since the 1920s. Although this classic study on party competition identifies four distinct lines 
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of political conflict, it also shows that the dominant cleavage among Western European party 
systems is the economic-related class conflict; this conflict has basically absorbed the other 
three. Party competition was therefore seen as one-dimensional, usually described in terms of 
‘left’ and ‘right’.  
Since the time of Lipset and Rokkan’s influential study, at least two phenomena have 
pointed to a fundamental change in the patterns of party competition in Western Europe. The 
first one was the emergence of green parties during the 1980s, accompanied and driven by the 
rise of self-expressing and ecological-oriented issues. A decade later, the emergence of parties 
of the extreme right, advocating anti-immigrant sentiments and law-and-order solutions, again 
signalled to political scientists that the party systems of Western Europe are anything but 
frozen.  
Consequently, scholars agree that traditional political conflicts – and the former 
dominant economic and class-based conflict – have lost much of their political importance 
(Crewe, 1983; Dalton et al., 1984; Franklin et al., 1992; Kriesi et al., 2006) and are 
increasingly replaced by relatively new cultural-related issues primarily concerned with 
ecology, cultural diversity, nationalism and immigration (Evans, 1999; Inglehart, 1990; 
Kitschelt, 1994, 1995; Knutsen, 1989; Kriesi, 1998; Manza and Brooks, 1999; Marks et al., 
2006). With regard to the voters, this trend is accompanied by a higher ranking of cultural-
related issues, compared to that of the traditional economic-related issues (Flanagan and Lee, 
2003; Inglehart, 2008, 1997, 1984; Inglehart and Flanagan, 1987).  
However, traditional economic issues are not completely replaced by these ‘new 
politics’ (Franklin et al., 1992) or ‘new value’ (Inglehart, 1990) issues. This is because parties 
do have incentive to incorporate the latter into existing lines of political conflict to attract both 
new cultural-oriented voters as well as their traditional economic-oriented supporters (Beck, 
1982; Castles and Mair, 1984). Therefore, while the increasing importance of cultural issues 
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for political competition is undisputed, the relationship between these new issues and the 
traditional economic conflict is still discussed.  
The two positions in this discussion might be summarized as a one- versus two-
dimensional view on the political situation in Western Europe. As the majority of the 
literature suggests, the political space in Western Europe is – for most countries – two-
dimensional (Bornschier, 2010; Enyedi and Deegan-Krause, 2010; Hooghe et al., 2002; 
Kitschelt, 1994, 1995; Knutsen, 1989; Kriesi, 2010; Kriesi et al., 2006; Marks et al., 2006; 
Warwick, 2002). Parties and voters’ positions on the economic and cultural dimensions are 
independent of each other; therefore, it is adequate and necessary to analyse political 
competition in a two-dimensional way. In contrast to this view, some authors argue that the 
new cultural issues have basically been absorbed and integrated into the traditional economic 
dimension, which results again in a one-dimensional political space, even if the meaning of 
this single dimension might have changed (Iversen, 1994; Van der Brug and Van Spanje, 
2009). Empirically, however, it is only appropriate to speak of a one-dimensional space if 
parties and voters’ positions on the economic and cultural axes are highly correlated with each 
other; therefore, we are able to predict where both actors stand on cultural issues if we know 
their position on the economic axis.
1
Following the majority of the literature, I begin my analysis with the assumption of a 
political space defined by an economic- and cultural-related axis. It is then tested for parties 
and voters to discover whether their positions on these two axes are highly correlated 
(supporting the one-dimensional view) or are independent of each other (supporting the two-
                                                          
1
 While this article is not intended to solve this ongoing discussion, it should be noted that the empirical results 
pointing to a one- or two-dimensional view on the political space do strongly depend on a number of 
methodological and theoretical questions: (1) the variety of issues taken into account, especially with regard to 
the cultural dimension, (2) the source of data (mass or expert surveys; content analysis of newspapers or party 
platforms (see for this point also Warwick, 2002), (3) the case selection, (4) the theories and the resulting 
measurements of party placements (spatial or salience theory), and (5) if parties, voters or both are analysed.  
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dimensional view). I expect that the political space of parties and voters is structured in 
different dimensions, as parties do have the incentive to structure and minimise the number of 
political conflicts, while we would not expect the same for voters.  
 
2. Locating parties and voters in Western Europe 
Let us start with the assumption of a political space in Western Europe that has an economic 
axis and a cultural axis. On the economic axis, parties and voters can position themselves 
between the extremes ‘state-interventionism’ (old left) and ‘free-market solutions’ (old right); 
the corresponding extremes for the cultural dimension are ‘liberalism’ (new left) and 
‘authoritarianism’ (new right). We therefore need data for the positions of parties and voters 
on the economic as well as on the cultural axis.  
The usual approach to locate both actors is to ask survey-respondents to locate 
themselves and their national parties on predefined scales, covering different issue 
preferences. Unfortunately, there is no cross-national dataset that asks respondents to locate 
themselves as well as parties on more than one issue-scale, usually a left-right-scale. The only 
way to obtain positions of parties and voters for more than one issue and for different Western 
European countries is to use different data for both actors.
2
 In this paper, parties’ positions 
have been calculated using the data offered by the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et 
al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006), while voters’ positions have been calculated using data 
offered by the World Value Survey (WVS, 2009). Thus, parties’ and voters’ positions could 
be measured for 16 Western European countries, depending on the availability of data for one 
                                                          
2
 The use of different data for both actors may raise concerns about the comparability of the resulting positions. 
With regard to this important methodological question, two remarks should be made at this early stage: First, the 
results of the corresponding models are comparable to studies relying solely on respondents’ self- and party-
placements (see endnote 12). Second, the use of respondents’ self- and party-placements to analyse the political 
space of both actors comes with its own difficulties, as voters might be influenced by processes of cognitive 
assimilation (Merrill et al., 2001) and projection (Merrill and Grofman, 1999). Using different data for voters 
and parties eliminates this problem. 
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to three time points: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK.  
Although previous studies have consistently defined the issues considered for the 
economic-related scale, the cultural scale is conceptualised rather diverse (see Enyedi and 
Deegan-Krause, 2010: 416). This diversity is driven primarily by the inclusion or 
noninclusion of ecology-related issues for the cultural axis. A prominent example for the 
inclusion of ecological preferences is the study by Marks et al. (2006). They see party support 
for European integration as one-dimensional with the two extremes GAL (green, alternative 
and libertarian) and TAN (traditionalist, authoritarian and nationalist). Although this allows 
them to place both green and extreme right parties on this GAL/TAN dimension, the inclusion 
of green issues might be questioned. This is because in contrast to the issue-pair 
libertarian/authoritarian, the preferences towards green issues might not discriminate between 
parties. We can easily perceive a party as alternative, libertarian, authoritarian or nationalist 
(or not), but it is difficult to conceive of a party not being in favour of environmental 
protection. In the words of Stokes (1963), green issues have been transformed from positional 
to valence issues, at least in the Western European context. The inclusion of green issues for 
the cultural scale therefore raises the potential problem that, for example, an extreme right 
party such as the Freedom Party of Austria might appear more to the GAL end of the 
GAL/TAN dimension than it would appear without taking ecological issues into account. The 
two measurements for voters and parties presented below, therefore, do not include ecologic-
related issues for the cultural dimension.  
To obtain party policy positions on the two dimensions, the data offered by the 
Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) has been used. The methods used by the CMP to map 
party policy positions based on election manifestos are described at length elsewhere (see 
Budge et al., 2001, app. 2), and I briefly review these methods here. Under the CMP 
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framework, policy preferences are characterized by systematic examination of party stances 
on policies based on content analysis of election programmes. The CMP isolates ‘quasi-
sentences’ in a party’s policy programme and pairs them with 56 predefined policy categories 
(e.g., welfare spending, law and order, traditional morality, etc.). The percentages of each 
category provide the basis for estimating the policy priorities of a party. Although there are 
different approaches to transform these salience-based measures into party positions (Gabel 
and Huber, 2000; Kim and Fording, 1998; Shikano and Pappi, 2004), the approach proposed 
by Franzmann and Kaiser (2006) has been used for this article. This results in policy positions 
of parties on an economic
3
 and cultural
4
 scale, each ranging from 0 (maximal state-
interventionist, resp. liberal) to 10 (maximal market-oriented, resp. authoritarian). Figure 1 
reports the policy positions for 63 parties in 16 Western European countries in the year 2000.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 The party positions on the economic axis have been calculated by following CMP categories: all categories of 
the fourth CMP domain (economy) and the categories 504 (social services expansion), 505 (social services 
limitation), 701 (labour groups: positive) 702 (labour groups: negative), 703 (agriculture) and 704 (middle class 
and professional groups). 
4
 The following CMP categories have been used for the cultural dimension: 107 (internationalism: positive), 109 
(internationalism: negative), 601 (national way of life: positive), 602 (national way of life: negative), 603 
(traditional morality: positive), 604 (traditional morality: negative), 605 (law and order), 607 (multiculturalism: 
positive), 608 (multiculturalism: negative) and 705 (minority groups). 
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Figure 1: Parties’ positions in Western Europe in 2000  
  
 
As the figure shows, parties in Western Europe are hesitant to occupy the theoretical available 
political space defined by the two axes. While the majority of parties combine a state-
interventionist with a liberal (quadrant 1) or a market-oriented with an authoritarian (quadrant 
3) policy appeal, we find only few parties in quadrants 2 (market-oriented and liberal) and 4 
(state-interventionist and authoritarian). Furthermore, in contrast to the more densely 
occupied quadrants, the positions of parties in quadrants 2 and 4 are moderate. If we correlate 
the party positions on the two axes, we obtain a person’s R of 0.646. While a value of 0 would 
represents a perfect two-dimensional space and 1 would represent a perfect one-dimensional 
policy space, this correlation is far away from either extreme. However, the fact remains that 
nearly no Western European parties can be found in quadrants 2 and 4.  
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Let us turn to the location of voters on the two axes. Using data offered by the World Value 
Survey, I have calculated an economic and cultural-related index.
5
 The economic index relies 
on four items, measuring respondent’s attitudes towards income equality, private versus state 
ownership of business, job taking of the unemployed and economic competition. 
Confirmatory factor analysis shows that these four items indeed tab one underlying 
dimension.
6
 After recoding the items to a scale of 0 to 10, I have constructed an additive index 
to account for respondents’ preferences with regard to economic issues. The cultural index is 
based on three single indices: an index for sexual permissiveness
7
, an index for traditional 
values about gender roles
8
 and an index for conformity as an educational value.
9
 
Confirmatory factor analysis reveals that the three single indices indeed tab one underlying 
dimension.
10
 All single items were recoded to a scale of 0 to 10 before summing up the three 
single indices for the cultural index. As for the parties, this results in policy positions of voters 
on an economic and cultural scale, each of which ranges from 0 (state-interventionist, resp. 
liberal) to 10 (market-oriented, resp. authoritarian). Figure 2 reports the policy positions of 
voters in the 16 Western European countries in 2000. For graphical presentation, I have drawn 
                                                          
5
 See for a similar operationalisation Achterberg (2006). 
6
 Confirmatory factor analysis shows that the four economic-related items could be explained by one underlying 
item with an Eigenvalue of 1.615 explaining 40.39% of the combined variance. 
7
 The scale for sexual permissiveness was measured by five judgements of respondents about the degree to 
which they think activities like ‘married men/women having an affair’, ‘sex under the legal age of consent’, 
‘homosexuality’, ‘prostitution’ and ‘abortion’ can be justified. The index for sexual permissiveness was 
constructed for each respondent using at least three valid answers. 
8
 The scale for traditional values about gender roles consists of five items, mainly of the Likert-type (agree 
completely–disagree completely), posing that ‘when jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women’, 
‘a working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does 
not work’, ‘a preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works’, ‘a job is alright, but what most 
women really want is a home and children’ and ‘being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay’. The 
index for traditional values about gender roles was constructed for each respondent using at least three valid 
answers. 
9
 The scale for conformity as an educational value consists of six items in which the respondents indicate which 
qualities children should be encouraged to learn at home. Three of these qualities, ‘good manners’, ‘religious 
faith’ and ‘obedience’, emphasize conformity, while the three qualities ‘determination, perseverance’, 
‘imagination’ and ‘independence’ emphasize the opposite. The index for conformity as an educational value was 
constructed for each respondent using at least five valid answers. 
10
 Confirmatory factor analysis shows that the three single indices (sexual permissiveness, gender roles and 
conformity as an educational value) could be explained by one underlying item with an Eigenvalue of 1.706 
explaining 56.86% of the combined variance. 
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a random sample of 500 respondents (out of 12.805 in the year 2000) for which values for 
both issues could be generated. 
 
Figure 2: Voters’ positions in Western Europe in 2000  
  
 
As Figure 2 shows, voters in Western Europe are more scattered among the available political 
space than parties are. In the overall dataset, we find 9.92% of all voters in quadrant 1 (state-
interventionist and liberal), 24.93% in quadrant 2 (market-oriented and liberal), 49.31% in 
quadrant 3 (market-oriented and authoritarian) and 15.31% in quadrant 4 (state-interventionist 
and authoritarian). The correlation of voters positions on the two scales results in a Pearson’s 
r of 0.083. This would allow us to conclude that the political preferences of voters are indeed 
better described in a two-dimensional way, as the knowledge of a respondent’s economic 
preferences does not allow us to predict his cultural preferences.  
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With regard to electoral representation of voters by parties, these findings support the point 
recently made by Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009): Many voters in Western Europe will 
be unable to find a party that matches both their economic and cultural preferences, and these 
voters are located primarily in quadrants 2 and 4. Therefore, these voters have to decide 
whether they should cast their vote for the party that identifies with their cultural preferences 
or the one in line with their economic preferences, a problem we will now turn to in more 
detail. 
 
3. Modelling the vote decision 
In order to obtain deeper insight into the problem of electoral representation discussed above, 
we can analyse the dilemma of voters applying insights from the proximity theory of voting 
(Downs, 1957; Enelow and Hinich, 1984, 1990). Although this formal theory of voting has 
been challenged and defended continuously since its formulation by Anthony Downs 
(Grofman, 2004; Iversen, 1994; Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989), it remains the main point 
of reference for studies on electoral behaviour. 
Whereas the assumptions of the proximity model of voting are rather restrictive 
(Grofman, 2004), the basic idea behind the theory is simple: Voters are able to locate 
themselves and their parties in a predefined policy space and can vote for the party whose 
position is closest to their own. The distance between voter and party is understood as a utility 
function: the closer the party is to the position of the voter, the greater the utility gained. 
Conversely, larger distances result in a loss of utility. In the two-dimensional policy space 
discussed above, the problem of representation could be translated into Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
120 
 
Figure 3: Vote choice in a two-dimensional policy space  
 
The figure depicts the simplest case, with one voter who has to decide between two rivalling 
parties. As the proximity theory assumes, this voter knows the distances between him and the 
two parties on each dimension ‘ΔA economic’ and ‘ΔA cultural’ for party A; ‘ΔB economic’ 
and ‘ΔB cultural’ for party B. Obviously, the voter in Figure 3 finds himself in an dilemma, as 
neither of the two parties matches his ideal position on both dimensions. While party A is 
close to his own position on the cultural axis, it does not match his preferences on the 
economic axis. Party B is close to him in economic preferences but not in cultural position. So 
which party should this voter vote for?  
A possible approach is to assume that voters are indifferent about the utility gained or 
lost on each of the single dimensions as long as the overall utility is maximized. However, 
this approach theoretically states that political competition could be reduced to a single 
dimension. Although this assumption is indeed at the heart of the proximity theory (see 
Grofman, 2004), it could be challenged for two reasons. First, studies on value change 
(Flanagan and Lee, 2003; Inglehart, 2008, 1990) and advocates of issue-ownership theories of 
voting behaviour have concordantly shown (Petrocik, 1996; Petrocik et al., 2003; Van der 
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Brug, 2004), voters are indeed able and willing to rank political issues, paying more 
importance to one and less to others. To sum up the position of voters on different scales and 
calculate the mean position might therefore be misleading.
11
 Second, as long as we follow the 
assumption of one-dimensionality, the issue regarding the economic- and cultural-closest 
party cannot be addressed and indeed is not even seen as a problem. Under the assumption of 
one-dimensionality, the proximity theory predicts that even voters with extreme preferences 
on both scales would vote for a centrist party. Let the position of the voter be 1 on the 
economic and 9 on the cultural scale; his preferred party would be located at 5. In contrast, in 
a political space with two independent dimensions, this voter might cast his vote for a party 
that is either far left in economic position or far right in cultural terms.              
For these reasons, Table 1 shows the voting decision of respondents in a two-
dimensional policy space under the assumption of two independent dimensions. For this table, 
voters’ positions on the economic and cultural scales (taken from the WVS) have been 
compared with the respective party positions (based on the CMP dataset).
12
 The table is based 
on the vote intention of voters, which explains the relatively small number of nonvoters. 
Given the two-dimensional political space discussed in the previous section, there are five 
possible choices voters can take: they could vote for the party that is (1) closest to them on 
both issue dimensions, (2) closest to them only on the economic dimension, or (3) closest to 
them only on the cultural dimension, or (4) closest to them neither on the economic nor on the 
cultural dimension. The final option, (5), is that they could decide to abstain from voting.  
 
 
                                                          
11
 For a discussion of this problem, see also (Grofman, 2004; Tomz and Van Houweling, 2008; Shikano, 2008). 
12
 In contrast to the use of voters’ self- and party placements, the use of independent data sources avoids the 
possibility of cognitive assimilation (Achterberg 2006) and projection (Merrill and Grofman, 1999), which can 
be assumed to overestimate the explained variance in proximity models of voting (Merrill, 1995). 
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Table 1: Vote choice depending on voters’ positions  
 
 Vote intention for the party closest on…  
Respondent 
would not 
vote 
economic 
and 
cultural 
dimension 
economic 
dimension 
cultural 
dimension 
none of the 
two 
dimensions 
All respondents 
(all quadrants) 
7.14 16.05 19.54 52.07 5.20 
State-oriented and liberal 
(quadrant 1) 
9.50 15.25 15.85 53.34 6.07 
Market-oriented and liberal 
(quadrant 2) 
3.02 18.23 19.05 55.04 4.65 
Market-oriented and 
authoritarian 
(quadrant 3) 
9.34 14.93 21.27 49.65 4.80 
State-oriented and 
authoritarian 
(quadrant 4) 
5.45 16.62 17.66 53.39 6.87 
 
 
Table 1 reports the distribution of the five possible choices for the overall sample and for 
voter groups with distinct combinations of economic and cultural preferences. In the overall 
sample, only 7.14% of all voters have voted for the party that is closest to them on both 
dimensions. However, these statistics vary sharply among voters with distinct policy 
preferences. While 9.5% of all voters located in quadrant 1 and 9.34% located in quadrant 3 
have cast their vote for the party closest to them on both dimensions, the percentage decreases 
significantly for voters located in quadrants 2 (3.02%) and 4 (5.45%). The variation in the 
percentage of voters able to find a party closest to them on one of the two issue-scales is 
rather limited and ranges from 15.85% to 18.23% for the economic dimension and 17.45% to 
21.27% for the cultural dimension. Also, the variation in the number of theory-noncompliant 
voters among the quadrants is rather limited.
13
          
                                                          
13
 The fact that 52.07% of voters behave as theory-noncompliant might appear to be a large percentage. 
However, this value is comparable to the unexplained variance reported in other studies using formal models of 
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Table 1 therefore supports the argument made in the previous sections: Depending on the 
combination of their economic and cultural preferences, voters in Western Europe are unable 
to find a party that simultaneously matches both of their policy demands. Faced with this 
dilemma, these voters have to decide whether they most value the economic position or the 
cultural position. The next section develops some hypotheses on the individual and context 
variables that might effect this crucial decision with which approximately 40% of all voters in 
the 16 Western European countries analyzed are confronted. 
 
4. Hypotheses 
Although the decision of voters regarding different issue dimensions has not been addressed 
by previous studies using formal theories of voting behaviour, it can be assumed that this 
decision is influenced by the individual characteristics of voters as well as by the political 
context in which this decision is made.   
Beginning with the individual level, we might assume that the intensity of preferences 
influences the choice between the economic or cultural closest party. Although the proximity 
theory understands this intensity solely as the distance between the voters’ position and the 
positions of the contesting parties, there are two alternatives to this view. First, advocates of 
issue-ownership theory (Merrill 1995, Van der Brug, 2004) find strong evidence that voters 
are able to rank political issues with regard to their perceived importance and that this ranking 
influences the individual voting decision. In our case, we can expect that voters that rank 
economic-related issues higher than cultural-related issues will also vote for the party that is 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
voting behaviour (Merrill, 1995; Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989; Westholm, 1997). However, it might be 
argued that this high percentage of theory-noncompliant voters is caused by the noncomparability of the voters’ 
and parties’ measures, which are based on independent data sources. To address this potential problem, I have 
calculated an additive index for voters’ and parties’ positions on the two dimensions. In this constructed one-
dimensional space, 30.25% of all respondents have voted for the party closest to them, while 69.75% show a 
vote intention that is not predicted by proximity theory. These values are comparable to these found by Warwick 
(2010), who reports that only one-third of all voters behave in a theory-compliant manner.  
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closest to them on the economic dimension, and vice versa. Second, critics of the proximity 
theory claim that the pure distance between a voter and his preferred party is insufficient for 
understanding this voter’s party choice. Advocates of the directional theory of voting 
behaviour (Macdonald et al., 1998; Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989) argue that voters are 
primarily interested in a policy shift towards a certain direction and consequently vote for the 
party that they believe will change policies in their preferred way. While this assumption has 
been criticized for both theoretical and methodological reasons (Iversen, 1994; Merrill, 1995; 
Warwick, 2004), we might assume for our scenario that voters with extreme preferences with 
regard to economic (resp. cultural) issues might also vote for the party closest to them on the 
economic (resp. cultural) dimension. 
In addition to the individual preferences of voters, the decision for the economic or 
cultural-closest party might be influenced by the overall patterns of party competition at a 
given election.
14
 This is the dominant theoretical view of many studies focusing on the 
political opportunity structure of different parties (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Bélanger and 
Meguid, 2005; Ignazi, 1992; Kitschelt, 1986, 1994, 1995; Meguid, 2005; Rydgren, 2005; Van 
der Brug et al., 2005). Again, there are two main contesting theories on how party competition 
operates, influences voters and should be measured (Budge, 2001).  
First, the salience theory states that parties do not compete with each other on all 
possible issues but put greater emphasis on issues they ‘own’ while ignoring issues occupied 
by rivalling parties. Parties’ positions thus consist of contrasting emphases placed on different 
policy areas. While the salience theory focuses exclusively on the electoral strategies of 
parties, the issue-ownership theory states that the mean salience of issues among all 
competing parties signals to voters which issues are of importance at a given election – and 
                                                          
14
 Theoretically, this presumes that voters are able to locate not only themselves and their preferred party but also 
all other parties in the predefined policy space, an assumption that is perfectly in line with the proximity model.  
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which are not. Voters then cast their vote for the party that they believe has the greatest 
competence in solving the most salient political problems (Petrocik, 1996). In our two-
dimensional policy space, this let us to assume that voters will vote for the economic-closest 
party if economic issues are of high salience. In contrast, voters will vote for the cultural-
closest party if cultural issues are of high salience. 
Second, confrontational theory of party competition sees parties taking up a range of 
explicit positions on each issue, ranging from fully pro to fully con (see e.g. (Downs, 1957). 
This view is theoretically much more in line with the proximity model of voting, as the 
confrontational approach directly measures parties’ policy positions on different issues, not 
the salience of these issues. In addition to the salience-based arguments developed so far, the 
decision for the economic or cultural-closest party might therefore also be influenced by the 
policy alternatives offered to voters, measured by the polarization of the party system on the 
two dimensions. To clarify this point, one might consider the following example. In a two-
party system, both parties dedicate 80% of their appeals to economic issues, while they view 
cultural issues of little relevance and dedicate only 20%. In this case, voters should have a 
strong incentive to base their voting decision on their economic preferences, as discussed 
previously. Let us now assume that both parties offer similar programs with regard to 
economic issues, which will result in a low degree of polarization in this dimension. Both 
parties favour a state-interventionist approach and can be regarded as economically left wing. 
In contrast, the two parties are highly polarized on the cultural dimension: one party favours a 
restrictive policy towards immigrants and advocates a tough law-and-order state, while the 
other party advocates a multicultural integration approach and strongly defends citizens’ 
rights to freedom. In this case, rational voters should base their vote on their cultural 
preferences, even if this dimension is far less salient. While voting based on economic issues 
would not make a significant difference on the outcome and could therefore be regarded as 
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‘wasted’, voting based on cultural preferences offers much more distinct alternatives in 
outcome. More general: If party competition is highly polarized with regard to economic 
(cultural) issues, voters will have a strong incentive to vote for the party closest to them on 
the economic (cultural) dimension. 
 
5. Model and data description     
To test the hypotheses developed in the last section, a multinomial logistic model has been 
constructed. The dependent variable is the vote intention of an individual voter as reported in 
Table 1. As we have already discussed, there are five possible options: (1) the voter can cast 
his vote for the party which is closest to him on the economic and cultural dimension, (2) he 
could vote for the party closest to him only in economic terms, (3) he could vote for the party 
closest to him only in cultural terms, (4) he could vote for a party not closest to him on either 
the economic or the cultural dimension, and (5) he could decide to abstain from voting. While 
these options result in a possible number of 20 comparisons, the focus of this paper is on the 
vote decision of voters with a certain combination of preferences, especially those of market-
oriented and liberal preferences and state-interventionist and authoritarian preferences. This is 
because these voters can be expected to have difficulty finding a party that simultaneously 
matches both their economic and cultural preferences and therefore are often confronted with 
the choice between the economic (=2) or cultural-closest party (=3). Although the decision of 
interest is a binary one – and could therefore also be analyzed using a logistic regression 
model – this would mean ignoring most of the available data, as about 2/3 of all voters choose 
option 1, 4 or 5. In contrast, multinomial logistic regression allows us to base our findings on 
all available data and respondents.
15
      
                                                          
15
 The resulting logistic regression would be based on 8.126 respondents (compared to 28.041 using multinomial 
logistic regression). However, the findings reported are not meaningfully different between the two models.  
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Data for the individual preferences of voters – including the positions of voters on the 
economic and cultural scale – has been taken from the World Value Survey, and data for party 
positions and issue salience has been taken from the Comparative Manifesto Project (see 
section 2). The selection of countries and time points is restricted primarily by the availability 
of the economic and cultural measurements for the individual level, as the items used for 
these scales have not been requested in each of the VWS waves. Altogether, 28.041 voters in 
31 election contexts [Austria (1990), Belgium/Wallonia (1990, 1999), Belgium/Flanders 
(1990, 1999), Denmark (1990), Finland (1990, 1996, 2000), France (1990, 2000), Germany 
(1990, 1997, 1999), Iceland (1990, 1999), Ireland (1990), Italy (1990, 1999), Luxembourg 
(1999), the Netherlands (1990, 1999), Norway (1990), Portugal (1990, 1999), Spain (1990, 
1995, 2000), Sweden (1990, 1996) and the United Kingdom (1990)] could be analysed.
16
 
Regarding the individual ranking of preferences, two dummies representing the 
highest ranking of economic and cultural-related issues have been constructed based on the 
four Inglehart-index items (the reference category being voters with mixed preferences).
17
 I 
expect that voters that rank economic issues highest will vote for the party closest to them on 
the economic dimension, while voters most concerned with cultural issues will vote for the 
cultural-closest party. 
                                                          
16
 The Belgium regions of Flanders and Wallonia are treated as separate party systems, as there have been no 
parties that seek for votes in national elections in all parts of Belgium since 1978. Consequently, Belgian voters 
have been divided into Flemish and Walloon voters, according to their reported region of residence.  
17
 The Inglehart-index asks respondents to name their first and second most important goals out of four political 
issues: (1) maintenance of law and order, (2) giving people more say in government decisions, (3) fighting rising 
prices, and (4) protecting freedom of expression. The answers are then combined to construct a materialist-
postmaterialist index in which (1) and (3) are seen as indicators for a materialist and (2) and (4) for a 
postmaterialist value orientation. As Flanagan (Inglehart and Flanagan, 1987) notes, three of the four Inglehart 
items (1, 2 and 4) are related to cultural issues, while only one item (3) can be seen as an indicator for economic-
related issues. This results in an overrepresentation of noneconomic-related answers. In addition, the index does 
not include an item that respondents with a strong interest in left-wing economic policies can be expected to 
choose, as ‘fighting rising prices’ is usually regarded as an answer that accounts for right-wing economic 
preferences. Aware of these shortcomings, they summed up items 1, 2 and 4 to measure cultural value priorities 
(be they liberal or authoritarian), while item 3 accounts for the highest ranking of (right) economic issues. 
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Voters’ intensity towards economic and cultural issues is taped by four dummies: state-
interventionist or market-oriented for the economic dimension, resp. liberal or authoritarian 
for the cultural dimension. These dummies reflect the value each voter scores on the 0–10 
points economic and cultural scales (see section 2). Voters are identified as state-
interventionist if their economic score equals or falls below 2, and as market-oriented if it 
equals or exceeds 8. Voters are regarded as liberal if their cultural score equals or falls below 
2, and as authoritarian if it equals or exceeds 8.
18
 In line with the hypotheses developed above, 
I expect voters that show extreme preferences with regard to economic issues (be they state-
interventionist or market-oriented) to vote for the party closest to them on the economic 
dimension. In contrast, the extreme cultural preferences (be they liberal or authoritarian) 
should correlate with the decision for the cultural-closest party.  
Concerning the electoral context, variables for the salience and polarization of the 
economic and cultural dimensions have been calculated from the CMP data. For the salience 
of each issue dimension, the frequencies for economic and cultural issues as given in the CMP 
have been multiplied for each party with this party’s share of votes. Finally, these values have 
been summed up for each single election, which results in one measure for the salience of 
economic-related issues and one for the salience of cultural-related issues. I expect that the 
salience of economic issues does have a positive impact on the decision for the economic-
closest party, while a high salience of cultural issues is positively correlated with the decision 
for the cultural-closest party. 
                                                          
18
 While these values are of course arbitrary, the use of alternative boundaries of extremeness (<=1 and >=9 or 
<=3 and >=7) does not meaningfully change the reported findings.  
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To account for the range of policy alternatives offered by parties to voters at a given election, 
two polarization measures have been constructed
19
 using the formula first proposed by 
Sigelman and Yough (1978). One measure accounts for the polarization of parties among 
economic issues, one for the polarization among cultural issues. The bases for both 
measurements are the party positions constructed for the economic and cultural scales as 
described in section 2. I expect that a high party-system polarization among economic issues 
is positively correlated with the decision for the economic-closest party, while a high 
polarization among cultural issues is positively correlated with the decision for the cultural-
closest party. 
 
6. Results 
Table 2 presents the results of the multinomial logistic regression model. For reasons of 
presentation, only the submodel comparing the vote decision for the economic-closest or 
cultural-closest party is shown. The full model comparing the reference-category with each of 
the four other outcome-categories is reported in the appendix (Table 1, app.). The reference 
outcome-category is the vote decision for the party closest to the voter on the cultural 
dimension only. Consequently, positive coefficients indicate a higher probability of voting for 
the economic-closest party, while negative coefficients indicate a preference for the cultural-
closest party. Clustered standard errors have been used to control for the possibility of 
correlation between voters within the 31 different election contexts.  
 
 
                                                          
19
 Party system polarization (P) is calculated for each dimension using the formula 
n
2
P P (X X)
i i
i 1
 

where ip is the 
vote share of party at a given election, 
i
X is the position of this party on a dimension of party competition, and 
X is the weighted mean. X is calculated by multiplying the vote share with the ideological position of a party. 
This step is repeated for each party in the party system. Finally, these values are summed up. Please note that this 
measurement is independent of the number of parties. 
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Table 2: Results of multinomial logistic regression  
 Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Individual preferences  Coefficient 
(std. err) 
Coefficient 
(std. err) 
Coefficient 
(std. err) 
Coefficient 
(std. err) 
Highest ranking of economic issues .116 
(.108) 
.115    
(.108) 
.105   
(.082) 
.091 
(.083) 
Highest ranking of cultural issues -.127   
(.100) 
-.126   
(.100) 
-.071   
(.084) 
-.097 
(.090) 
State-interventionist .546*   
(.241) 
.710*   
(.275) 
.760**   
(.266) 
.717** 
(.262) 
Market-oriented .566*   
(.221) 
.550*   
(.219) 
.547**   
(.197) 
.566**    
(.196) 
Liberal .295   
(.345) 
.121   
(.336) 
.399   
(.444) 
.344   
(.431) 
Authoritarian -1.343**   
(.206) 
-1.324**   
(.207) 
-1.368**   
(.193) 
-1.407**   
(.189) 
Market-oriented  
and liberal 
 2.672**    
(.868) 
2.760**   
(.877) 
2.756**   
(.881) 
State-interventionist and 
authoritarian 
 -.949*   
(.432) 
-1.029*   
(.526) 
-.923*   
(.516) 
 
Electoral context     
Salience of economic issues   .001 
(.001) 
.001   
(.001) 
Salience of cultural issues   -.001*   
(.001) 
-.001*   
(.001) 
Polarization among economic issues   .306*   
(.127) 
 
Polarization among cultural issues   -.120   
(.086) 
 
More polarization among economic 
than among cultural issues 
   .673*   
(.275) 
 
Constant -.154   
(.191) 
-.153    
(.191) 
-1.725*   
(.655) 
.199   
(.344) 
 
N 28.041 28.041 28.041 28.041 
Pseudo R² (full model) 0.0240 0.0245 0.0393 0.0378 
 
 
We start with Model 1, including only the individual preferences of voters. First, and as has 
been hypothesized, the intensity of preferences towards economic and cultural issues does 
have an impact on the decision between the economic and cultural-closest party. Voters 
 
 
 
131 
 
located close to the state-interventionist or market-liberal ends of the economic scale 
demonstrate a higher probability of voting for the economic-closest party, while authoritarian 
voters tend to favour the party closest to them in cultural terms instead. All of the three 
dummies are significant and show the assumed direction.
1
 Only the dummy controlling for extremely liberal cultural preferences results as 
insignificant and is – in contrast to the theoretical expectation – positively correlated with the 
decision for the economic-closest party. A possible explanation for this might be that voters 
with extremely liberal preferences might not be as concerned with the decision between the 
economic or cultural-closest party as extremely authoritarian voters are. Extremely liberal 
voters might more easily find a party that matches both their cultural and economic 
preferences, given the high variation in economic policy appeals offered by cultural liberal 
parties (Greens and Liberals, but also Communists) in Western Europe.  
Second, the ranking of political issues does not seem to have an impact on the decision 
between the economic or the cultural-closest party. Respondents that rank economic issues 
highest do not show a higher probability of voting for the economic-closest party, nor do 
respondents that rank cultural issues highest show a higher probability of voting for the 
cultural-closest party. Although the two dummies controlling for the ranking of issues do 
show the expected direction, they do not reach common levels of statistical significance. 
However, this insignificance may be due to the inappropriateness of the Inglehart-items to 
distinguish between economic and cultural-related issues as they have been defined in this 
paper. As Flanagan (Inglehart and Flanagan, 1987) notes, none of the four Inglehart-items can 
be expected to account for voters with a strong interest in left-wing economic policies; the 
                                                          
1
Although the intensity of preferences is not a key variable in the proximity model but is theoretically derived 
from directional theory of voting behaviour, these findings support recent efforts to incorporate the two rivalling 
theories into one model of voting behaviour. (Dow, 1998; Iversen, 1994; Macdonald et al., 1995; Tomz and Van 
Houweling, 2008; Warwick, 2004). 
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index is therefore biased which may explain the insignificance of the related coefficients. 
Unfortunately, the Inglehart-items are the only survey items available to measure 
respondents’ ranking of issues in the VWS for every wave and country.  
As the graphical presentation in section 2 suggests, we can expect that voters who 
combine market-oriented and liberal preferences or state-interventionist and authoritarian 
preferences to have the biggest dilemma regarding the decision between either the economic 
or the cultural-closest party. Model 2 therefore includes these combinations of preferences. 
Please note that the two new dummies tab voters with extreme preferences towards both 
economic and cultural issues. Theoretically, these voters might vote for either the economic or 
cultural-closest party. Both dummies are significant but point to different directions: While 
voters who combine economically market-oriented and culturally liberal attitudes tend to 
support the economic-closest party, voters with extreme state-interventionist and authoritarian 
preferences tend to support the cultural-closest – and therefore more authoritarian – parties. 
How can we explain this finding?  
A possible and theoretically consistent explanation would be that voters who are 
extreme market-oriented and liberal should be more market-liberal than they are liberal. In 
contrast, voters who are both extreme state-interventionist and authoritarian should be more 
authoritarian than they are state-interventionist. However, this explanation based on 
individual preferences does not seem to be supported by the data. If we compare the 0–10 
scores of extreme market-oriented and liberal voters, we find means of 8.77 (economic) and 
1.45 (cultural dimension). Although these voters are a bit more extreme in their economic 
preferences than in their cultural preferences, the difference is rather small. In contrast, state-
interventionist and authoritarian voters score 1.13 (economic) and 8.62 (cultural dimension). 
Again, the differences in extreme are rather small, but these latter voters would be expected to 
vote for the economic-closest party – which is not the case, as Model 2 tells us. The 
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theoretical arguments made about the intensity of preferences do not explain this divergent 
pattern of voting behaviour, but the decision between the economic and cultural-closest party 
might be influenced by other individual or contextual variables that have not been accounted 
for in this paper.     
It has been hypothesised that the vote decision of individuals might be influenced by 
the individual preferences of voters as well as by the overall patterns of party competition 
when the vote decision is made. Model 3 accounts for this possibility by including four party 
competition variables: the salience of economic and cultural issues and the polarization of 
parties among economic and cultural issues. We find that while all four coefficients of party 
competition point to the expected direction, only two of them pass common levels of 
statistical significance. Confronted with the choice between the economic or cultural-closest 
party, voters tend to support the cultural-closest party if cultural issues are of high salience. In 
contrast, if parties are highly polarized among economic issues, voters tend to support the 
party closest to them in economic terms. The inclusion of the party competition variables does 
not change the significance or direction of the variables accounting for the individual 
preferences of voters.  
However, model diagnostics report the possibility of multicollinearity in Model 3, as 
the party system polarization among economic issues is highly correlated with the 
polarization among cultural issues (Pearson`s R at 0.66). I have therefore re-estimated the 
model by using only one variable for the party system polarization between the two different 
issue dimensions. The new dummy-variable reflects the value of 1 if parties are more 
polarized with regard to economic issues than they are with regard to cultural issues. In this 
case, voters should prefer the economic-closest party, instead of the cultural-closest party. As 
Model 4 shows, this is indeed the case. Theoretically, voters’ potential utility gain, resp. loss, 
increases if the policy alternatives offered by parties to voters are more distinct on the 
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economic dimension than they are on the cultural dimension. Rational voters should base their 
vote decision on the dimension that makes the greatest difference in outcome – in this case, 
the economic dimension. Finally, testing has been conducted for possible interaction effects 
between the variables of party competition and the individual preferences, but these effects do 
not reach common levels of statistical significance and are therefore not reported.  
 
Conclusion  
The political space in Western Europe is seen by the majority of recent studies as two-
dimensional, consisting of an economic dimension and a cultural-related dimension. 
However, although voters are evenly distributed in this political space, parties are hesitant to 
occupy the diversity of theoretical available positions. Especially the combinations market-
orientation/liberalism and state-interventionism/authoritarianism are occupied by few Western 
European parties. For voters with these combinations of political preferences, it is therefore 
nearly impossible to find a party that simultaneously matches both their economic and cultural 
demands.  
Applying a proximity-oriented model of voting behaviour, the resulting crucial 
decision many Western European voters are confronted with has been analysed: Should they 
vote for the party that is closest to them in economic terms, or should they cast their vote for 
the party that best matches their cultural preferences? The findings of the statistical analysis 
allow us to conclude that this decision is influenced both by the individual characteristics of 
voters’ and by the overall patterns of party competition. On the individual level, voters of 
extreme positions on the economic dimension show a higher probability of voting for the 
economic-closest party; voters with extreme authoritarian preferences show a higher support 
for the cultural-closest party. Interestingly, voters who combine extreme market-oriented with 
extreme liberal preferences tend to support the economic-closest party, while voters holding 
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the combination of state-interventionism and authoritarianism show a higher support for the 
cultural-closest party.  
Regarding the electoral context, both the salience of issues and the party system 
polarization are relevant predictors of voting behaviour. If cultural issues are of high salience, 
voters show a higher probability of voting for the cultural-closest party. If party competition is 
more polarized with regard to economic than cultural issues, voters will vote for the 
economic-closest party. This effect of party system polarization on the individual vote 
decision has also been identified by a recent simulation study (Shikano, 2008).   
The theoretical – and political – relevance of these findings deserves further attention. 
Theoretically, this means that in two elections, the very same voter with constant political 
preferences might vote for very different parties (see also Grofmann, 2004: 39; Van der Brug 
and Van Spanje, 2009), depending on the dimension of party competition more salient or 
polarized. To advance formal theories of voting behaviour, this context-oriented argument 
should receive much more interest in future research.  
Politically, the importance of party system polarization becomes clear if we recognize 
that the positions of parties in Western Europe tend to converge with regard to economic 
issues (Kitschelt, 1995), but tend to diverge on the cultural dimension (Bornschier, 2010). At 
the same time, the salience of cultural issues has increased steadily during the last decades, 
while economic issues are less frequently addressed by political parties (Kriesi et al., 2006). 
In light of the findings presented in this paper, this means that more voters will allow their 
voting decision to be guided exclusively by their cultural preferences, be they liberal or 
authoritarian. The declining differences between parties in economic preferences are therefore 
directly related to the voting decision for extreme liberal or extreme authoritarian parties and 
offer a supply-side argument for the continuous electoral success, especially of the latter 
group.   
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Appendix 
 
Table 1, app.: Results of multinomial model (complete) 
 
Model Vote for the party closest on both dimensions vs. 
vote for the cultural-closest party 
Vote for the economic-closest party vs.  
vote for the cultural-closest party 
 
 Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Individual 
preferences 
Coefficien
t 
(std. err) 
Coefficien
t 
(std. err) 
Coefficien
t 
(std. err) 
Coefficien
t 
(std. err) 
Coefficien
t 
(std. err) 
Coefficien
t 
(std. err) 
Coefficien
t 
(std. err) 
Coefficien
t 
(std. err) 
Highest 
ranking of 
economic 
issues 
-.0103 
(.106) 
-.013   
(.106) 
-.011  
(.106) 
-.021   
(.104) 
.116 
(.108) 
.115    
(.108) 
.105   
 (.082) 
.091 
(.083) 
Highest 
ranking of 
cultural issues 
.010    
(.137) 
.009    
(.137) 
.032   
(.127) 
.019   
(.129) 
-.127   
(.100) 
-.126   
(.100) 
-.071   
(.084) 
-.097 
(.090) 
State-
interventionis
t 
-.280   
(.340) 
.077   
(.354) 
.113   
(.350) 
.097   
(.355) 
.546*   
(.241) 
.710*   
(.275) 
.760**   
(.266) 
.717** 
(.262) 
Market-
oriented 
.475    
(.243) 
.474   
(.248) 
.480*   
(.243) 
.489*   
(.238) 
.566*   
(.221) 
.550*   
(.219) 
.547**   
(.197) 
.566**    
(.196) 
Liberal .601   
(.405) 
.568   
(.430) 
.638   
(.441) 
.606   
(.435) 
.295   
 (.345) 
.121    
(.336) 
.399   
 (.444) 
.344   
 (.431) 
Authoritarian .205   
(.105) 
.222*   
(.105) 
.232*   
(.109) 
.218*   
(.108) 
-1.343**   
(.206) 
-1.324**   
(.207) 
-1.368**   
(.193) 
-1.407**   
(.189) 
Market-
oriented and 
liberal 
 1.752   
(1.265) 
1.798   
(1.268) 
1.797   
(1.271) 
 2.672**    
(.868) 
2.760**   
(.877) 
2.756**   
(.881) 
State-
interventionis
t and 
authoritarian 
 -1.750**   
(.604) 
-1.782**   
(.602) 
-1.724**   
(.608) 
 -.949*   
(.432) 
-1.029*   
(.526) 
-.923*   
(.516) 
Electoral 
context 
 
Salience of 
economic 
issues 
  .001   
(.001) 
0.001    
(.001) 
  .001 
(.001) 
.001   
 (.001) 
Salience of 
cultural issues 
  0.001 
(.001) 
-.001   
(.001) 
  -.001*   
(.001) 
-.001*   
(.001) 
Polarization 
among 
economic 
issues 
  .159   
(.124) 
   .306*   
(.127) 
 
Polarization 
among 
cultural issues 
  -.042   
(.081) 
   -.120   
(.086) 
 
More 
polarization 
among 
economic 
than among 
cultural issues 
   .379   
(.249) 
   .673*   
(.275) 
Constant -1.185**  
(.142) 
-1.189**   
(.142) 
-1.73*   
(.655) 
-1.301**   
(.384) 
-.154 
(.191) 
-.153    
(.191) 
-1.725*   
(.655) 
.199   
 (.344) 
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Model Vote for a party neither close on one of the 
dimension vs. vote for the cultural-closest party 
 
Vote abstention vs.  
vote for the cultural-closest party 
 Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Individual 
preferences 
Coefficien
t 
(std. err) 
Coefficien
t 
(std. err) 
Coefficien
t 
(std. err) 
Coefficien
t 
(std. err) 
Coefficien
t 
(std. err) 
Coefficien
t 
(std. err) 
Coefficien
t 
(std. err) 
Coefficien
t 
(std. err) 
Highest 
ranking of 
economic 
issues 
.088   
(.079) 
.087   
(.079) 
.072   
(.059) 
.064   
(.058) 
-1.149  
(.149) 
.212    
(.128) 
.190   
(.132) 
.200    
 (.129) 
Highest 
ranking of 
cultural issues 
-.128*    
(.062) 
-.127*   
(.063) 
-.077   
(.050) 
-.084  
(.051) 
-.377*   
(.147) 
-.376*   
(.147) 
-.345*   
(.144) 
-.338*   
(.145) 
State-
interventionis
t 
-.149   
(.137) 
-.031   
(.178) 
-.036   
(.169) 
-.041   
(.162) 
.546*   
(.251) 
.707*   
(.284) 
.638*   
(.279) 
.685*   
(.279) 
Market-
oriented 
-.300     
(.161) 
-.317*   
(.159) 
-.319*   
(.139) 
-.307*   
(.134) 
.030    
(.189) 
.008    
(.191) 
.015   
 (.195) 
.012   
 (.184) 
Liberal .398   
(.468) 
.235   
(.458) 
.472    
(.539) 
.449   
(.536) 
.528    
(.440) 
.309    
(.410) 
.462    
(.460) 
.464   
 (.450) 
Authoritarian -1.149**   
(.147) 
-1.143**   
(.144) 
-1.229**   
(.144) 
-1.239**   
(.143) 
-.592**   
(.118) 
-.579**   
(.115) 
-.676**   
(.118) 
-.660**   
(.115) 
Market-
oriented and 
liberal 
 2.753**   
(.974) 
2.747**   
(1.010) 
2.764*   
(1.009) 
 2.995**   
(1.150) 
2.961*   
(1.193) 
2.967*   
(1.186) 
State-
interventionis
t and 
authoritarian 
 -.315   
(.438) 
-.322   
(.439) 
-.268  
(.426) 
 -.606   
(.563) 
-.539    
(.574) 
-.566   
(.557) 
Electoral 
context 
 
Salience of 
economic 
issues 
  .001**   
(.000) 
.001*   
(.001) 
  .001 
(.001) 
.001   
 (.001) 
Salience of 
cultural issues 
  -.001**   
(.000) 
-.001**   
(.001) 
  -.001   
(.001) 
-.001   
(.001) 
Polarization 
among 
economic 
issues 
  .142   
(.090) 
   -.043 
(.233) 
 
Polarization 
among 
cultural issues 
  -.060   
(.047) 
   -.077   
(.122) 
 
More 
polarization 
among 
economic 
than among 
cultural issues 
   .496*   
(.207) 
   .201  
  (.543) 
Constant 1.213**   
(.154) 
1.214**   
(.154) 
.926   
(.486) 
1.119**   
(.360) 
-1.212**  
(.313) 
-1.210**   
(.312) 
-1.045  
(1.193) 
-1.487   
(1.130) 
N 28.041 28.041 28.041 28.041 28.041 28.041 28.041 28.041 
Pseudo R² (full 
model) 
0.0240 0.0245 0.0393 0.0378 0.0240 0.0245 0.0393 0.0378 
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Chapter 5 
 
Does the Mode of Candidate Selection Affect the 
Representativeness of Parties? 
 
(with André Kaiser) 
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Abstract 
In this article we analyze the impact of intra-party procedures of candidate selection for 
national elections on the representativeness of parties towards their voters. With regard to 
candidate selection we distinguish between two dimensions: inclusion and centralization. 
While the first identifies the type of selectorate for candidate nominations (members, 
delegates or committees), the second captures the territorial unit in which the nomination is 
decided (local, regional or national). The analysis based on data for 53 parties in nine western 
European countries for the period from 1970 to 1990 points to the relevance of the inclusion 
dimension. Parties in which party elites decide over the nomination of candidates show 
slightly higher degrees of representation than parties with more inclusive selectorates.  
Furthermore, we conduct our analysis separately for two frequently used but theoretically 
different concepts of representation: cross-sectional representation (at one point in time) and 
dynamic representation (over time). Our analysis shows that candidate selection procedures 
only matter for the first concept. The empirically inconsistent results between the two 
concepts are due to deficiencies in the way dynamic representation is currently 
operationalized.  
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Introduction 
The representation of voter preferences by political decision makers is at the heart of studies 
on democratic political systems (Dahl 1971; Downs 1957; Iversen 1994; McDonald and 
Budge 2005; Miller and Stokes 1963; Schofield and Sened 2005; Stimson et al. 1995; 
Wlezien 2004). While most of the literature empirically addressing the linkage between public 
preferences and political output focuses on the United States, it has recently been 
supplemented by a growing set of cross-national studies, analyzing the impact of different 
institutional arrangements on the degree of representation (Adams et al. 2004; Blais and 
Bodet 2006; Ezrow and Adams 2009; Ezrow et al. 2010; Golder and Stramski 2010; Hobolt 
and Klemmensen 2008; Soroka and Wlezien 2004). 
In established democracies and especially in the European context, political parties 
play a crucial role for the ‘opinion-policy nexus’ (Brooks 1987; 1990): ‘Citizens in Western 
democracies are represented through and by parties. This is inevitable’ (Sartori 1968: 471; 
italics in original). Therefore, party-related variables take centre stage in a set of recent 
studies (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; Adams et al. 2004; Ezrow 2007; Ezrow and Adams 
2009; Ezrow et al. 2010) which focus on the relationship between party political programmes 
and the preference distribution in the electorate. 
We wish to contribute to this discussion by analyzing the effect of intra-party modes 
of candidate selection on the representation of voters by political parties. With regard to 
selection procedures (i.e. the nomination of candidates running for elections to national 
parliament) we follow the analytical framework suggested by Rahat and Hazan (2001) and 
measure candidate selection procedures on two dimensions: inclusion and centralization. 
While the first identifies the type of selectorate for nominations (members, delegates or 
committees), the second captures the territorial unit in which the nomination is decided (local, 
regional or national). Distinguishing between the two dimensions is important because neither 
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conceptually nor empirically there is a close correlation between types of selectorates and 
territorial units. We analyze the separate and combined impact of both dimensions on the 
linkage between voters and their respective parties applying data on 53 parties from nine 
Western European countries for the period from 1970 to 1990.
1
   Furthermore, we distinguish between two prominent conceptualizations of representation: 
cross-sectional representation (addressing the congruence of voters’ and parties’ positions at 
one point in time) and dynamic representation (addressing changes in voters’ and parties’ 
positions over time). While both concepts have been frequently referred to in previous studies, 
until recently their relationship has received only minor interest. Our analysis reveals that 
both concepts cannot be used interchangeably and therefore lead to completely different 
results with regard to representation.   
 
1. The State of the Art in Representation Studies 
The representation of public preferences by political decision makers is one of the essential 
topics for normative democratic theories as well as for the empirical study of democratic 
political systems (Dalton et al. 2011; Lijphart 1999; Page and Shapiro 1983; Powell 2000; 
Wlezien 2004). Regardless of this long and continuing scientific interest in representation, 
empirical findings so far are rather mixed.
2
 
Most studies addressing the congruence between public preferences and political 
decisions come up with the normatively desirable view that levels of representation are high 
in established democracies. For instance, Stimson et al. conclude in their influential study on 
US institutions that politicians are keen to pick up the faintest signals in their political 
                                                          
1
 The period of analysis is restricted by data availability.  
2
 We do not intend to give a comprehensive literature review on representation studies. The references given in 
this section should therefore be taken as examples on how different authors have conceptualized and measured 
representation. For an extensive literature review for the United States see Burstein (2003) and Manza and Cook 
(2002). For an excellent overview on comparative studies in the field see the volume edited by Rosema et al. 
(2011). 
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environment: ‘Like antelope in an open field, they cock their ears and focus their full attention 
on the slightest sign of danger’ (Stimson et al. 1995: 559), i.e. of changing voter preferences. 
In contrast to this, a number of studies find that the degree of representation is considerably 
lower than stated by Stimson et al. (see Manza and Cook, 2002). Some scholars even argue 
that representation is virtually impossible, because voters do not hold clear preferences but 
rather ‘non-attitudes’ (Campbell et al. 1960) with regard to political issues and, therefore, 
politicians do not have to fear electoral consequences of non-responsive performance 
(Skocpol 1995). 
These contrasting empirical findings are hardly surprising, considering the differences 
of existing studies with regard to case selection, investigation period, data sources and 
methodological design. Beyond these causes for disagreement, we identify four questions in 
order to summarize the diversity of empirical studies on representation and to relate our own 
analysis to the existing literature. These questions are: (1) Who represents? (2) Who is 
represented? (3) What is represented? and (4) What is the concept of representation? 
‘Who represents?’ is concerned with the subject of representation. Possible answers 
range from single politicians (Miller and Stokes 1963), parties (Ezrow et al. 2010), 
governments or governing parties (McDonald and Budge 2005), to single institutions or 
whole political systems (Ezrow 2007; Stimson et al. 1995). Most studies focusing on political 
parties analyze the representativeness of governing parties or coalitions. More recently, 
scholars have addressed the representation by parties independent of their government 
participation (Ezrow et al. 2010). With our analyses, we wish to contribute to these latter 
studies. 
‘Who is represented?’ asks for the object of representation. Usually, public preferences 
are perceived as the political preferences of voters, measured by a variety of survey items. 
Other indicators of public preferences, like demonstrations or the activities of organized 
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economic or social groups, are rarely considered. With regard to the preferences of voters, 
most studies follow a Downsian tradition and investigate the representation of the median 
voter (Blais and Bodet 2006; McDonald and Budge 2005; Powell 2009; Warwick 2010), 
others address the mean voter (Dalton 1985; Ezrow et al. 2010), the mean voter of single 
parties (Ezrow 2010), or distinguish between sub-groups of the latter, e.g. politically informed 
voters (Ezrow and Adams 2009). In our analysis we will focus on the relationship between 
single parties and these parties` mean voters.  
‘What is represented’ asks which kind of political preferences is represented. This 
question is closely related to the operationalization of the dependent (political programme) 
and the independent (voters’ preferences) variable, as whatever measure is applied for the side 
of political actors should be equivalent to the measure chosen for the voter side. The variety 
of possible answers to this question is impressive and our review does not intend to capture it 
in detail. However, with regard to the dependent variable four approaches seem to stand out in 
terms of frequency of use: (1) Fiscal output, i.e. (changes of) spending figures (Hobolt and 
Klemmensen 2008; Soroka and Wlezien 2004), (2) policy output, e.g. numbers of laws 
enacted, court rulings or roll calls (Stimson et al. 1995), (3) political rhetoric, e.g. party 
statements and manifestos or politicians’ speeches (Golder and Stramski 2010; McDonald et 
al. 2004; Powell 2009), or (4) a combined measure of 1 to 3 (Stimson et al. 1995). On the side 
of the voters, the range of survey items used includes the left-right self-placement of 
respondents (Powell 2009), questions regarding the most important political problems 
(McDonald et al. 2004) or ‘spend-more-or-less’ questions (Wlezien 2004). Furthermore, each 
of these preferences might be related to single policies (e.g. with regard to social spending) or 
might be summarized into an overall index of policy preferences (which is usually referred to 
as a left-right scale). This point is important, because the preferences of voters might be well 
represented by parties with regard to distinct policy areas but less with regard to others 
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(Soroka and Wlezien 2004) as voters might reward policy shifts in pragmatic while punishing 
policy adjustments in principled issue domains (Tavits 2007). In this paper, we measure the 
positions of parties and their voters on a general left-right scale. 
While the number of possible combinations of the answers given to the questions 1 to 
3 – and, following on from that, the variety of findings with regard to the degree of 
representation – is already numerous, a fourth question should be taken into account: the 
underlying concept of representation. We believe this is an important point, which until 
recently has received only minor interest (but see Dalton et al. 2011). As we are interested in 
the degree of representation between parties and their voters measured on a single left-right 
dimension, there are two options to analyze this pattern: at a specific point in time and over 
time. We will refer to the former concept as cross-sectional representation and to the latter as 
dynamic representation.  
The concept of cross-sectional representation conceives the representation of voters by 
parties as the congruence of these two groups at a specific point in time, usually on election-
day. While different operationalizations of congruence have been proposed (Golder and 
Stramski 2010; Powell 2009), each of these rely on a measure of ideological distance between 
party and voter. To illustrate, let us compare the distance between two parties and their 
respective supporters. Let the mean position of the voters of party X be 2 and the position of 
the party be 3, while the mean voter of party Y is located at 2 but the party itself at 4. In terms 
of cross-sectional representation, party X is more representative than party Y. Studies 
reporting empirical evidence for this kind of linkage are numerous. For instance, Powell 
(2000, 2009) finds a strong correlation between the left-right positions of the median voter 
and the government parties, a conclusion shared by a number of other scholars investigating 
the ideological congruence of voters’ and parties’ positions at one point in time (Blais and 
Bodet 2006; Golder and Stramski 2010; Huber and Powell 1994; Kim and Fording 2001; 
 
 
 
150 
 
McDonald and Budge 2005; McDonald et al. 2004; Pardos-Prado and Dinas 2010; Powell 
2009). 
A different view on representation is given by Stimson et al. with their concept of 
dynamic representation, arguing that ‘representation exists when changing preferences 
[authors’ note: of voters] lead to changing policy acts’ (Stimson et al. 1995: 534). For this 
concept, the time perspective is crucial. Regarding the linkage between parties and their 
voters, a party should adjust its left-right position in accordance with changes in the left-right 
position of its voters. While the reaction-time of parties is a matter of empirical analysis (see 
Warwick 2010), the usual time-span assumed is the time between two consecutive elections 
(t0 and t-1). The concept of dynamic representation has been very influential since its 
formulation by Stimson et al. and has also been applied by a set of recent studies on the 
linkage between voters’ preferences and parties’ policy stances (Adams and Somer-Topcu 
2009; Adams et al. 2004; Ezrow 2007; Ezrow and Adams 2009; Ezrow et al. 2010). 
Intuitively, the concepts of cross-sectional and dynamic representation seem to be 
largely compatible. If parties react to changing preferences of their voters over time they 
might also represent their voters well on election-day. However, the relationship between the 
two concepts has not been tested empirically, yet. Therefore, we will first investigate the 
empirical relationship between the two concepts of representation and then analyze the impact 
of candidate selection on the party-voter linkage for each of them. We begin with formulating 
our theoretical expectations.  
 
2. Intra-party candidate selection and the representation of voters by parties 
One of the major functions of political parties is to select candidates who contest in elections 
for public office. Within the European context of parliamentary democracy, this process of 
intra-party candidate selection is crucial, since the electoral chances of non-party candidates 
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to win seats are very limited.
3
 The options offered to voters are thus mainly structured by 
party political competition. The statutes on intra-party candidate selection are numerous and 
differ considerably from party to party, as well – while to a lesser extent – over time (Rahat 
and Hazan 2001). In order to classify the often very detailed party statutes with regard to the 
nomination of candidates, scholars have identified different dimensions of this process.  
For our analysis, we distinguish between two dimensions of structural features of 
candidate selection: inclusion and centralization.
4
 The inclusion dimension captures the type 
of selectorate for candidates running for public office. It therefore deals with the question 
‘who decides’ about the nomination of candidates and differentiates between three possible 
groups: party members, delegates, or committees. While party supporters would be a possible 
fourth group and are well known from the US context (Gallagher and Marsh 1988), the 
observable spectrum of inclusion in Western Europe ranges from party members (maximal 
inclusion) to committees, which are exclusively assigned with the task of nomination 
(minimal inclusion). The three distinct groups might each be located on different territorial 
levels, captured by the dimension of centralization. Centralization ranges from local, over 
regional to national. All in all, taking the possible combinations into account we come up with 
nine possible combinations of inclusion and centralization. 
What are the theoretical expectations on the impact of inclusion and centralization on 
the degree of representation of voters by political parties? To our knowledge, only the study 
by Dalton (1985) has dealt with this question so far, analyzing the congruence of voters’ and 
candidates’ issue-preferences at the first election to the European Parliament in 1979. With 
regard to candidate selection, he distinguishes between candidates nominated locally, locally 
                                                          
3
 There are some exceptions, e.g. Ireland. See Bolleyer and Weeks (2009). 
4
 While we agree with Norris (1997) that candidate selection might also be influenced by non-party actors, we 
claim that this influence is not institutionalized and therefore randomly distributed between parties. In contrast, 
our focus is on intra-party candidate selection procedures and our theoretical arguments capture the impact of 
these rather constant institutions.  
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with national approval, or nationally, a classification largely comparable with our dimension 
of centralization. While Dalton does not test for the impact of the inclusion dimension, he 
finds that centralized parties with candidates nominated on the national level show a higher 
degree of representation than decentralized parties with locally nominated candidates. He 
concludes that ‘centralized parties may be less open to innovation and allow less internal 
democracy, as critics suggest, but centralized parties display greater dyadic correspondence’ 
(Dalton 1985: 292), that is, a higher degree of representation. This argument leads to our first 
hypothesis:  
 
H1: Parties with a national candidate selection are more representative than parties with a 
regionally or locally organized candidate selection.  
 
The reason for this may lie in hierarchically-centralized party structures, which allow national 
party leaders to impose their political strategies on subordinated party levels and in this way 
let the party offer clear policy positions to potential supporters, as Dalton (1985: 294) 
suggests. However, an opposite effect seems also plausible, as party leaders in centralized 
parties might be rather independent of and therefore less responsive to the preferences of 
party supporters (Epstein 1980; Harmel and Janda 1982).  
 
H2: Parties with a local candidate selection are more representative than parties with a 
regional or national candidate selection. 
 
It is important to note that both arguments combine inclusion (party leaders) and 
centralization (national or local) effects of candidate selection procedures, while Dalton’s 
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analysis tests only for the impact of centralization. The reason for this is that in our view the 
theoretical expectations seem to call for a simultaneous effect of centralization and inclusion. 
In contrast to the territorial centralization of candidate selection, the theoretical arguments for 
an effect of the inclusion dimension are less developed. Why should candidates nominated by 
party leaders better represent their voters than candidates nominated by party members or 
delegates? While previous studies have not dealt with this pattern, a theoretical starting point 
is to assume different preferences and motivations of the three selectorates that affects the 
type of candidate they nominate.  
In his seminal study on the motivations of party activists, May (1973) distinguishes 
between non-leaders, sub-leaders and leaders. Each group is defined by its intra-party status, 
which itself is defined by influence over personal and procedural decisions, ideology, 
campaign strategies and legislative activity. May argues that sub-leaders are the ideologically 
most extreme group, while both non-leaders and leaders are rather moderate. This leads to his 
so-called ‘General Law of Curvilinear Disparity’. This is due to different motivations of the 
three groups - and especially between sub-leaders and leaders – with regard to their 
engagement in politics.  
Non-leaders are the lowest strata with regard to their intra-party status. They are 
supporters and activists, whose engagement in party politics is usually low or only temporary 
(e.g. during election campaigns). While non-leaders are the group less involved into politics, 
they are by far the largest group within each party. Because of this, their mean political 
preferences are rather moderate and therefore comparable to the preferences of the median 
non-party voter.  
In contrast to non-leaders, sub-leaders devote much of their time and personal 
resources for party organization and politics. However, in most cases they cannot hope of 
becoming paid full-time politicians; instead, their work will be voluntary for most of the time. 
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The reason why sub-leaders are nonetheless willing to engage in party politics is a strict 
policy motivation: sub-leaders want to see their extreme preferences to be translated into 
policies and are not willing to sacrifice these for a more moderate but maybe vote-maximizing 
election strategy.  
Leaders have chosen politics as a profession and do therefore highly depend on their 
election and re-election; therefore, in the terms of Strom (1990), they are office-motivated. 
Because of this orientation, they have strong incentives to get their political appeal in line 
with the preferences of their potential voters. According to May, leaders are rather cushioned 
from being defeated in general elections, as they often run in safe districts or are secured by 
comfortable list positions. Their political careers do therefore not so much depend on their 
results in general elections but on their intra-party support by both moderate non-leaders and 
extreme sub-leaders. Leaders will therefore position themselves towards the middle of both 
groups. However, as the political fortunes of leaders do depend more on the support of 
influential sub-leaders than of less powerful non-leaders, their position will be closer to the 
former than to the latter. 
‘May’s Law of Curvilinear Disparity’ has frequently been applied to the analysis of 
political parties (Kitschelt 1989; Narud and Skare 1999; Norris 1995; Scarrow et al. 2000) 
although it has been criticized for its theoretical presumptions (Kitschelt 1989). While the 
empirical findings are rather mixed and our data does not allow us to directly test for 
ideological attitudes of the three party sub-groups, we have decided to take May’s arguments 
as a theoretical starting point for the effect of the inclusion dimension of candidate selection. 
If May’s argument about the different preferences of non-leaders, sub-leaders and leaders has 
analytical value, then these differences in ideology might be translated into different 
preferences of the candidates who get nominated by the groups.  
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For this, we have to make three presumptions. First, the preferences of each group are 
completely homogenous (for a critique on this point see Kitschelt 1989) and determine their 
candidate selection. Second, each of the three sub-groups will choose the candidate whose 
preferences are closest to their own. Non-leaders will therefore vote for centrist candidates, 
sub-leaders for extreme and leaders for candidates between these two positions. The 
possibility, that e.g. sub-leaders might vote for a moderate candidate for reasons of vote-
maximization is therefore excluded. Third, once selected, the candidate acts as an honest 
agent of its principal’s preferences. This presumption is especially relevant for candidates 
selected by sub-leaders. These will therefore remain extreme, even if they now could be 
considered as part of the more moderate leader-group. Under these presumptions, we derive 
three hypotheses on the impact of the inclusion dimension of candidate selection on the 
degree of the representation of voters by parties. For reasons of clarity, we have replaced 
May’s group labels by our own labels of inclusion (non-leaders = members; sub-leaders = 
delegates; leaders = committee). Given the listing of party groups by May (1973: 135-36) and 
our coding of candidate selection procedures, we trust in their equivalence. 
 
H3: Parties with a candidate selection decided by members are most representative. 
 
H4: Parties with a candidate selection decided by delegates are least representative. 
 
H5: Parties with a candidate selection decided by committees are more representative than 
parties with a candidate selection decided by delegates but less than parties with a candidate 
selection decided by members. 
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While the theoretical expectations concerning the centralization dimension are therefore 
mixed, with regard to the inclusion-dimension we expect parties with candidates nominated 
by delegates to be the least representative in terms of voter representation. Although different 
theoretical expectations for a combined impact of inclusion and centralization are possible, at 
this point we expect parties with a candidate selection decided by delegates on a local level to 
be the least representative. This would be in line with the empirical findings of Dalton (H1) 
and the theoretical expectations of May (H4). We will therefore use this combination as the 
reference-category and expect any other combination as being superior to it in terms of 
representativeness. 
We close this section by noting that our hypotheses are theoretically not restricted to 
one of the two concepts of representation. We therefore expect an effect of the centralization 
and inclusion of candidate selection procedures, regardless of the applied representation 
concept (cross-sectional or dynamic representation). However, as has already been mentioned 
in the last section, the relationship between the two concepts has so far not been investigated 
empirically. We will turn to this point before we begin our analysis of the impact of the 
candidate-selection variables. 
 
3. Data and model description 
In order to analyze the representation of voters by parties, we need measures of each group’s 
policy stances. We have decided to measure both on a left-right dimension which we interpret 
as a ‘super-issue’ absorbing all the different meanings of other issues (Flanagan and Lee 
2003; Inglehart 1984; Knutsen 1989).  
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There are several methods for determining parties’ left-right positions, the most 
common being mass survey, expert survey and manifesto data.
5
 While each data source 
reveals its own advantages and disadvantages, expert data is seldom available for longer time 
periods. Therefore, we decided to use data offered by the Comparative Manifesto Project 
(Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, et al. 2001; Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge, et al. 
2006) to identify parties’ policy positions. CMP provides a transcription of manifestos due to 
salience theory. Hence, there is a debate how to generate positional data using the manifesto 
raw scores (Kim and Fording 1998; Gabel and Huber 2000; Pappi and Shikano 2004; 
Franzmann and Kaiser 2006). For our empirical analysis, we make use of the approach 
developed by Franzmann and Kaiser (2006). The most important advantage of this approach 
is that it allows us to account for time- and country-specific meanings of the terms ‘left’ and 
‘right’ by identifying positional (either left or right) and non-confrontational issues of party 
competition.
6
 The resulting 0 (most left) to 10 (most right) left-right scale of party positions 
consists of all possible CMP categories.  
The left-right positions of voters are mainly drawn from data offered by the 
Eurobarometer Trend File (Schmitt et al. 2005). While the Eurobarometer covers only 
member states and candidate countries of the European Union, we have supplemented this 
                                                          
5
 Recently, Powell (2009) compared the three measurement approaches in order to analyse if they lead to 
different results regarding median voter representation by governing parties. He concludes that differences in 
results are not related to the use of different data sources, and reports a high correlation of party positions 
derived from mass surveys, expert surveys and CMP data.  
6
 The idea of this approach is to take all out of the CMP raw data that is not positional. Using this approach, first 
confrontational and non-confrontational issues are identified. In a second step it is determined, whether a 
confrontational issue is left or right. Then the raw CMP scores themselves are transformed. A minimal value is 
subtracted for each election and party system in order not to overestimate issue stances that each party in a 
particular country and in a particular election takes. The scores of these differences are summed up and 
transformed to a 0-10 scale, leading us to determine party positions between 0 (leftmost) and 10 (rightmost). 
Using moving averages as smoothing procedure, the raw value of a manifesto before and after the particular 
election is used for error correction. Data on party positions is available online: http://www.vergl-polwiss.uni-
koeln.de/10603.html. For an extensive description of the approach see Franzmann and Kaiser (2006). 
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data by several other surveys.
7
 For each party, we have first recoded the left-right self-
placement of its voters (that is, respondents reporting a vote intention for this party) to a scale 
from 0 (most left) to 10 (most right) and then calculated the mean left-right score of all party 
supporters. In order not to let our estimates being influenced by outliers, we have only 
included the mean left-right score of party supporters if at least 10 respondents reported a vote 
intention for the party. As also the CMP usually offers data only for those parties that were 
able to gain seats in their national parliament this results in the exclusion of most minor 
parties from the analysis. Altogether, we have been able to obtain the mean left-right positions 
of 98 parties and their respective voters in 18 countries for the period from the mid-1970s to 
2002 (see Table 1, appendix). Our analysis on the relationship between different concepts and 
operationalizations of representation will rely on this data. 
We have collected data on the intra-party procedures of candidate selection for 53 
parties in nine countries.
8
 Inclusion reports whether members, delegates or committees decide 
about the nomination of candidates; centralization reports the territorial unit on which this 
decision is made (local, regional or national). In the infrequent cases in which two or more 
groups or territorial units are equally involved in a decision about the nomination of 
candidates, we have decided to code the most centralized unit and/or exclusive selectorate. 
However, as this rarely occurs,
9
 this coding decision does not affect our findings. 
Values for both variables have been assigned independently by three coders. Because 
nomination procedures in parties are often very detailed, we have only included values for 
                                                          
7
 In addition to the Eurobarometer data, we have used data offered by the European Voter Project (Thomassen 
2005), the World Value Survey (ASEP/JDS 2009), The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), and the 
Swiss National Election Studies (FORS 2010).  
8
 Data on intra-party candidate selection procedures and replication data for this paper is available online: 
http://www.vergl-polwiss.uni-koeln.de/10586.html.  
9
 This decision is most relevant for our coding of German parties. In Germany, candidates can win a seat either 
by being elected directly by the voters of their district (through the so-called Erststimme) or by being elected 
through sub-national party lists (through the so-called Zweitstimme). While the candidates for both forms are 
nominated by party delegates, the territorial unit is local for the district- and regional for the list-candidates. We 
have decided to code the candidate selection procedure for the list-candidates, as candidates of German minor 
parties rarely win district-seats.    
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those parties with a unanimous coding. Katz and Mair’s Data Handbook on Party 
Organizations in Western Democracies (1992) and Janda’s International Comparative 
Political Parties Project (1980) are the relevant data sources to which we refer. For a few 
cases, party authorities have been consulted to validate the findings. As these data collections 
mainly deal with party organizations in the period from 1970 to 1990 and as coding intra-
party nomination procedures beyond that period is highly time-consuming we restrict 
ourselves to this period. Therefore, and in contrast to our analysis on the relationship between 
different representation concepts, our analysis of the impact of candidate selection procedures 
on the representativeness of parties will rely on only 53 parties. See Table 1 (appendix) for 
parties included and modes for centralization and inclusion for the period from 1970 to 1990.       
While we acknowledge the debate on the impact of the electoral system on the 
representativeness of parties (Blais and Bodet 2006; Golder and Stramski 2010; Huber and 
Powell 1994; Lijphart 1999; McDonald and Budge 2005; McDonald et al. 2004; Powell 
2000), we have decided not to include the design of the electoral system as a control variable. 
For this, we have theoretical and methodological reasons. First, the theoretical arguments with 
regard to the impact of the electoral systems on party representativeness focus on the 
congruence between the median voter and the governing parties, while we are interested in the 
representation of party supporters by their respective parties. Second, our – due to data 
limitations on the modes of candidate selection – limited  period of analysis and case 
selection, offers only small variation with regard to the electoral system, the UK being the 
only country included with a single member plurality system. Third, the common 
operationalization of dynamic representation makes it necessary that every additional 
explanatory variable is modeled as an interaction effect, moderating the effect of the position 
of the mean voter on the respective party position (see data section). In our case, we would 
therefore have to test for a combined effect of (1) the mean position of party supporters, (2) 
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the modes of intra-party candidate selection and (3) the electoral system on the dependent 
variable, which would be very hard to interpret. As we see also no theoretical expectations, 
why the mode of intra-party candidate selection should have a different impact on party 
representativeness in different electoral systems, we will not include the latter as a control 
variable. 
 
4. Cross-sectional and dynamic representation: choosing the dependent variable 
As indicated in the first section, existing representation studies mainly refer to one of two 
definitions of representation. On the one hand, several studies have dealt with the 
convergence of voters’ and parties’ policy positions at one point in time, a concept we have 
referred to as cross-sectional representation. On the other hand, a set of recent studies 
explicitly refer to the concept of dynamic representation, introducing a time perspective on 
the voter-party linkage. While both concepts have been used to analyze the representation of 
voters by political parties on a left-right dimension of political competition, their empirical 
relationship has not been analyzed yet. In addition, studies referring to the same concept differ 
with regard to their operationalization of the dependent variable, i.e. the congruence between 
voter and party position.  
A review of previous studies shows four different operationalizations of the 
representation of voters by political parties, one referring to the concept of dynamic, three to 
the concept of cross-sectional representation. We introduce each of them and show how they 
operationalize  the relationship between a party’s policy position (LRparty) and the mean 
position of its voters (LRvoter). Both variables are measured on a left right scale ranging from 
0 (most left) to 10 (most right). 
With regard to cross-sectional representation, we identify three concept 
operationalizations in usage (see also: Golder and Stramski 2010; Powell 2009). While each 
 
 
 
161 
 
of these is predominantly employed to measure the ideological distance between the median 
voter and the respective government coalition, they can be easily transformed to account for 
the ideological congruence between party supporters and their respective parties. The 
operationalization most frequently employed in representation studies takes the mean voter 
position (LRvoter) to calculate the distance between voters and their respective party (Powell 
2009). According to this concept, representation is high when the absolute distance between 
mean voter and party is low.  
 
Cross-sectional_1 = |LRvoter − LRparty|     
 
As several scholars have noted (Achen 1978; Blais and Bodet 2006; Dalton 1985; Golder and 
Stramski 2010), cross-sectional_1 does not take into account the distribution of voter 
positions. This might be problematic, because parties with the same position of their mean 
voter might well differ with regard to the distribution of their supporters’ preferences. Given 
the same distance between the position of a party and its mean voter, a party with 
ideologically more homogenous supporters will be more representative than a party with more 
widely spread preferences of its voters. Therefore, cross-sectional_2 takes into account the 
distribution of voter preferences by calculating the distance between each single voter and its 
respective party. 
 
Cross-sectional_2 = 
N
i
i 1
1
| LRvoter LRparty |
N 

   
 
 
 
LRvoteri is the left-right position of the i
th
 voter of a party, LRparty is the position of the party 
and N is the number of voters intending to vote for this party. According to this formula, 
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representation is high when the average absolute difference between party supporters and 
party is small.  
Finally, Golder and Stramski recently proposed an operationalization which they call 
‘relative citizen congruence’ (2010: 96). While they acknowledge the advantage of taking the 
distributions of voter preferences into account, they argue that this might lead to potential 
problems when analyzing the ability of parties to reach congruence between their position and 
the one of their voters across different units of analysis. This is because while parties might be 
willing to adjust their own position accounting for the position of their mean supporter, they 
cannot influence the distribution of their voters` preferences. In terms of voter representation, 
ceteris paribus a party X with more homogenous voter preferences will therefore always be 
superior to a party Y with less homogenous voter preferences. To account for this, Golder and 
Stramski (2010: 96) propose to conceptualize congruence between voters and parties in terms 
of their distance relative to the dispersion of voter preferences (see for a similar approach: 
Achen 1978). Cross-sectional_3 ranges from 0 (most representative) to 1 (least 
representative). 
 
Cross-sectional_3 = 
N
i
i 1
1
1 Var(LRvoter) / | LRvoter LRparty |
N 
   
 
In contrast to the concept of cross-sectional representation, dynamic representation focuses on 
the responsiveness of parties to changing preferences of their voters over time. Studies 
applying the concept of dynamic representation usually model representation as a regression 
function (Ezrow 2007; Ezrow and Adams 2009; Ezrow et al. 2010). 
  
Dynamic =  t 1 tLRparty c ß LRvoter e    
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Here LRpartyt captures the shift in a party`s position from the previous to the current election 
and LRvotert accounts for the shift in the position of this party’s mean voter in the same 
period. In contrast to the distance between voter’s and party`s position used for the three 
operationalizations of cross-sectional representation, the coefficient ß1 captures the degree of 
dynamic representation. A value of 1 would indicate that a party and its voters have shifted 
into the same direction with exactly the same magnitude. A negative value of ß1 would 
indicate a position-change in contrasting directions, which is normatively not desirable.    
How do the different operationalizations of the concepts of cross-sectional and 
dynamic representation relate to each other empirically? To test this, we have calculated for 
each of the four operationalizations one value for each party in our data set. Table 1 reports 
the correlations between these for 98 parties in the time period from the mid-1970s to 2002 
(see Table 1, appendix).  
 
Table 1: Bivariate correlations of different operationalizations of representation 
 
Cross-
sectional_1 
Cross-
sectional_2 
Cross-
sectional_3 
Dynamic 
Cross-
sectional_1 
1.0000    
Cross-
sectional_2 
0.7658 1.0000   
Cross-
sectional_3 
0.8386 0.7936 1.0000  
Dynamic 
 
0.2329 0.3337 0.2382 1.0000 
 
Notes: For the operationalization of dynamic we calculated the correlation coefficient ß1. For the 
operationalizations of cross-sectional representation we calculated mean values for each party. Only parties that 
have contested in at least three successive elections have been included (n=98).   
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As the table shows, the three operationalizations of cross-sectional representation are highly 
correlated with each other. While we agree with Golder and Stramski (2010) who argue that 
the appropriate conceptualization should be guided by the author´s research question, the very 
high correlations confirm the findings recently made by Powell (2009): The use of different 
operationalizations of cross-sectional representation might lead to different results, but these 
differences can be expected to be rather limited.  
As Table 1 shows, the same cannot be said for the choice between the concept of 
cross-sectional representation and the concept of dynamic representation. Here, the bivariate 
correlations are rather low and positive which is theoretically surprising. Recall that the three 
measures of cross-sectional representation are based on distances between parties and their 
mean voters. Therefore, higher values indicate less representative parties. In contrast, the 
concept of dynamic representation is based on a regression coefficient which captures the 
impact of a shift in the position of the mean voter on the shift of the position of its party. As 
higher shifts in mean voter positions should be accompanied by higher shifts in party 
positions, here, higher values indicate more representative parties. The positive correlations in 
Table 1 between the concept of dynamic representation and the different operationalizations 
of cross-sectional representation indicate that parties which are responsive to changing voter 
preferences over time (i.e. since the last election) are less representative to their voters on 
election-day (and vice versa). While this might be regarded as somehow counterintuitive, 
Figure 1 helps explain this pattern.  
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Figure 1: Cross-sectional and dynamic representation 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Let the parties X and Y have the same mean voter who has changed position from 7 to 9 from 
the foregoing (t-1) to the current election (t0). With regard to cross-sectional representation, 
party Y is clearly outperforming party X as it perfectly matches the mean voter`s position at 9. 
However, and with regard to the concept of dynamic representation, party Y is completely 
unresponsive, at it has moved in a different direction than its voters since the last election. In 
contrast, party X has not only moved in the same direction as the mean voter but has done so 
also to the very same extent. According to the concept and operationalization of dynamic 
representation, it would therefore be regarded as perfectly responsive, irrespective of the high 
distance between the party and its mean voter position.  
Of course, the example presented in Figure 1 – while supported by our data – is a 
‘worst-case scenario’. In the long run, parties that are not responsive to changing preferences 
of their voters cannot match these voters’ preferences on election-day. Therefore, our 
intention is not to criticize the theoretical relevance of the concept of dynamic representation 
per se but to raise attention to the incomparability of the empirical findings of studies 
referring to different concepts of representation.  
1 3 
Party´s 
position  
Voters‘ 
position 
 
9 10 
Party X 
t = - 1 t = 0 
Party Y 
t = 0 t = - 1 
7 9 
t = - 1 t = 0 
 
 
 
166 
 
Aware of this, we will conduct our analysis for both concepts separately. For dynamic 
representation we will follow the commonly used operationalization and model representation 
as presented above (dynamic). For cross-sectional representation, we will follow the advice of 
Golder and Stramski (2010) and apply a relative measure of party and voter distance (cross-
sectional_3).  As we are interested in the ability of parties to produce congruence between 
them and their voters, we think that this is the most appropriate operationalization of cross-
sectional representation.    
 
5. Results 
We start our analysis of the impact of candidate selection procedures on the 
representativeness of parties by applying the concept of cross-sectional representation. For 
this we have run three models (Table 2). Model 1 includes only variables related to the 
dimension of centralization. In line with the theoretical arguments and empirical findings of 
Dalton (1985), we have decided to use locally nominated candidates as the reference category 
and expect these as being the least representative group. In contrast to our theoretical 
expectations stated in hypotheses 1 and 2, we find no evidence for an impact of the 
centralization dimension of candidate selection. In terms of ideological congruence at one 
point in time, parties with candidates nominated on the regional or national level are neither 
more nor less representative than parties with locally nominated candidates. Our findings do 
therefore not support Dalton, who finds that parties with nationally centralized candidate 
selection are more representative than less centralized parties. 
Model 2 tests for the impact of the inclusion dimension. Following the theoretical 
arguments based on ‘May´s Law’, we have used candidates nominated by delegates as the 
reference category and expect these as being the least representative group. Furthermore, we 
expect candidates nominated by members as being the most representative group, while 
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parties with candidates nominated by committees should lie somewhere between delegates 
and members. The results do only partially support our hypotheses. The most inclusive parties 
with regard to candidate selection do not show higher levels of party-voter congruence than 
those in which delegates decide over the nomination. However, committees – or in May´s 
words ‘party leaders’ – are slightly closer located to their mean voters and do therefore show 
a higher degree of cross-sectional representation. The assumed office-motivation of party 
leaders might therefore lead to better voter representation, which is again in line with the 
arguments developed by Dalton. However, it is not the territorial unit of candidate selection 
that matters but the inclusiveness – or in this case exclusiveness – of the selectorate.  
Finally, model 3 accounts for the combined effect of the centralization and inclusion 
of candidates. In line with our theoretical expectations, we have used the combination of local 
delegates as the references category. Three findings stand out. First and regardless of the 
territorial unit of candidate selection, parties in which candidates are nominated by 
committees are always more representative than the reference category. Second and also 
independent of the centralization dimension, parties with candidates nominated by members 
never show higher levels of representation than the combination local and delegates. Third, 
with regard to the group of party delegates these turn out to be more representative the more 
centralized the level of candidate selection. This result confirms our approach to measure 
candidate selection on two independent dimensions and lets us to conclude that the interplay 
between the centralization and inclusion of candidate selection does influence the degree of 
cross-sectional representation.  
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Table 2: Results for cross-sectional representation 
 
Model 1 
(cross-
sectional3) 
Model 2 
(cross-
sectional3) 
Model 3 
(cross-
sectional3) 
 Coefficient (rob. std. err.) 
Centralization    
Reference: Local    
Regional 
-.027   
(.027) 
  
National 
-.017   
(.028) 
  
Inclusion  
Reference: Delegates  
Members  
.034 
(.027) 
 
Committees  
-.058*  
(.024) 
 
Centralization & 
Inclusion 
 
Reference: Local & 
Delegates 
   
Local & 
Members 
  
-.016 
(.033) 
Local & Committees   
-.134** 
(.030) 
Regional & Members   
.052 
(.066) 
Regional & Delegates   
-.093* 
(.031) 
Regional & Committees   
-.116*  
(.045) 
National & Members   
-.119 
(.057) 
National & Delegates   
-.181** 
(.029) 
National & Committees   
-.061* 
(.028) 
Constant 
.574** 
(.021) 
.579** 
(.019) 
.631** 
(.029) 
R² 0.004 0.041 0.085 
F-Value 0.50 4.61* 2.92** 
N 260 260 260 
 
Notes: *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, two-tailed tests. Clustered standard errors (year) are in parentheses. The 
dependent variable is the distance between a party and its voters relative to the dispersion of these voters’ 
preferences. 
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Our results with regard to dynamic representation are reported in Table 3. Note that the 
reduced number of observations compared to cross-sectional representation is caused by the 
need to measure positional shifts of parties rather than parties’ positions.    
As mentioned in the foregoing section, the common operationalization of dynamic 
representation models representation as the regression coefficient between the mean-centered 
position of a party’s mean-voter position (LRvoter) and the dependent variable (party`s 
position). This operationalization makes it necessary to include every additional independent 
variable as an interaction effect between itself and LRvoter. Therefore, the main effects of the 
variables related to centralization, inclusion or a combination of both are theoretically 
meaningless. For example, the significant and positive effect of candidates nominated on the 
national level (model 1) indicates that these parties show higher values of the dependent 
variable than parties with locally nominated candidates if all other independent variables take 
the value of 0. As the dependent variable is the party’s left-right position, this means that 
parties with nationally nominated candidates are located 0.3 points more to the right of the 0-
10 left-right scale (if LRvoter is at its mean). While this is an interesting finding in itself, it 
does not tell us anything about the degree of dynamic representation achieved by these 
parties. Applying the concept of dynamic representation, only the interaction effects in Table 
3 are meaningfully interpretable.    
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Table 3: Results for dynamic representation 
 
Model 1 
(dynamic) 
Model 2 
(dynamic) 
Model 3 
(dynamic) 
Model 4 
(dynamic) 
 Coefficient (rob. std. err.) 
LRvoter 
-.050 
(.082) 
.109 
(.179) 
.008 
(.177) 
-.013 
(.048) 
Centralization     
Reference: Local     
Regional 
.140 
(.069) 
   
National 
.300* 
(.130) 
   
Inclusion     
Reference: Delegates     
Members  
-.119 
(.078) 
  
Committees  
-.029 
(.094) 
  
Centralization & 
Inclusion 
    
Reference: Local & 
Delegates 
    
Local & 
Members 
  
-.089 
(.086) 
 
Local & Committees   
-.026 
(.099) 
 
Regional & Members   
-.118 
(.361) 
 
Regional & Delegates   
.135 
(.128) 
 
Regional & Committees   
.105 
(.192) 
 
National & Members   
.398 
(.189) 
 
National & Delegates   
.469** 
(.078) 
 
National & Committees   
.206 
(.205) 
 
     
Interaction Effects     
Regional*LRvoter 
.071 
(.122) 
   
National*LRvoter 
-.103 
(.329) 
   
Members*LRvoter  
-.210 
(.174) 
  
Committees*LRvoter  
-.109 
(.224) 
  
Local & 
Members*LRvoter 
  
-.127 
(.175) 
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Local & 
Delegates*LRvoter 
  -  
Local & 
Committees*LRvoter 
  
-.028 
(.239) 
 
Regional & 
Members*LRvoter 
  
-.269 
(.525) 
 
Regional & 
Delegates*LRvoter 
  
.253 
(.158) 
 
Regional & 
Committees*LRvoter 
  
-.139 
(.247) 
 
National & 
Members*LRvoter 
  
.039 
(.408) 
 
National & 
Delegates*LRvoter 
  (dropped)  
National & 
Committees*LRvoter 
  
-.133 
(.585) 
 
Constant 
-.049 
(.032) 
.073 
(.047) 
-.008 
(.076) 
.037 
(.021) 
     
R² 0.050 0.015 0.077 0.000 
F-Value 1.21 0.99 1.14 0.09 
N 208 208 208 527 
 
Notes: *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, two-tailed tests. Clustered standard errors (year) are in parentheses. The 
dependent variable is the change in a party’s left-right policy position. 
 
These interaction effects are throughout insignificant and do therefore not support our 
hypotheses. Having in mind the low (and positive) correlations between the operationalization 
of dynamic representation and the different operationalizations of cross-sectional 
representation, this comes at little surprise.  
In order to explain the wholly insignificant results for dynamic representation we have 
also regressed the change in a party’s mean voter position (LRvoter) on the change in the 
position of the respective party (LRparty) without any additional independent variables and 
for the complete sample of 98 parties in the period from 1970 to 2002 (see Table 1, appendix).  
The results are presented in Model 4. Not only is the coefficient insignificant, it is also 
negative. Thus, shifts in the positions of parties’ mean voters are completely unrelated to 
shifts in party positions, a finding that contradicts recent studies applying the concept of 
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dynamic representation (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; Adams et al. 2004; Ezrow 2007; 
Ezrow and Adams 2009; Ezrow et al. 2010). 
 
Conclusion 
In this article we have analysed the impact of intra-party procedures of candidate selection on 
the representativeness of parties towards their voters. With regard to candidate selection we 
have distinguished between two dimensions: inclusion (members, delegates or committees) 
and centralization (local, regional or national). We have discussed and applied our analysis for 
two frequently used concepts of representation: cross-sectional (measured as the ideological 
congruence between voters and parties at one point in time) and dynamic representation 
(measured as the relationship in shifts of voters’ and parties’ positions over time).  
Our empirical analysis for 53 parties in the period of 1970 to 1990 reveals that it is the 
inclusion dimension which is relevant for the degree of representativeness of parties.  The less 
inclusive the selectorate of candidates, the better a party represents its mean voter with regard 
to cross-sectional representation. While this effect is rather limited, we theorize that an 
increased office-motivation of party elites compared to lower party strata in the end leads to 
better representation. Since the 1960s, many Western European parties have reformed their 
procedures of candidate selection (Bille 2001; LeDuc 2001; Rahat and Hazan 2001; Tan 
1997). In many cases, these reforms resulted in moderate efforts to more inclusive nomination 
procedures (Pennings and Hazan 2001). It is not without a certain irony that these reforms 
aiming at more democratization of intra-party politics might in the end have made parties less 
responsive to the political demands of their voters.  
In contrast to cross-sectional representation, we find no influence of candidate 
selection procedures on the degree of dynamic representation. However, our analysis of the 
relationship between the two concepts shows that both concepts are not only very weakly 
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correlated but are also contradictory. Parties that are responsive to changing preferences of 
their voters over time do represent their voters less well on election-day. While this finding is 
logically puzzling, we think it is due to the way dynamic representation is operationalized, 
measuring the change in parties’ and voters’ positions between two consecutive elections. 
Parties might adjust their positions over a shorter or longer period of time, depending e.g. on 
their government participation or external pressures. Therefore, and while we acknowledge 
and support recent efforts to complement existing representation concepts by a time 
perspective, we question the dominant operationalization of dynamic representation. We 
conclude that the results of studies referring to either cross-sectional or dynamic 
representation are not comparable and suggest that scholars pay more attention to this.  
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Appendix 
Table 1, appendix: List of parties and modes for inclusion and centralization 
Country Year and  
interelection periods 
Party name (Abbr.) Inclusion 
(Mode,  
1970-1990)  
Centralization 
(Mode,  
1970-1990) 
Austria 1995-1999; 1999-2002 Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) - - 
Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) - - 
Green Party (former Green Alternative) 
(GRÜNE) 
- - 
Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) - - 
Belgium 1977-1978; 1978-1981; 
1981-1985; 1985-1987;  
1987-1991; 1991-1995; 
1995-1999 
 
Christian People’s Party (CVP) 1 1 
Christian Social Party (PSC) 1 1 
Flemish Bloc (VB) - - 
Flemish Socialist Party (SP) - - 
Flemish Liberals and Democrats (former 
Party of Liberty and Progress) (VLD) 
3 3 
Francophone Liberals (PRL) - - 
Francophone Socialist Party (PS) - - 
Live Differently -Flemish-speaking 
Ecologists  (AGALEV) 
- - 
Peoples’ Union (former Flemish 
Christian Peoples’ Union) (VU) 
3 1 
Denmark 1973-1975; 1975-1977; 
1977-1979; 1979-1981; 
1981-1984; 1984-1987; 
1987-1988; 1988-1990; 
1990-1994; 1994-1996; 
1996-2001 
Centre Democrats (CD) 1 2 
Christian People’s Party (KrF) 1 1 
Conservative People’s Party (KF) 1 1 
Danish Communist Party (DKP) - - 
Justice Party (RF) - - 
Left Socialist Party  (VS) - - 
Liberals (V) 3 2 
Progress Party (FP) - - 
Radical Party (RV) 1 1 
Socialist People’s Party (SF) 1 1 
Social Democratic Party (SD) 2 1 
France 1973-1978; 1978-1981; 
1981-1986; 1986-1988;  
Gaullists (includes: UNR, UDT, RPR) - - 
French Communist Party  (PCF) - - 
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1988-1993; 1993-1997;  
1997-2002 
Parti Socialiste, Socialist Part  (PS) - - 
National Front  (FN) - - 
Germany 1976-1980; 1980-1983; 
1983-1987; 1987-1990;  
1990-1994; 1994-1998;  
1998-2002 
Alliance’90/The Greens (GRÜNE) 2 2 
Christian Democratic Union/ 
Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) 
2 2 
Free Democratic Party (FDP) 2 2 
Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) 2 2 
Social Democratic Party (SPD) 2 2 
Greece 1981-1985; 1985-1989;  
1990-1993; 1993-1996;  
1996-2000 
Communist Party of Greece (KKE) - - 
New Democracy (ND) - - 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement 
(PASOK) 
- - 
Ireland 1973-1977; 1977-1981;  
1981-1982; 1987-1989; 
1989-1992; 1992-1997; 
1997-2002 
Fianna Fáil (FF) 2 1 
Fine Gael (FG) 2 1 
Green Party (GP) 1 1 
Labour Party (LAB) 2 1 
Progressive Democrats (PD) 2 1 
Italy 1976-1979; 1979-1983; 
1983-1987; 1987-1992; 
1992-1994; 1994-1996; 
1996-2001 
Communist Party (PCI) 3 3 
Go Italy (FI) - - 
Italian Democratic Socialist Party 
(PSDI) 
3 3 
Italian Popular Party (PPI) 3 1 
Italian Social Movement (MSI) - - 
Liberal Party (PLI) 3 2 
Radical Party (R) 3 2 
Republican Party (PRI) 3 2 
Socialist Party (PSI) 3 3 
Luxembourg 1979-1984; 1984-1989;  
1989-1994; 1994-1999 
Christian Social People’s Party (CSV) - - 
Communist Party (KPL) - - 
Democratic Party(former Democratic 
Group) (DP) 
- - 
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Socialist Workers’ Party (LSAP) - - 
Netherlands 1971-1972; 1972-1977; 
1977-1981; 1981-1982;  
1982-1986; 1986-1989;  
1989-1994; 1994-1998 
Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP) 3 3 
Catholic People’s Party (KVP) 3 3 
Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) 3 1 
Christian Historical Union (CHU) 3 2 
Democrats’66 (D66) 1 3 
Green Left (GL) 1 1 
Labour Party (PvdA) 2 2 
People’s Party for Freedom and 
Democracy (VVD) 
3 3 
Radical Political Party (PPR) 2 3 
Socialist Party  (SP) - - 
Norway 1973-1977; 1977-1981;  
1985-1989; 1989-1993; 
1993-1997 
Centre Party (former Farmers’ Party) 
(SP) 
3 1 
Christian People’s Party (KRF) 3 1 
Conservative Party (H) 3 1 
Liberal Party (V) 3 1 
Norwegian Labour Party (DNA) 3 1 
Progress Party (former Anders Lange’s 
Party) (FRP) 
3 1 
Socialist Left Party (former Socialist 
People´s Party)  (SV) 
3 1 
Portugal 1985-1987; 1987-1991; 
1995-1999 
Centre Social Democrats (CDS-PP) - - 
Popular Democratic Party (PSD) - - 
Portuguese Socialist Party (PS) - - 
 
Spain  
 
1986-1989; 1989-1993;  
1993-1996; 1996-2000 
 
Basque Nationalist Party (EAJ-PNV) 
- - 
Centre Democrats (CDS) - - 
Convergence and Union (CiU) - - 
Popular Party (former Popular Alliance 
(PP) 
- - 
Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party 
(PSOE) 
- - 
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United Left (former Communist Party) 
(IU) 
- - 
Sweden 1973-1976;  1976-1979;  
1979-1982; 1982-1985; 1985-
1988; 1988-1991; 1991-1994; 
1994-1998 
 
Centre Party (former Agrarian Party) 
(CP) 
2 2 
Christian Democratic Community Party 
(KdS) 
- - 
Left Party (former Left Communist 
Party) (Vp) 
2 1 
Green Ecology Party (MP) 3 2 
Moderate Coalition Party (former Right 
Party)  (M) 
3 3 
Liberal People’s Party (former People’s 
Party) (FP) 
2 2 
Social Democratic Labour Party (SdaP) 2 2 
Switzerland 1971-1975; 1975-1979; 1987-
1991; 1991-1995; 1995-1999; 
1999-2003 
Christian Democratic People’s Party 
(former Conservative Peoples´s Party) 
(CVP) 
- - 
Farmers’, Traders’ and Citizens’ Party 
(BGB) 
- - 
Independents’ Alliance (LdU) - - 
Liberal Party of Switzerland (LPS) - - 
Protestant People’s Party (EVP) - - 
Radical Democratic Party (FDP) - - 
Social Democratic Party (SP) - - 
 
United 
Kingdom 
 
1979-1983; 1983-1987; 1987-
1992; 1992-1997; 1997-2001; 
2001-2005 
 
Labour Party (LAB) 
 
3 
 
1 
Liberal Party (LDP) 1 1 
Conservative Party (CON) 3 1 
Scottish National Party (SNP) - - 
 
 
 
 
 
